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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
WASHINGTON'S INDEPENDENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED REMEDY
For the past sixty-four years, Washington courts have excluded evidence
obtained in violation of a defendant's right to privacy guaranteed in article
1, section 7 of the Washington Declaration of Rights.1 In 1982, the
Washington Supreme Court distinguished the state exclusionary rule2 from
its federal counterpart, holding that the Declaration's broader privacy
protection and the years of independent state jurisprudence required the
state exclusionary rule to apply whenever the defendant's right to privacy
was violated. 3 However, due to major changes in the court's membership, a
new majority seems to be forming behind a privacy protection that more
closely reflects federal search and seizure jurisprudence with the inevitable
result: the court has been asked to conform the state exclusionary rule to its
federal counterpart. 4
Underlying any court's analysis of the exclusionary rule are certain basic
theoretical elements that determine whether a court takes a unitary or a
bifurcated approach to exclusion. 5 To determine what theoretical elements
1. The Washington State Constitution is divided into 27 articles, the first of which contains the
Declaration of Rights. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-34. Based on article 1, §§ 7 and 9 of the Declaration
of Rights, the Washington Supreme Court, in 1922, first recognized the exclusion doctrine in State v.
Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922). See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
2. The term "exclusionary rule" is employed in a variety of evidentiary contexts where a court
suppresses evidence acquired in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. However, for the
purposes of this Comment, the term exclusionary rule refers exclusively to exclusion of evidence
obtained in a search and seizure violative of either the federal or the state constitution. In the federal
context, the term refers to the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment, first
required in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and applied against the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). In the context of the Washington Declaration of Rights, the term refers exclusively
to evidence seized in violation of article 1, § 7, first required in State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171,203 P.
390 (1922), and most recently discussed in State v. Bonds, 97 Wn. 2d 1,683 P.2d 1024 (1982). The term
also has been applied to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); State v. Lavaris,
99 Wn. 2d 851,856, 664 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1983). But see New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633
(1984) (adopting a public safety exception to Miranda warnings requirement). The term also applies to
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,394-95,406 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964);
State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wn. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, vacated, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd on remand, 94 Wn.
2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). But see Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2510 (1984) (adopting the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule).
3. State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 108-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-72 (1982). See infra notes 178-84
and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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underlie the Washington rule, the court must familiarize itself with the state
rule's long history of independent application, which has never been fully
explored. The court must also recognize the historical relationship between
the state exclusionary rule and certain provisions of the Declaration of
Rights. 6 Analysis of the Washington exclusionary rule's development re-
veals that, at minimum, exclusion is constitutionally compelled as the most
effective remedy available to vindicate the defendant's right to privacy. 7
Moreover, failing to exclude violates the framers' intention to incorporate
the exclusionary rule in the state privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination contained in article 1, section 9.8 Finally, a failure to exclude
eviscerates the defendant's article 1, section 7 rights in violation of the state
due process guarantee contained in article 1, section 3.9
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTROVERSY: DETERMINING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION
Traditionally, courts conceive of the exclusionary rule as either a consti-
tutional right or one of several possible judicially created remedies. 10 A
third view perceives exclusion as the remedy best able to make the applica-
ble state or federal constitutional protection against unlawful search and
seizure effective and, therefore, constitutionally compelled. I" Exclusion's
connection to the constitutional guarantee might have been unambiguously
set out within the constitutional text. Unfortunately, neither the federal
Constitution nor the Washington state constitution contains such unam-
biguous wording.
The textual differences between the federal and state constitutional
guarantees against unlawful search and seizure are readily apparent. Arti-
cle 1, section 7 provides:
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.12
6. See infra notes 211-374 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 124-46, 281-97 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 298-339 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 340-74 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); Stewart, The
Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
11. See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 640-49; Stewart, supra note 10, at 1383-89.
12. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 7. At the state constitutional convention of 1889, the framers of the
Washington Declaration of Rights expressly rejected a proposed state provision identical to the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Instead, the framers adopted the present wording of
article 1, § 7. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 51, 497
(B. Rosenow ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as 1889 JOURNAL]; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686,
460
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The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 13
Regardless of the significance one attaches to the textual differences, the
two provisions do have one element in common-neither text specifies
what consequences should attach when their substantive requirements are
violated. Furthermore, no contemporaneous record indicates whether the
framers of either provision considered the need for an express enforcement
mechanism. 14 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of both guarantees depends
upon a remedy attaching when a violation occurs. 15
Since neither constitutional provision specifies an enforcement mecha-
nism, a court must, at some point, determine how the constitutional
guarantee will be made effective. 16 Two theoretical elements underlie this
690-91,674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983). From 1978 through 1985, the Washington Supreme Courtrelied on
this intentional difference in language to hold, in a variety of contexts, that article 1, § 7 embodied a
broader protection than the fourth amendment. See infra note 160. However, critics of this broader
protection approach argue that, by rejecting the fourth amendment text, the framers may have intended
to provide less, rather than more, protection. Ringer Committee, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT at
Appendix Al (1984) [hereinafter cited as RINGER REPORT] (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review). See infra note 160. This argument is based on the fact that neither records of the Constitutional
Convention nor contemporaneous newspaper accounts explain the framers' decision to reject the fourth
amendment text. See generally 1889 JOURNAL, supra, at vi-vii (although a daily journal was kept,
arguments presented in debate went unrecorded). See also State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 690, 674
P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983). The Ringer Committee argued that since the federal Constitution did not
restrict state and local officials at the time of the drafting of article 1, § 7, the state was free to choose
lesser protection than that provided by the fourth amendment. United States Supreme Court jurispru-
dence at the time, however, indicates that the framers intended to provide broader protection. Note that
this Comment addresses whether the framers intended to adopt wording that reflected the scope of
fourth amendment guarantees as of 1889, not as of late twentieth century Burger Court interpretations.
See infra notes 308-12, 316-18 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. For the history surrounding the framing of article 1, § 7, see generally 1889 JOURNAL, supra
note 12. For a brief discussion of the origins of the fourth amendment, see Stewart, supra note 10, at
1371. For a detailed account of the origins of the fourth amendment, see J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT ch. 1 (1966); N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
15. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
25 CoLUm. L. REv. 11, 24 (1925); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 373-75 (1981).
16. Atkinson, supra note 15, at 24; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 373-75. The most
frequently raised criticism of the exclusionary rule as a mandate of the search and seizure guarantee is
that neither constitutional provision explicitly requires suppression. Therefore, a court could decline to
nullify or invalidate the unconstitutional conduct and refuse to invoke the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); Finley, Who Is on Trial-The Police? The Courts? Or the
CriminallyAccused?, 57 J. CRPm. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 379,384 (1966); Kaplan, The Limits of
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determination: (1) the enforcement mechanism's relationship to the guar-
antee against unlawful search and seizure, as well as its relationship to any
other constitutional provisions that may require a specific mechanism 17 and
(2) the purposes thought served by enforcing the constitutional guaran-
tees. 18 A court's perception of the source and purposes of the mechanism
depends, in turn, upon whether a court allows the tension created by two
competing responsibilities to influence its decision. On the one hand,
courts have an obligation to preserve the defendant's individual rights
guaranteed by the state constitution. 19 On the other hand, courts must be
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1974). However, assuming the validity of this
criticism, it then follows that no need forjudicial review would arise under any constitutional provision,
unless the constitutional text explicitly granted the judiciary the power o invalidate or nullify
government actions which ran counter to the constitutional command. Schrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 351 n.251
(1974). See also Kamisar, supra note 10, at 581-86; infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
Consequently, unless article 1, § 7, unlike any other constitutional provision, does not contemplate
judicial review of governmental conduct, then the "not explicit criticism" is, in reality, an attack on the
institution of judicial review. Schrock & Welsh, supra, at 351 n.251.
17. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to tile
Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 650 (1978). The viability of any exception is
greatly influenced by the remedy's theoretical basis. For example, "[i]f exclusion is considered a
constitutional right, the Court would have a constitutional duty to uphold it and could not dispense with
it simply because of good faith." Id; see also Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1978). Consequently, either a court will find that the
constitutional provision itself mandates, by implication, the choice of a particular mechanism, or a
court will find it is free to choose, using its supervisory power, whatever mechanism it deems most
appropriate. This source determination is, in turn, dependent upon whether a court applies a narrow or
broad interpretation of the constitutional provision. See infra notes 38-42, 166-77 and accompanying
text.
18. A court's perception of the remedy's purposes determines the scope, and ultimately the fate, of
the enforcement mechanism chosen. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1, at 18 (1978). How a court perceives the rule's purposes seems to follow from its
determination of the source. If the court sees the remedy as implied by the constitutional provision
itself, the purpose for invoking the rule is to protect the defendant's rights and to maintain judicial
fidelity to the constitution. If the court sees the choice of remedy as arising under its own power, limited
only by the need to make the constitutional guarantee effective, then the court's perception of the
beneficiary of the constitutional protection determines the purposes served by the enforcement mecha-
nism. Since the Burger Court believes the choice of remedy falls within its supervisory power and
believes that the fourth amendment affords protection only to the innocent victims of illegal searches,
vindicating the defendant's rights need not be considered as an exclusionary rule objective. See Loewy,
The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1268-69
(1983). However, if a court believes that the constitutional protection against unlawful search and
seizure extends to all, regardless of what evidence the illegal search discovers, then vindication of the
defendant's rights becomes the paramount concern. See, e.g., id. at 1268-69.
19. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955) (opinion of Traynor, J.).
Justice Traynor observed that a court must vindicate both the rights of the defendant before it, however
guilty he may appear, and the constitutional rights of all people to be secure in their homes and private
affairs. See also State v. McCollum, 17 Wn. 2d 85, 95-96, 136 P.2d 165, 169-70 (1943) (Millard, J.,
dissenting). See generally Kamisar, supra note 10. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
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careful not to diminish society's ability to provide efficient and effective
law enforcement. 20
The choice of the exclusionary rule highlights this tension; suppression
of highly probative evidence focuses attention on the cost society bears to
vindicate the rights of a defendant who probably committed the crime
charged. 21 Yet, even after a court selects the exclusionary rule as the
enforcement mechanism, whether exclusion automatically applies de-
pends upon the nature of the rule's constitutional connection and upon
whether or not the court allows the tension between its conflicting respon-
sibilities to influence its decision.
Courts generally adopt one of two approaches to the exclusionary rule's
application. Courts adopt a unitary approach if they view exclusion as
20. Former Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert C. Finley has written that the exclusionary
rule embraces "two antitheticals .. On the one side there is the individual and his rights equated
with concepts of liberty and freedom. On the other, there is society, group interests and rights, equated
with the concepts of ordered liberty and freedom through government under law." Finley, supra note
16, at 384. Former Supreme Court Justice Jackson warned that:
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without
either. There is danger that if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical
wisdom, it will convert the Constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.
Terminillo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Those who emphasize society's need for protection have adopted the "Crime Control Model," which
is "based on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function
to be performed by the criminal process." H. PACKER, THE Limrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 158
(1968). For a discussion of the crime control model versus individual rights, see id. at 149-73. See also
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALF. L. REV. 929, 951-53 (1965).
Perhaps the most quoted criticism of the exclusionary rule was authored by Justice Cardozo who stated
that the rule results in the anomalous situation where "the criminal goes free because the constable
blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 637 (1926).
While the Cardozo formulation seems to underlie the Burger Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence,
many commentators argue that it is the fourth amendment, not the exclusionary rule that causes the loss
of the evidence. See Kamisar, The exclusionary rule in historical perspective: the struggle to make the
Fourth Amendment more than just an "empty blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 343-44 (1979) ("exclu-
sionary rule prevents convictions in no greater degree than would effective prior direction to police to
search only by legal means") (quoting Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE
L.J. 161, 162 (1948)); Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender of State and Federal Criminal Laws: A
Reply to Those Who Believe That the Court Is Oblivious to the Needs of Law Enforcement, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1218, 1236 (1969) ("the criminal does not go free because the constable had blundered,
but because he would have gone free if the constable had not blundered"). For a full range of criticisms
of the exclusionary rule, see Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search andSeizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
Rev. 665, 672-736 (1970).
21. The strong resistance to the exclusionary rule arises because, by invoking it, a court seeks to
"unring the bell," to reconstruct the past as though the highly probative evidence never existed.
Kamisar, supra note 10, at 569 (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449,460 (1975)). This unringing
of the bell is seen as "flaunt[ing] before us the costs we must pay for fourth amendment guarantees."
Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1037. See also J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY CASEs AND
MATERIAL 28 (Ist ed. 1973); 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 1.2, at 23 (arguing that the cost objection
was rejected when the fourth amendment was adopted).
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either an inviolate constitutional right of the accused or a constitutionally
compelled remedy aimed at protecting the accused's personal right to
privacy. 22 Under a unitary approach, once a court decides that a substantive
violation has occurred, it automatically excludes the wrongfully obtained
evidence.23 Courts adopting this approach do not attempt to balance the
competing responsibilities, reasoning instead that the framers of the consti-
tutional provision have already balanced the competing interests. 24 Con-
versely, courts adopt a bifurcated approach if they perceive exclusion as a
product of their supervisory power, intended as a check on unlawful police
conduct, and unconnected to the accused's personal constitutional rights. 25
Under a bifurcated approach, a court divides its review of police conduct
into separate questions. First, the court must determine whether a substan-
tive violation of the constitutional provision occurred. If the answer is yes,
the court then decides whether to suppress the unlawfully obtained evi-
dence. Suppression depends upon the results of a cost-benefit analysis: the
benefits derived from excluding the evidence must outweigh societal costs
resulting from the loss of evidence highly probative of the defendant's
guilt.26 During the first sixty years of federal exclusionary rule jurispru-
dence, federal courts strictly adhered to the unitary approach.2 7 Since
22. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 373. See generally Geller, supra note 1I; Stewart,
supra note 10.
23. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 373-75.
24. The federal exclusionary rule operated as a unitary remedy from its inception until 1949 when
the Supreme Court decided Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-32 (1949). Mertens & Wasserstrom,
supra note 15, at 379. Early in the development of Washington's exclusionary rule jurisprudence the
court adopted a unitary approach, holding that when article I, § 7 is violated, by necessity, the
exclusionary remedy must attach. State v. Dersiy (Dersiy 1), 121 Wash. 458, 209 P. 837, 838 (1922).
Over 25 years later, Justice Simpson observed that the drafters of the constitution had considered the
danger of criminals escaping punishment and had still designed the constitution to place obstacles in the
way of police excesses, which they seemed to think were a greater danger to a free people. State v.
Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 932-33, 190 P.2d 740, 746-47 (1948); see also Kamisar, supra note 10, at 647.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984).
26. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 373-74. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying
text. The judicial process itself often requires a court to select the value representing the deeper and
larger interest from an array of conflicting principles, precedent, or logic. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 40-43 (1921); Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26. Justice Powell believes that "the
jurisprudence of the fourth amendment demands consideration of the public's interest in effective law
enforcement as well as each person's constitutionally secured right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (Powell, J., con-
curring). However, because the guarantee against unlawful search and seizure remains a fundamental
constitutional right, a court does not have the power to choose not to enforce it. See Stewart, supra note
10, at 1404; see also Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26 (fourth amendment violations must be discouraged
by every feasible means).
27. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Although Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf
drove a wedge between exclusion and the constitutional right, the Supreme Court stoutly adhered to the
exclusionary rule in federal cases. Kamisar, supra note 10, at 616 n.296; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 15, at 380. Nevertheless the Wolf opinion "planted the seeds of destruction for the [federal]
exclusionary rule-in federal as well as state cases." Kamisar, supra note 10, at 616.
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1974, however, the Burger Court has employed the bifurcated approach,
selectively applying the exclusionary remedy according to the results of
this cost-benefit analysis. 28 Whether Washington follows the Burger
Court's lead depends, in part, upon whether the federal approach to
exclusion is consistent with the source and purposes of the Washington
exclusionary rule.
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WASHINGTON
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
During its history, the Washington exclusionary rule has gone through
three distinct historical periods. The Washington Supreme Court adopted
the rule in 1922.29 This initial period of developing an independent state
exclusionary rule jurisprudence continued until 1961,30 when the United
States Supreme Court first required state courts to apply the federal
exclusionary rule in state prosecutions. 31 As a result, Washington's inde-
pendent rule entered its dormant period; the Washington court stopped
applying the independent state exclusionary rule, and began relying solely
on cases decided under the fourth amendment. The Washington rule lay
dormant for more than twenty years, 32 until 1982, when the rule passed out
of dormancy into a new era of independent application. In response to the
Burger Court's narrower approach to the scope and enforcement of fourth
amendment guarantees, 33 the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
federal approach to exclusion in one of a series of controversial decisions34
that interpreted article 1, section 7 as providing a broader privacy protec-
tion than the fourth amendment. 35
28. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, the Court deconstitutionalized
the federal exclusionary rule and held that no constitutional violation occurred when a witness was
compelled to answer grand jury questions based on information acquired in an unlawful search. Id. at
351-52. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 17, at 1119; see also Kamisar, supra note 10, at 640; Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 384-88. See generally Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16. The selective
application approach is based upon the Court's perception of exclusion as a judicially-created remedy
aimed at vindicating fourth amendment rights generally by deterring future unlawful police conduct.
See infra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
29. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922).
30. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
32. The Washington court did not reassert the exclusionary rule as an independent state require-
ment until its 1982 decision in State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see Nock, Seizing
Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article 1, Section 7, 8 U. PuGEr SouND L. REv. 331, 332-33
(1984). See also infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
34. State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
35. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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A. Prologue
Under the common law, a strict nonexclusionary rule required a court to
admit all competent and probative evidence regardless of its source. 36 This
doctrine of nonexclusion developed from the common law courts' para-
mount concern with truth-seeking and punishing the guilty. 37 Common law
courts employed a literal interpretation of the applicable constitutional text
and concluded that admitting unlawfully obtained evidence did not violate
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure. 38 Al-
though they did not condone the illegal search, common law courts ignored
the unlawful nature of the search until the defendant brought an action
directly against the offending officer.39
The common law rule of nonexclusion remained unchallenged until
1886, when the United States Supreme Court reached its landmark deci-
sion in Boyd v. United States.40 The Boyd Court viewed illegal search and
seizure from the perspective of a nineteenth century conception of trespass
against property and against an individual's rights. Based on the need to
36. The earliest statement of the common law rule came in Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. 329
(2 Met. 1841), cited in 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (2d ed. 1923). Originally courts justified the
nonexclusionary rule by reasoning that the officer or party responsible for issuing a warrant bears the
responsibility for the illegal search, not the state. Id. Courts would not take notice of the manner in
which evidence was obtained-whether lawfully or unlawfully. Id.
37. The common law prevented courts from framing a collateral issue to decide the legality of a
search because to do so would merely confuse, interrupt, or delay the determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. Stevison v. Earnest, 80 111.513, 518 (1875); see also 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183
(1st ed. 1905); Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26; R. LEMPERT & S. SALZBERG, A MODERN APPROACH To
EVIDENCE 148 n.2 (2d ed. 1982) (in the law of evidence, the "truthfinding" model dominates).
38. Under this literalist view, the constitutional violation is seen as ending with the illegal search,
which is already complete before trial begins. The constitutional provision literally only prohibits the
illegal search, it says nothing about the use of illegally obtained evidence. Consequently, a court's
decision to admit such evidence is not limited by the constitutional provision. Since the constitutional
violation was complete before trial, admission of the evidence would not subvert the defendant's rights.
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 13; Note, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 14 COLUM. L.
REV. 338, 338-39 (1914).
Some courts went even further, construing the amendment so narrowly as to deny that a violation
occurred at all. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897). Under this view, police officers who
conduct an illegal search exceed their authority. Id., 28 S.E. at 627. Through a legal fiction, courts no
longer viewed the offending officer as a representative of the state but rather as a private person. Id.
Consequently, search and seizure guarantees against governmental conduct were inapplicable. Id.
39. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2183, at 626. Professor Wigmore believed that the fourth
amendment implied a remedy: not suppression of the unlawfully obtained evidence, but rather a direct
action against the offending officer in trespass or for constitutional criminal contempt. Id. § 2184, at
639. For criticism of Wigmore's defense of the common law rule, see Chafee, The Progress of the Law,
1919-1922, Searches and Seizures, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 694 (1922); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 589
n. 160; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 330-34.
40. 116 U.S. 616(1886). See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2183. Justice Brandeis hailed Boydas
a "case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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protect rights from governmental trespass, the Boyd Court interpreted the
fourth and fifth amendments as providing a broad guarantee of personal
privacy.41 To effectively protect those privacy rights, Justice Bradley's
opinion enunciated a principle of constitutional interpretation (the Boyd
principle) that required courts to liberally construe constitutional provi-
sions that protected individual rights. 42 Applying this principle of liberal
construction to the fourth and fifth'amendments, the Boyd Court found that
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure converged with the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court held that admit-
ting into evidence private papers unconstitutionally seized from the defend-
ant, in effect, compelled the defendant to be a witness against himself in
violation of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
(hereinafter designated the Boyd convergence theory). 43
The Boyd decision generated widespread criticism. 44 State supreme
courts almost universally rejected the Boyd principle and its concomitant
convergence theory.45 Moreover, in Adams v. New York,46 the Supreme
41. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
42. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. According to Justice Bradley, such constitutional provisions required a
liberal construction because
[a] close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to
be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis [resist the first encroachment].
Id. (emphasis in original). The "Boyd principle" served as the basis for the civil liberty decisions
reached by the Warren Court in the 1950's and 60's. Burger Court retrenchment in the area of individual
rights represents an abandonment of the long adhered-to principle. Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HAIv. L. REv. 489, 494-95 (1977).
43. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35. Boyd concerned a civil charge for evasion of custom duties by
fraudulent invoicing. The trial court, acting pursuant to federal statute, ordered the defendant to
produce a paper invoice or have the prosecution's allegations taken as confessed. The defendant
complied under protest and appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 620. Although the Court could have
decided the issue before it under the fifth amendment alone, id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring), it also
relied on the fourth amendment to hold the federal statute unconstitutional and the court order an
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 622. Using its liberal construction principle, the Boyd Court
viewed the fourth and fifth amendments as protective of an individual's privacy, id. at 635, and found
the two amendments to be intimately related. Id. at 630, 633. This convergence of the two amendments
resulted in exclusion. This Comment refers to the Boyd exclusion analysis as the "convergence theory."
For further discussion of the Boyd convergence theory, see infra notes 64, 308-36 and accompanying
text.
44. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361,366 (1920); see, e.g., 4 J.
WIoMOmm, supra note 36, at §§ 3125-27; Taft, The Tobacco Trust Decisions, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 375,
384, 386 (1906); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479,
480 (1922); Note, Admission of Evidence Obtained Under An Illegal Search Warrant, 4 COLUM. L.
REv. 60, 61 (1904). For a contemporary response to Wigmore's criticism of Boyd, see Chafee, supra
note 39, at 694.
45. For a list of courts rejecting Boyd, see 4 J. WioMora, supra note 36, § 2264. Prior to 1914, at
least two state courts adopted the Boyd rule and rejected the common law's close and literal interpreta-
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Court virtually repudiated Boyd by declaring that the "weight of authority
as well as reason" supported the common law rule.47 When the Washington
Supreme Court's first opportunity to address the exclusion issue came in
the 1905 case of State v. Royce, 48 the court also found Boyd unpersuasive. 49
Without addressing the issue of whether the defendant's article 1, section 7
rights were violated,50 a unanimous Washington Supreme Court held that,
in any event, admitting evidence seized from the accused without authority
of law did not compel the defendant to testify against himself.51 The court
rejected the Boyd convergence theory in favor of the common law rule.52
Seventeen years elapsed before the Washington court reconsidered the
exclusionary rule issue. 53 During the intervening years, two substantial
tion. State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 A. 1097, 1099 (1901) (convergence theory invoked to suppress
letter seized during search pursuant to warrant authorizing search for stolen goods); State v. Sheridan,
121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (allowing a defendant to be convicted on illegally seized
evidence would "emasculate the constitutional guaranty, and deprive it of all beneficial force oreffect in
preventing unreasonable searches and seizures"). For a contemporary criticism of Sheridan, see Note,
supra note 44, at 60. For a complete listing of the date at which each state adopted or rejected the federal
exclusionary rule, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949). Rather than outright rejection of
Boyd, state courts often distinguished it as applying only when a court affirmatively ordered a defendant
to produce private papers. See, e.g., Gindrat v. People, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1891).
46. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
47. Id. at 594. Following the trend in common law courts, the Adams Court limited Boyd's
application to situations where a court specifically ordered the defendant to affirmatively produce
evidence. Id. at 598. See I W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 132 (1985).
48. 38 Wash. 111, 80 P. 268 (1905). Royce concerned an appeal from a burglary conviction. Police
officers, acting on mere suspicion, seized and searched the defendant, discovering a pawn ticket to a
typewriter, not reported stolen until several days later. Id. at 113, 80 P. at 269. The defendant appealed
his conviction and, inter alia, invoked the Boyd convergence theory. Id. at 116, 80 P. at 270.
49. Id. at 116-17, 80 P. at 270-71.
50. Id. at 116, 80 P. at 270. Royce is a prime example of how the absence of an exclusionary rule
affects the substantive content of article 1, § 7. In Royce, the court found no need to address whether the
police conduct had, in fact, violated the defendant's privacy. Instead, the court assumed, arguendo, that
a violation had occurred and went on to hold that the constitution did not require the exclusion of
unconstitutionally acquired evidence. Id. at 116, 80 P. at 271. Without the possibility of exclusion, the
defendant's article 1, § 7 rights offered no protection against the government's conduct. Proponents of
the exclusionary rule cite this failure to address the substantive violation of the constitutional provision
as a basic reason to maintain the rule's existence. Without an exclusion requirement, a court will not
address the constitutional protections and consequently they will have little effect. See I W. LAFAVE,
supra note 18, § 1.2, at 28; Geller, supra note 11, at 654-56.
51. Royce, 38 Wash. at 118, 80 P. at 271.
52. Id. at 117-18, 80 P. at 270-71. The Royce court failed to identify which constitution, state or
federal, guided its decision. The court found the Boyd decision inapplicable because no court exercised
any "compulsion whatever to procure evidence from the defendants." Id. at 117, 80 P. at 270 (quoting
Gindrat v. People, 138 111. 103, 111, 27 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1891)). In reaching its decision in Royce, the
court relied on State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S.W. 1002 (1895), a case decided under a Missouri
constitutional provision containing a "testimony" based self-incrimination guarantee purposefully
rejected by the framers of WASH. CONST. article 1, § 9. Royce, 38 Wash. at 117-18, 80 P. at 271. For a
discussion of the history of article 1, § 9, see infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
53. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922). Prior to Gibbons the Washington court had
two other opportunities to address the exclusion issue but failed to reach the question in both instances.
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changes took place. First, the passage of prohibition, both state and federal,
caused an unprecedented increase in the frequency of interactions between
individuals and law enforcement officers. This magnified the importance of
constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure. 54 Second,
significant developments occurred in Supreme Court exclusionary rule
jurisprudence that resurrected the federal suppression doctrine, but left
unclear its exact connection to variois provisions of the federal Constitu-
tion.
In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,55 the Supreme Court resurrected the
exclusionary rule, transforming the common law rule into a requirement
that defendants move before trial for the return of their property and
suppression of the evidence.56 The Weeks Court reasserted the Boyd princi-
ple and concluded that fourth amendment guarantees would be mean-
ingless unless courts prohibited the government from using unlawfully
seized evidence. 57 However, rather than invoking the Boyd convergence
theory, the Weeks Court focused solely on the fourth amendment, 58 holding
that the constitutional provision required the government to return property
illegally seized from the defendant. 59 Six years later, in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States,60 the Court again relied solely on the fourth
State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 145 P. 69 (1914) (lower court inappropriately invoked
exclusionary doctrine, no illegal search occurred); State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 P. 211 (1921)
(court rejected defendant's contention that evidence was unlawfully seized, noting that, in any event,
motion to suppress came too late).
54. Wigmore, supra note 44, at 479. See also Search and Seizure in Old Days, 8 A.B.A. J. 712
(1922) (comparing public attitudes towards "rum running" in 1922 to "molasses running" in the
1770's).
55. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks concerned a federal trial for illegal gambling in which the
defendant challenged the admission into evidence of papers and lottery tickets seized unlawfully from
his home, first by local police and later by federal agents. Id. at 386-87.
56. Id. at 396-97. Justice Day, who also authored the Adams opinion, distinguished Adams on the
grounds that the motion to suppress in Weeks came before trial, while the motion in Adams came after
trial began. Id.
57. Id. at 393-94. For the Weeks Court, the fourth amendment protection reached those accused of
crimes, as well as the innocent. Id. at 392.
58. Id. at 389. Based on the actual language employed in the Weeks opinion, the fifth amendment
played no explicit role in the decision. However, former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart maintains
that the Weeks Court implicitly based its holding on the fifth amendment. Stewart, supra note 10, at
1375.
59. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. Although the court held that the fourth amendment did not reach
evidence illegally obtained by local police, such evidence obtained by federal officers could not be used
in a federal trial. Id. Commentators differ on the exact import of the Weeks holding. See Kamisar, supra
note 10, at 594-95 (arguing that while the Weeks decision was ambiguous, later Supreme Court
decisions made it clear that the defendant had a personal fourth amendment constitutional right to
exclusion); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 295-302 (contending that Weeks held that use of
illegally seized evidence constituted second violation of fourth amendment); Stewart, supra note 10, at
1374-75 (arguing that Weeks established exclusion not as a constitutional right, but rather as a
constitutional remedy necessary to give meaning to the fourth amendment).
60. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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amendment and held that the guarantee against unlawful search and seizure
prohibited the government from making any derivative use of evidence
obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. 61
However, federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence was ambiguous con-
cerning whether the fourth amendment mandated exclusion independently
from the fifth amendment. 62 In Gouled v. United States, 63 the Court,
relying on Boyd, returned to the fifth amendment rationale and the con-
vergence theory. 64 The Gouled Court also emphasized the Boyd tres-
passory and property rights theory of privacy by placing private books and
papers inside a super privacy zone65 and by articulating the property rights-
61. Id. at 391-92. In Silverthorne, the defendant's business records had been illegally seized and
presented to the grand jury. ld. at 390. After complying with a district court order requiring the return of
the originals to the defendant and the impoundment of the copies, the grand jury then issued a subpoena
duces tecum requiring the defendant to produce the originals. The defendant refused to comply and
appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 391. The Court held that the fourth amendment prevented the
government from making use of knowledge derived from illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 391. It
stated that a failure to exclude all evidence tainted by the government's original illegal act would reduce
the fourth amendment to a mere "form of words." Id. at 392. Moreover, in writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes also observed that "[t]he essence of a provision [the fourth amendment] forbidding the
acquisition of evidence [by unlawful search and seizure] is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. However, the Burger Court
has since held that, in the grand jury context, the exclusionary rule does not prohibit an individual from
being asked questions based on evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974).
Justice Holmes' conception of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule served as the basis for Justice
Fullerton's description of the Washington rule six years later in State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 258 P.
1030 (1927). See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Silverthorne gave birth to what later
became known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which requires the exclusion of all evidence
tainted by the prior constitutional violation. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and the "independent source" doctrine, which prevents the
operation of the exclusionary rule where the government learned of the evidence from a source
independent of the constitutional violation. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984) (relying
on the Silverthorne reasoning to adopt the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule).
62. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26 (describing exclusion in fourth amendment context not
as a personal right, but rather as necessary to discourage violations of its guarantee); Stewart, supra note
10, at 1375 (arguing that originally exclusion as a constitutional right found its source in the fifth
amendment, but when viewed as a constitutionally compelled remedy, the rule depended upon the
fourth amendment).
63. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
64. Id. at 306. The Gouled Court explained the convergence theory by reasoning that whether the
government unlawfully compelled the defendant to produce incriminating evidence or obtained the
evidence by an unlawful search and seizure, the result for the defendant remained the same. In either
case, the defendant became the unwilling source of the evidence. To the Boyd and Gouled Courts, the
essence of the privilege against self-incrimination was that the accused could not be unlawfully made
into the unwilling conduit of incriminating evidence. Id. at 306, 311.
65. In Gouled, the government had seized the defendant's private business papers in two separate
searches. The first, conducted surreptitiously by a government agent without a warrant, was a clear
violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 306. Relying on Boyd, the Gouled Court placed private books
and papers in a super privacy zone susceptible neither to search with a warrant nor to compulsory
production by subpoena unless the government could show with particularity which papers were
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based "mere evidence" rule. 66
In Gouled's companion case, Amos v. United States,67 the Court clouded
the exclusionary rule picture still further. First, in an ambiguously worded
paragraph, the Amos Court cited both the WeekslSilverthorne and the Boydi
Gouled line of cases without clarifying whether each established an inde-
pendent exclusion requirement. 68 Second, theAmos Court extended exclu-
sion beyond private books and papers to other types of physical or real
evidence. 69 However, both the Court and government lawyers continued to
analyze exclusion in terms of the defendant's right to the return of the
evidence, even where the unlawfully seized evidence was contraband
whiskey.70 Consequently, in 1922, when the Washington Supreme Court
reconsidered exclusion in State v. Gibbons,71 it was unclear whether the
involved in criminal activity. Id. at 305-13. Because the second search, conducted pursuant to a valid
search warrant, intruded upon this super privacy zone, the Gouled Court held that it also violated the
fourth amendment. Id. at 311. Whether the GouledlBoyd super privacy zone continues to offer any
protection for private papers is a matter of controversy among present Supreme Court members. See
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 618-19 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Gouled Court held that the use of the papers illegally
obtained in both searches violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Gouled,
255 U.S. at 306, 311. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly noted that the BoydlGouled
convergence theory has "failed the test of time." United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984).
See infra note 308.
66. The Gouled Court articulated the "mere evidence" rule by relying on language from Boyd. The
"mere evidence" rule prevented the government from searching for articles of a purely evidentiary
nature. The government could only search for evidence to which it had a superior right to possession,
such as contraband, stolen articles, and the tools used to commit a crime. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308-09.
However, the Supreme Court abandoned the "mere evidence" rule in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
310 (1967).
67. 255 U.S. 313(1921). In Amos, federal revenue officers had unlawfully seized whiskey on which
the defendant had failed to pay the tax required by law. Id. at 315. Although the facts establishing the
illegality of the search were contained in the. revenue officer's testimony, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress, having earlier denied a petition for the return of the whiskey. Id.
68. Id. at 315-16.
69. Id. at 316. Supreme Court exclusionary rule decisions prior to Amos dealt exclusively with
private books and papers. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Consequently, one could argue that prior toAmos, the convergence theory
applied only to books and papers because such evidence embodies a defendant's testimony and
admitting the evidence at trial would compel defendants to bear witness against themselves. However,
the Amos Court attached no significance to the nontestimonial nature of whiskey as evidence. 255 U.S.
at 316-17. For a possible explanation of the reason the Court treated all illegally seized evidence
identically, see infra note 320 and accompanying text.
70. Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16. On several occasions, the Supreme Court had considered property
liable to duties and concealed to avoid payment, like the whiskey in Amos, as the type of evidence the
government had a superior right to possess. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,308 (1921); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). Despite the contraband nature of the evidence, the Court
continued to view exclusion as related to the right to the return of unlawfully seized property. Amos, 255
U.S. at 316-17. The government answered the defendant's appeal by arguing that the petition for return
of the evidence came too late, not that the whiskey could not be returned. Id. at 316.
71. 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922).
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federal exclusionary rule extended to contraband evidence. 72 Furthermore,
it was uncertain that the fourth and fifth amendments independently re-
quired exclusion. 73 As late as 1925, the federal exclusionary doctrine
rested on a constellation of related but not very clearly articulated
principles. 74
Despite the development of a federal exclusionary requirement, most
state courts refused to follow the SupremeCourt's lead, continuing instead
to adhere to the pre-Boyd common law rule.75 Thus, the Gibbons court
could have followed the great weight of state authority,76 and its own
precedent in State v. Royce, by rejecting the exclusion doctrine. 77 However,
the Washington Supreme Court found the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning persuasive and Washington became the fifth state to adopt an
independent exclusionary rule patterned on the federal doctrine.78
72. The United States Supreme Court did not explicitly extend exclusion to contraband evidence
until 1925. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Agnello Court attached no significance to
the distinction between papers and contraband cocaine seized in an illegal search. After stating that
when the evidence is contraband the defendant need not move for its return, the Agnello Court invoked
the convergence theory and held the evidence inadmissible. Id. at 34. See Stewart, supra note 10, at
1377. For a discussion of the property rights aspects of early federal exclusionary rule decisions, see
White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1279 (1983).
Unlike its federal counterpart, the Washington exclusionary rule, from its very inception, extended to
nontestimonial, contraband evidence. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922). See infra
notes 316-33 and accompanying text.
73. Atkinson, supra note 15, at 17, 26 (arguing that exclusion as a right is mandated by the fifth
amendment but exclusion under the fourth amendment is only an enforcement mechanism). This
ambiguity continued in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Court's opinion raised some
doubt as to whether the fourth amendment independently required exclusion: "It is well settled that,
when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use of
evidence obtained through search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 33-34.
74. Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 86 (1984). However, two later Supreme Court decisions expressly recognized an
independent fourth amendment exclusionary mandate. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530. 532
(1926) (fourth amendment "would be infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed to be used");
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,462 (1928) ("the Fourth Amendment, although not referring
to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government
officers through a violation of the Amendment"). See Kamisar, supra note 10, at 596-98; Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 366 n.6.
75. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, §§ 2183-84.
76. Chafee, supra note 39, at 694 (great weight of state authority rejected Boyd).
77. The Royce court quoted one of the most cited common law, nonexclusionary rule decisions,
Gindrat v. People, 138 I11. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891): "Courts, in the administration of the criminal law,
are not accustomed to be over-sensitive in regard to the sources from which evidence comes, and will
avail themselves of all evidence that is competent and pertinent and not subversive of some constitu-
tional or legal right." State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 117, 80 P. 268, 270-71 (1905).
78. The other four states were Vermont (State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 A. 1097, 1099 (1901));
Iowa (State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903)); Michigan (People v. Marxhausen. 204
Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919)); and Kentucky (Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W.
860 (1920)). Four other states adopted the federal rule soon after the Gibbons decision: Tennessee
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B. Stage 1: Origins, Development, and Independent Application
1. Origins and Early Development: The Article 1, Section 9 Mandate
Originally, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the convergence of
the article 1, section 9 privilege against self-incrimination and the article 1,
section 7 privacy protection to adopt the exclusionary rule in State v.
Gibbons.79 In Gibbons, a local sheriff, acting solely on a hunch and
without waiting for a telephone warrant he had requested, seized defendant
in his automobile and forced him to drive to the police station. After
arriving at the station, the sheriff searched the vehicle pursuant to a warrant
and discovered twelve quarts of whiskey, which led to a conviction for
unlawful possession.80 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court
violated his constitutional rights by denying his pretrial motion for the
return of the illegally seized whiskey and his motion to suppress made after
trial had begun.81
Since at that time neither the fourth nor the fifth amendment limited state
authorities, 82 the court based its decision solely on the Washington Decla-
ration of Rights.8 3 To reach its decision, the Gibbons court employed a two-
(Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544,238 S.W. 588(1922)); Mississippi (Tuckerv. State, 128 Miss. 211,90
So. 845 (1922)); Florida (Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922)); and West Virginia (State v.
Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (1922)).
79. 118 Wash. 171, 184, 203 P. 390, 395 (1922).
80. Id. at 180-81, 203 P. at 394.
81. Id. at 183,203 P. at 394-95.
82. At the time of the Gibbons decision, the United States Supreme Court had specifically held that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause did not require state authorities to abide by the
procedural safeguards contained in the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), or the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
search and seizure, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Consequently, the Washington
court was free to accept or reject the reasoning underlying the federal exclusionary rule.
83. Because Supreme Court decisions were not binding on state courts, the Gibbons court, in order
to rely on federal precedent, compared article 1, §§ 7 and 9 with their federal counterparts, the fourth
and fifth amendments, concluding that the guarantees were in substance the same. Gibbons, 118 Wash.
at 184, 203 P. at 395. Having done so, the Gibbons court concluded that it could use federal
exclusionary rule jurisprudence as "a proper aid" in the court's decisionmaking process. Id. Later in its
opinion, the Gibbons court relied on the reasoning used by the Michigan Supreme Court, but only after
observing that the two state constitutions were also in substance the same. Id. at 187,203. P. at 396. The
Gibbons court's treatment of federal precedent as merely a proper aid was consistent with the
Washington court's view in general concerning the authoritativeness of Supreme Court precedent. For
example, even where the wording in state and federal provisions was virtually identical, as in the due
process clause of article 1, § 3 and the fourteenth amendment, the Washington court did not feel bound
by federal precedent. The court only assigned substantial weight to Supreme Court interpretations, and
required the Supreme Court's reasoning to be persuasive before following federal precedent. See, e.g.,
State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 608, 70 P. 52, 54 (1902); Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101,105,258
P. 1039, 1040 (1927). In contrast to the Washington court's independent attitude, several state courts felt
bound to conform interpretations of their state constitutions with that of the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
State v. Andrews, 91W. Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257, 260 (1922); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P.
545, 547-58 (1923).
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step approach. 84 First, the court addressed the substantive question, hold-
ing that the sheriff's original warrantless seizure of the defendant, as well
as the search under the warrant, violated article 1, section 7.85 Second, the
court considered whether the trial court's decision to admit the contraband
whiskey constituted an additional, distinct violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.86
In analyzing the exclusion issue, the Gibbons court found the reasoning
underlying federal and Michigan state precedent sufficiently persuasive to
use as an aid in its inquiry. 87 Without mentioning Royce, the Gibbons court
held that evidence seized in violation of defendants' privacy, guaranteed by
article 1, section 7, could not be admitted against them. 88 The court's
analysis did not include recognition of an independent article 1, section 7
exclusionary mandate. Nor did the court refer to the Weeks/Silverthorne
fourth amendment-based analytic. 89 Instead, the Gibbons court concluded
that the Boyd convergence theory was embodied in the state constitution.
84. This two-step analysis is not the bifurcated approach, as this Comment uses the term. As used
in this Comment, bifurcated analysis refers to the two-step approach courts use to decide whether to
apply the exclusionary rule, not the two-step approach necessary to deciding whether to adopt an
exclusionary rule. Since Washington had no preexisting exclusionary rule, the court had to decide the
substantive question first. Only after determining that a violation occurred could the court turn to the
separate question of whether to adopt the exclusionary rule.
85. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 182-84, 203 P. at 394-95. The court found that the initial seizure of the
defendant, his automobile, and its contents occurred without a search warrant. Id. The search warrant
waiting at the police station could not cure the original illegality. Id. The subsequent seizure of the
whiskey was also unlawful in that it came incident to the unlawful arrest of the defendant. Id.
86. The court noted that the defendant had moved for the return of the whiskey in order "to prevent
the introduction of the whiskey in evidence against him." Id. at 183, 203 P. at 394. The court did not
address the question of returning contraband, since the return of the evidence was not the important
point. Rather, the court concentrated on the admission of the whiskey into evidence. Id. at 188-89, 203
P. at 396. Thus, the court's focus was not on the defendant's right to the return of his property, but rather
on the defendant's right to have the property excluded from evidence. Later the same year, the court
took care to make it clear that a court could not order the return of contraband to the accused, and
therefore, a defendant need only move to suppress, rather than for the return of the evidence. State ex
rel. Yakima v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 280, 282, 206 P. 925, 925 (1922).
87. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 184-85, 187, 203 P. at 395-96. See infra note 83.
88. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188-89, 203 P. at 396.
89. The court discussed the federal rule in terms of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 189-90,
203 P. at 395-96. Although the court quotes the fourth amendment for comparative purposes, the
opinion failed to mention the Weeks/Silverthorne fourth amendment branch of exclusion. This failure to
focus on the search and seizure provision as the source of the federal exclusionary requirement
reinforces the notion that United States Supreme Court exclusionary rule jurisprudence was ambiguous
on the point. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text. Yet, later Washington cases cite Gibbons,
along with other early Washington cases, as having adopted the Weeks rule. E.g., State v. Greco, 52
Wn. 2d 265, 266, 324 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1958); State v. Smith, 50 Wn. 2d 408, 409, 312 P.2d 652, 653
(1957); State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 842,246 P.2d 480,482-83 (1952). However, in a decision reached
prior to the cases cited above, but subsequent to Gibbons, the Washington court implicitly invoked the
rationale underlying Silverthorne. State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 258 P. 1030 (1927). See infra note
122 and accompanying text.
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The court observed that without exclusion, article 1, section 7 and article 1,
section 9 could not effectively guarantee an individual's privacy.90 Relying
on earlier Washington case law,91 as well as Boyd, the Gibbons court held
that the admission of evidence taken from the defendant without authority
of law compelled the defendant to give evidence against himself in viola-
tion of article 1, section 9.92
Gibbons was decided by Department Two of the Washington Supreme
Court, rather than the court sitting en banc. 93 In State v. Catalino,94
decided immediately after Gibbons, Department Two continued to develop
the state exclusionary rule, holding that a defendant had the right to cross-
examine a prosecution witness as to the validity of a search warrant.95
Thus, the Catalino court implicitly recognized that under certain circum-
stances the defendant had a right to move to suppress after trial began.96
However, shortly after Catalino, Department One took a much narrower
approach to exclusion in two companion cases. Contrary to the procedural
approach adopted by Department Two in Catalino, in both State v. Dersiy
(Dersiy 1)97 and State v. Smathers,98 Department One articulated, and
strictly applied, a rule that exclusion would not apply unless the defendant
90. Although the court did not address the nature of the connection between article 1, § 7 and
exclusion, it did note that both the United States and Michigan Supreme Courts had observed that both
the privilege against self-incrimination and the guarantee against unlawful search and seizure could not
be effective without exclusion. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 184, 187, 203 P. at 395, 396.
91. In addition to implicitly adopting the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's convergence
theory, Chief Justice Parker justified the exclusionary mandate contained in article 1, § 9 by relying on
State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514,145 P. 470 (1915). Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188, 203 P. at 396. InJackson,
the court had held that article 1, § 9 prohibited the prosecution from making a demand, in front of the
jury, that the defendant produce incriminating documents claimed to be in his possession. Jackson, 83
Wash. at 516-19, 145 P. at 471-72. In Gibbons, Justice Parker stated that since article 1, § 9 prohibited
the prosecution from making a demand for production, ii must also prohibit the prosecution from
introducing illegally seized evidence. However, Justice Parker's opinion failed to explain exactly how
the admission of such evidence violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at
188, 203 P. at 396. See infira notes 300-07 and accompanying text.
92. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188-89, 203 P. at 396.
93. Id. at 171,203 P. at 391. In 1909 the strubture of the Washington Supreme Court changed from
an en banc court to a departmental system with the membership of the court increasing from seven to
nine. Each department was composed of four members appointed by the Chief Justice who usually sat
as the fifth member of each panel. The membership of the departments changed from time to time.
However, an en banc court could be convened either by the Chief Justice or at the request of four of the
nine justices. 1909 Wash. Laws ch. 24, § 3 at 34 (codified at WAsH. REy. CODE § 2.04.120 (1961)). In
1971, thecourtreturnedto anenbanc format. 1971 Wash. Laws ch. 81, § 183 (effectiveMarch23, 1971).
94. 118 Wash. 611, 204 P. 179 (1922).
95. Id. at 611-12, 204 P. at 179.
96. Id. at 612-13, 204. P. at 179-80.
97. 121 Wash. 455, 209 P. 837 (1922).
98. 121 Wash. 472, 209 P. 839 (1922).
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moved to suppress before trial. 99 Moreover, Department One decisions
brought into question exclusion's constitutional connection; neither deci-
sion contained any reference to the Gibbons convergence theory. In Dersiy
I, however, Department One clearly agreed with one aspect of the Gibbons
holding: Washington had adopted a unitary approach that required the
exclusionary remedy to automatically attach whenever law enforcement
officers violated the defendant's right to privacy. 100 Some months later,
perhaps in an attempt to avoid the appearance of a divided court, an en banc
court affirmed the approach adopted in Dersiy 1. 101 Although the en banc
court did not clarify whether exclusion was constitutionally mandated, the
court did take care to affirm the Catalino procedural approach, establishing
specific guidelines for the timing of a motion to exclude unlawfully ob-
tained evidence once trial had begun. 102
Thus, by the end of 1922, although exclusion's precise constitutional
connection was unclear, the Washington Supreme Court had adopted a
unitary approach, with exclusion automatically applying because of its
inextricable connection to the violation of the defendant's right to privacy.
However, the cost of the exclusionary remedy to society may have troubled
the court. In twenty-two out of twenty-four article 1, section 7 cases
between 1922, when Gibbons was decided, and 1927, when the commit-
ment to exclusion was reevaluated in State v. Buckley, 103 the Washington
Supreme Court decided the issue in favor of the prosecution. 104 When
99. In Dersiy 1, Department One held that regardless of how obvious the constitutional violation,
when the defendent knew or had reason to suspect that evidence had been seized without a warrant, a
failure to investigate and move to suppress before trial resulted in a denial of any suppression motion
made after trial began. 121 Wash. at 458, 209 P. at 838. In Smathers, the court characterized Royce's
adoption of the common law rule as establishing a "timely application" requirement for all suppression
orders. 121 Wash. at 474, 209 P. at 840.
100. "[Slince there is a right, there must by necessity be a remedy, and the remedy is to be found in
the making of a timely application to the court for an order [suppressing the evidence]." Dersiy 1, 121
Wash. at 458, 209 P. at 838 (quoting from 10 R.C.L. 933 and agreeing with Taylor v. Benham, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 233 (1847)) (emphasis added).
101. State v. Dersiy (Dersiy 1I), 121 Wash. 461, 215 P. 34 (1922) (rehearing en banc).
102. A defendent could move to suppress after trial began only if one of the following could be
established: (1) direct or proper cross-examination of state witnesses made it appear that the articles
offered in evidence were unlawfully seized; or (2) the defendant demonstrated that he could not learn of
the unlawful seizure before trial. Id. at 462-63, 215 P. at 34-35.
103. 145 Wash. 87, 258 P. 1030 (1927).
104. State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 306, 309-10, 205 P. 394, 395-96 (1922) (no article 1, § 7
violation where officers enter door uninvited when door opens to admit member of the public); State v.
Miller, 121 Wash. 153, 154, 209 P. 9, 10 (1922) (motion to suppress properly denied where contraband
evidence in plain view of officers); Dersiyl, 121 Wash. 455, 459, 209 P. 837, 839 (1922) (defendant
failed to make timely motion to suppress); State v. Smathers, 121 Wash. 472, 474-75, 209 P. 839, 840
(1922) (defendant failed to make timely motion to suppress); State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366,370, 214
P. 841, 843 (1923) (limiting Gibbons' substantive search and seizure holding so that no article 1, § 7
violation occurs where police search defendant and automobile without a warrant but incident to an
arrest); State v. Duncan, 124 Wash. 372,376,214 P. 838, 840 (1923) (no search warrant necessary since
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viewed in light of the court's unitary approach, 105 some of these decisions
seem to reflect a desire to avoid invoking the exclusionary remedy. Given
its commitment to the unitary principle, the court could avoid excluding
evidence only by limiting the number of defendants that could take advan-
tage of its benefits or by holding that police conduct did not violate article
1, section 7.
For example, to limit the scope of the rule, the court adopted a "stand-
ing" requirement in State v. Ditmar:10 6 a defendant could invoke the
exclusion doctrine only if his personal privacy rights had been violated. 107
liquor seized as evidence was in "plain view" of police officers); State v. Wynn, 125 Wash. 398, 403,
216 P. 872, 874 (1923) (warrant to arrest not required where arresting officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that defendant committed the offense charged); State v. Basil, 126 Wash. 155, 157-58, 217 P.
720, 721 (1923) (civil trespass by police officers not a violation of article 1, § 7 where police look
through glass doorandsee defendant with liquor); State v. Secrest, 131 Wash. 217,218,229 P. 744,744
(1924) (where officers do not commit a trespass and liquor is in plain view, no search warrant required);
State v. Conrad, 132 Wash. 153, 153, 231 P. 942, 942 (1925) (where evidence seized was in officer's
presence, no warrant required); State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501,508,232 P. 321,324 (1925) (no right to
suppression where defendant's personal privacy rights not violated); State v. Costello, 133 Wash. 170,
172,233 P. 307,308 (1925) (search pursuant to warrant not abandoned where police leave premises and
return later as part of ruse to fool defendants); State v. Zounick, 133 Wash. 638, 638, 234 P. 659, 659
(1925) (where evidence conflicts as to legality of search, court refuses to disturb trial judge's denial of
motion to suppress); State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609, 612,238 P. 638,639 (1925) (search warrant not
invalidated because of incorrect address where police knew which residence defendant lived in without
reference to the address); State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228,230-31,239 P. 386, 387 (1925) (court allows
warrantless search of defendant and automobile when made incident to a lawful arrest for any
misdemeanor including minor traffic violations); Olympia v. Culp, 136 Wash. 374, 240 P. 360 (1925)
(no article 1, § 7 violation where police officers searching pursuant to warrant detain and search all
persons on the premises); State v. Kittle, 137 Wash. 173,177,241 P. 962,963 (1926) (source of sheriff's
information upon which probable cause based is irrelevant to legality of warrantless search occurring
before defendant arrested); State v. Britton, 137 Wash. 360, 364, 242 P. 377, 378, aff'd, 137 Wash.
367, 247 P. 9 (1926) (en banc) (no article 1, § 7 violation occurs when city police arrest and search
defendant after request by county officials "to look him over" even though city police had no idea
whether probable cause existed and county officers based "probable cause" on fact that defendant left
town with two suitcases on afternoon of burglary); State ex rel. Hagen v. Superior Court, 139 Wash.
454, 461-62, 247 P. 942, 945 (1926) (Boyd doctrine not applicable in license revocation proceeding);
State v. Rhode, 140 Wash. 47, 49, 248 P. 67, 67 (1926) (no article 1, § 7 violation where police invade
defendant's home without warrant because home used for unlawful production of liquor and therefore
not protected by law); State v. Dutcher, 141 Wash. 627, 629, 251 P. 879, 879 (1927) (where police
observe defendant in possession of illegal liquor from vantage point outside of home, no violation of
privacy when police enter home uninvited and arrest defendant without benefit of a search warrant);
State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 13,258 P. 845,849 (1927) (defendant consented to search of his hotel room
after police arrested him on street corner, but even without consent search valid as incident to arrest).
The two decisions favorable to the defendant were: State v. Catalino, 118 Wash. 611,611-12, 204 P.
179, 179 (1922) (court held defendant had right to cross-examine prosecution witness as to legality of
search); State v. Etheridge, 135 Wash. 500,504-05, 238 P. 19, 20 (1925) (en banc) (defendant arrested
illegally when he was seized by federal agents on federal property, forced to enter state jurisdiction, and
search by state officers discovered liquor).
105. See supra notes 22-24, 100 and accompanying text.
106. 132 Wash. 501, 232 P. 321 (1925).
107. In Ditmar police officers, acting pursuant to information acquired by stopping a car carrying
two young men, obtained a search warrant and discovered an unlawful "moonshine" operation in the
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Although a standing rule was consistent with the court's conception of
exclusion as a means to redress the invasion of the defendant's privacy, 08 it
also served to limit the number of defendants who could avail themselves of
the rule's benefits. 109
In several cases the court "manipulated" search and seizure require-
ments to avoid finding that the defendant's privacy had been violated. For
example, soon after Gibbons, the court, in a series of decisions, began to
expand the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement beyond any historical justification or precedent. 110 In addition,
in both Ditmar and State v. Costello, "' the court approved police officer
use of one warrant to make repeated searches when the original search
proved fruitless. 112
Given the court's apparent ambivalence toward the exclusionary rule, it
is not surprising that the 1927 case of State v. Buckley" 3 concerned a
government appeal of a lower court decision to exclude evidence. 114 But in
defendant's farmhouse. Id. at 504, 232 P. at 322-23. Although the evidence obtained by the original
seizure of the young men and their automobile may have been unlawful, the court held that the
defendants could not invoke the exclusionary rule because the evidence was not obtained through any
violation of the defendants' personal right to privacy: the defendants could not avail themselves of the
wrong committed against the victims of the original search. Id. at 507-08,232 P. at 324. Without citing
Gibbons, Justice Fullerton's opinion confirmed that evidence unlawfully seized from the defendant is
suppressed because its use compelled the defendant to become a witness against himself. Id. at 507, 232
P. at 324 (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)). Foran explanation and discussion of the
standing rule, see W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at § 9.2. See also infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
110. State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841, 843 (1923) (limited the Gibbons court's
broad pronouncement concerning the protection accorded by article 1, § 7 to citizens in their auto-
mobiles); State v. Dietz, 136 Wash. 228, 230, 239 P. 386, 387 (1925) (allowed search by police of an
automobile trunk where the defendant was arrested for a minor traffic violation); State v. Evans, 145
Wash. 4, 12-13, 258 P. 345, 349 (1927) (in dicta, court unnecessarily expressed its willingness to allow
the search of defendant's hotel room as a search incident to arrest even though the arrest took place
outside on a public street). For a criticism of Evans and the trend towards a broad search incident
doctrine, see Note, Search Without a Warrant of a Home as Incident to an Arrest Made Away From the
Home of the Person Arrested, 3 WASH. L. REv. 59 (1928).
The court's willingness to continue enlarging the search incident doctrine continued until 1983, when
the Washington court reversed this trend, overruling case law dating back to Hughlett as being "without
historic foundation" and inconsistent with the traditional scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d. 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983).
111. 133 Wash. 170, 233 P. 307 (1925).
112. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501,513,232 P. 321,326(1925); Costello, 133 Wash. 170, 171-72,233 P.
307, 307-08. For a contemporary criticism of Ditmar, see Note, Invalidity of Several Searches Under
Same Warrant, 3 WASH. L. REv. 61 (1928). In Costello, the court held that police, after a fruitless
search, could return to the site of the search using the same warrant. Costello, 133 Wash. at 171-72, 233
P.2d at 307-08.
113. 145 Wash. 87, 258 P. 1030 (1927).
114. Buckley presented an opportunity for the government to appeal an order for anew trial granted
by a trial judge after he recognized his own error in admitting evidence seized in a search of the
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Buckley, Justice Fullerton, 115 writing for a unanimous court, rejected the
state's argument that no article 1, section 7 violation occurred when police
officers forcibly entered defendants' hotel room with no reason to suspect
the presence of stolen goods. 116 On the substantive issue, the Buckley court
held that police officers violated Washington statutes, 117 and therefore
article 1, section 7.118 More importantly, the court rejected the state's
invitation to return to the common law rule of nonexclusion, 119 reaffirming,
instead, Washington's commitment to the exclusionary rule and its under-
lying unitary principle. 120
While Gibbons provides the historical origins of the Washington exclu-
sionary rule, Washington courts invariably invoke Justice Fullerton's ex-
planation of the reason courts must suppress illegally seized evidence:
[I]t is beneath the dignity of the state, and contrary to public policy, for the
state to use for its own profit evidence that has been obtained in violation of
law. 121
defendant's hotel room by police officers acting without a warrant or probable cause. 145 Wash. at
87-89, 258 P. at 1031-32.
115. Justice Fullerton, the only justice whose term of office dated back to Royce, authored many of
the key decisions that favored the government's position in search and seizure cases. See, e.g., State v.
Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 P. 845 (1927); State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 P. 321 (1925); State v.
Basil, 126 Wash. 155, 217 P. 720 (1923); State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 306, 205 P. 394 (1922).
116. Buckley, 145 Wash. at 90, 258 P. at 1031.
117. The police conduct violated REM. REv. STAT. § 2240(1), (2) (1921), which made it a gross
misdemeanor for police to search residences without a search warrant. Id. at 90, 258 P. at 1032. See
infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
118. Buckley, 145 Wash. at 90, 258 P. at 1031. Although the court did not specifically refer to art. 1,
§ 7, the violation of the constitutional provision was apparent due to the unlawful nature of the search
under Washington laws.
119. Id. at 89, 258 P. at 1031.
120. Id. at 89-90, 258 P. at 1031. Justice Fullerton, however, did not rely on the reasoning
underlying the Gibbons holding. Id. at 89-90, 258 P. at 1031. Instead, he explained the need for an
exclusionary rule by referring to United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 89, 258 P. at 1031.
Fullerton's reference to federal, rather than state precedent, probaby resulted from his view that the
United States Supreme Court was the authoritative court. State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 507-08, 232
P. 321, 324 (1925).
121. Buckley, 145 Wash. at 89, 258 P. at 1031. Justice Fullerton articulated this principle after
citing the following United States Supreme Court decisions: Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1920); and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Buckley was the last time the Washington
court considered whether, or on what basis, exclusion was required under the Washington Declaration
of Rights until State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). See infra notes 178-84 and
accompanying text. After Buckley, Washington courts simply cited the principle set forth in Buckley to
explain the theoretical basis underlying exclusion. See, e.g., State v. Knudson, 154 Wash. 87, 88, 280
P. 922, 923 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 745 (1930); State v. Vennir, 159 Wash. 58, 63,291 P. 1098,
1099-1100 (1930); Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn. 2d 215, 223, 177 P. 2d 886, 890-91 (1947); State v.
Smith, 50 Wn. 2d 408,409, 312 P.2d 652, 653 (1957). For a criticism of theBuckley decision, see State
v. Rousseau, 40 Wn. 2d 92, 99-101, 241 P. 2d 447, 451-53 (1952) (Finley, J., concurring).
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Buckley does not explicitly contradict the Gibbons court's reasoning, yet on
its face, the principle formulated by Justice Fullerton (the Buckley princi-
ple) does not refer to any state or federal constitutional provision as the
source of the exclusionary rule. 122 Consequently, the Gibbons convergence
theory, the original justification for the state exclusionary rule, receded into
the jurisprudential background. Subsequent decisions by the court did not
clarify the nature of the exclusionary rule's connection with either article 1,
section 7 or article 1, section 9.123
2. Independent Application: Exclusion as a Remedy Constitutionally
Compelled by Article 1, Section 7
After Buckley, the Washington Supreme Court continued to view the state
exclusionary rule as connected, in some unspecified way, to the state consti-
tution, and as independent of the federal constitution. The state rule con-
tinued to be applied as a traditional remedy124 aimed at redressing the
122. The concept of suppressing evidence on the theory that the government may not profit from its
own wrongdoing derives from Justice Holmes' opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.
251 U.S. 385 (1920). Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624,630 (1946). This concept of a "no use" policy
is part of the very essence of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures itself.
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 74, at 138. The use of the illegally seized evidence is a wrong in
itself. Id. at 139 n.37 I. Thus the exclusionary rule, as defined by Buckley, was designed both to provide
a meaningful remedy for the "trespassory violation" of the defendant's right to privacy, and to deprive
the wrongdoing government of an ongoing benefit from its wrongful conduct. White, supra note 72, at
1279. Commentators interested in the nature of the federal rule's connection to the fourth amendment
have focused on the failure of federal courts to articulate the rule's basis as the "no profit" concept
contained in Buckley. For example, one critic of the federal exclusionary rule has argued that the failure
of federal courts to fully adhere to the "no government benefit" concept means that the federal rule is
not directly connected to the fourth amendment. Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1030. This view would
suggest that exclusion must be directly connected to article 1, § 7, because Washington courts have
strictly adhered to the "no government benefit" concept since Buckley. However, another commentator
argues that when a court, as in Buckley, bases a decision on public policy choices, it cannot be
considered a constitutional mandate. See Wilkey, The exclusionary rule: why suppress valid evidence?,
62 JUDICATURE 214, 232 (1978).
123. Some later decisions refer to exclusion as a court-created rule. E.g., State v. Knudsen, 154
Wash. 87, 88, 280 P. 922, 923 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 745 (1930); State exrel. Fong v. Superior
Court, 29 Wn. 2d 601,606-07, 188 P.2d 125 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 946 (1949). Others note the
fundamental connection between exclusion and article 1, §§ 7 and 9 without specifiying the nature of
the connection and without referring to exclusion as mandated by the constitutional provisions. E.g.,
State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash. 528, 534, 63 P.2d 376, 379 (1936); Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn. 2d 215,
220-22, 177 P.2d 886, 889-90 (1947); State v. Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 926, 190 P. 2d 740, 743 (1948).
124. A traditional "past-oriented" remedy seeks to help make or keep defendant-victims whole by
helping them recover from or ward off specific governmental invasions. See Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 16, at 315. When exclusion is viewed as a traditional remedy it is "dereliction of office" for the
court to decline to invoke it. Id. at 316. Early in the development of the Washington exclusionary rule,
the Washington court stated that a trial court had a "duty" to exclude once it became clear that evidence
was seized in violation of the defendant's article 1, § 7 right to privacy. State v. Dersiy (Dersiv 11), 121
Wash. 461, 461-63, 215 P. 34, 35 (1923) (en bane). Moreover, the Buckley principle's prohibition
against the government profiting from its violation of the defendant's rights embodies this past-oriented
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invasion of the defendant's privacy and vindicating the defendant's rights
guaranteed in article 1, section 7.125 Although the Buckley principle implied
that the state should not profit from any illegally seized evidence, 126 the
Washington court in State v. Vennir, 127 and later in State v. Michaels, 128 reaf-
firmed the connection between the state exclusionary rule and the vindica-
tion of the defendant's rights by continuing the standing requirement. 129
remedy approach. Courts have recognized that the purpose of such a prohibition is to restore the status
quo ante by preserving the defendant's rights to the same extent as if the officers had stayed within the
law. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802, 807 (1983). Conversely, although the United
States Supreme Court describes exclusion as a remedy, its remedial effect is directed against future
violations, not the violation of the defendant's rights. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
125. In State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash. 528, 534, 63 P.2d 376, 380 (1936), the court expressly
recognized that exclusion protected and preserved the defendant's article 1, § 7 constitutional rights.
Five years later, the court again recognized that it had a duty to safeguard the defendant's civil liberties
and reversed a trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, noting that procedural require-
ments of timeliness should not prevail over protection of the defendant's constitutional right to privacy.
State v. Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 927, 190 P.2d 740, 743-44 (1948). See also State v. Raum, 172 Wash.
680, 683, 21 P.2d 291, 292 (1933) (after a search of defendant and his automobile proved fruitless,
police seized defendant's keys and opened up his front door to search for liquor, court excluded
evidence because defendant was entitled to have his article 1, § 7 rights protected).
126. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 383 (a standing requirement is inconsistent
with view that exclusion prevents government from profiting from its illegal conduct).
127. 159 Wash. 58, 291 P. 1098 (1930). In Vennir, police officers, acting without warrant or
probable cause, arrested the defendant, searched him and an automobile nearby, and discovered
contraband liquor. Citing the Buckley principle, the court held that the search of the defendant's person
violated his article 1, § 7 rights and that exclusion automatically attached. Id. at 61, 291 P. at 1100.
However, unlike some federal courts, the Washington court held that the evidence seized in the car
search was admissible because the defendant claimed he had no connection to the car; consequently, his
article 1, § 7 rights had not been violated. Id. at 61, 291 P. at 1100.
128. 60 Wn. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
129. In Michaels, the court adopted the automatic standing rule articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Under automatic standing, the court
grants standing to invoke the exclusionary remedy whenever the defendant is charged with an offense
that includes, as one of its essential elements, possession of the thing unlawfully seized. Michaels, 60
Wn. 2d at 646,374 P.2d at 993-94. Under the pretext of an arrest for a minor traffic accident, police had
gained access to the defendant's car, turning up illegal gambling equipment. Id. at 645, 374 P.2d at
992-93. The defendant disclaimed ownership of both the car and the gambling equipment. Neverthe-
less, the court distinguished Vennir and accorded the defendant standing because he was legitimately on
the searched premises (the car) and the fruits of the search were to be used against him. Id. at 646, 374
P.2d at 993. The automatic standing rule has a twofold basis. First, defendants would otherwise have to
incriminate themselves at the suppression hearing to establish that they possessed the goods. Id. at 646,
374 P.2d at 993. Second, without automatic standing, the government must simultaneously take
contradictory positions that the defendant possessed the goods discovered in the illegal search, but did
not suffer a deprivation of fourth amendment rights. Id. at 646, 374 P.2d at 993.
The Burger Court has abandoned the "legitimately on the premises" concept of standing in favor of
requiring the defendant to have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy for
drugs hidden in a friend's purse); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers in a car do not have
standing simply because of their lawful presence). In essence, the Burger Court has developed this
expectation of privacy test by focusing not on the government's conduct, but rather on the nature of the
evidence uncovered. See Comment, Defining Fourth Amendment Searches: A Critique of the Supreme
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:459, 1986
Consequently, the state could profit from evidence illegally seized from any-
one except the defendant.
Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 196 (1985). Washington has followed the
Burger Court's formulation, requiring defendants to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society is willing to recognize. See State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 110 n.9, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 n.9
(1982).
Although the Burger Court has made substantial changes in federal standing rules, the Washington
court has not always followed. Washington refused to follow the Burger Court when it abandoned
automatic standing. The Burger Court accomplished this alteration in the standing requirements in two
steps. First, the Court claimed to have eliminated one point that had necessitated the automatic standing
rule by holding that a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress may not be admitted at
his trial to establish his guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1968). Second, the
Burger Court overruled Jones' automatic standing rule on the grounds that Simmons provided the
defendant broader protection and that, after Rakas, the government could, without contradiction,
maintain both that the defendant possessed the goods, and did not suffer a deprivation of fourth
amendment rights if the defendant failed to establish the requisite expectation of privacy in the area
searched. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980). For a discussion and criticism of
federal standing rules, see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at §§ 9.1-9.2 (1984). Washington
rejected the Burger Court's reasoning and result and maintained automatic standing for possessory
crimes, in part, because of the state rule allowing use of suppression hearing testimony for impeach-
ment purposes at trial. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). See infra note 160.
However, the opportunity to overrule Simpson and end the automatic standing rule is now before the
court. State v. Stroud, No. 51501-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard on May 15, 1985); see infra note 199.
Adoption of, and continued adherence to, a "standing" requirement indicates that the Washington
exclusionary rule seeks to remedy a wrong done to the defendant and that the remedy is directly
connected to the defendant's article 1, § 7 guaranteed right to privacy. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (Traynor, J.); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1950); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal
Searches and Seizures, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 156 (1948). See generally Burkoff, The Court That Devoured
the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151
(1979). Moreoever, the Washington court's strict adherence to the "standing" requirement, even one
based on a reasonable expectation of privacy, demonstrates that the state exclusionary rule was created
and continues to be applied from the perspective of protecting those accused of crimes, rather than soley
protecting innocent victims of illegal searches. Loewy, supra note 18, at 1268. But see Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 383 n.85 (concept of standing is inconsistent with exclusionary rule's
prohibition against the government profiting from its unlawful conduct).
However, strict adherence to and application of a standing requirement couched in terms of privacy
expectations also works as an incentive for government officers to violate the constitutional rights of one
person knowing that while they may not use the evidence obtained against the victim of the search, they
can use it against the defendant who was the real object of their attention. See, e.g., United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727,730 (1980) (supervisory power may not be used to exclude evidence even though
government actually encouraged its agents to violate fourth amendment rights of one person in order to
obtain evidence against the defendant). Many commentators have pointed out the inconsistency that
exists between the deterrence rationale and the standing rule's concomitant incentive for police
wrongdoing. For a discussion of the standing requirement in the federal context see Burkoff, supra, at
162-67; Kamisar, supra note 10, at 634-38; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 383; Oaks,
Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 342, 358 (1967). In
Washington, however, the rule's paramount purpose is to protect the defendant's right to privacy, rather
than deterring future violations. Consequently, while the standing requirement's incentive aspects are
regrettable, they are not inconsistent with the paramount rationale underlying the state exclusionary
rule.
Washington's Exclusionary Rule
During the late 1940's several attempts were made to convince the
Washington court to alter the automatic nature of the exclusionary rule. In
Tacoma v. Houston, 130 police officers acting on an informant's tip made a
warrantless entry into what appeared to be a normal residence, but discov-
ered, instead, an operating house of prostitution. 131 Justice Mallory argued
that a house of prostitution was not a bona fide residence and therefore the
state statute requiring a warrant did not apply.132 Consequently, Justice
Mallory felt that the evidence should have been admissible, in effect
suggesting that the defendant waives or loses the protection of his privacy
rights according to the nature of the evidence discovered. 133 A majority of
the court, however, held the evidence as inadmissible, refusing to allow the
nature of the illegally seized evidence to determine whether the premises
"deserved" protection. 34 One year later, in State v. Miles, 135 police
officers had stopped and searched defendants without probable cause; the
court excluded all evidence seized in the unlawful search even though the
evidence linked the defendants to an unreported robbery. 136 The Miles
court, like the Houston court before it, refused to allow the unlawfully
seized evidence to legitimize the government's violation of the constitu-
tion, regardless of the probative and incriminating nature of the evi-
dence. 137
130. 27 Wn. 2d 215, 177 P.2d 886 (1947) (en banc).
131. Id. at 217-18, 177 P.2d at 887-88.
132. Id. at 228-29, 177 P.2d at 893 (Mallory J., dissenting).
133. This is known as the "waiver" or "forfeiture" theory. By engaging in illegal activity, even in
the privacy of the home, defendants waive or forfeit their constitutional right to privacy. Therefore,
defendants cannot complain about illegal searches and seizures that uncover contraband and other proof
that a crime has been committed. See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 581 (1955). For a response to Barrett's thesis see
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16 at 280.
134. Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn. 2d 215, 227, 177 P. 2d 886, 886 (1947) (en bane). The majority
expressly stated that
[i]fthe evidence. . . were admissible, we would have no difficulty in holding that the character of
the premises. . . was that of a house of prostitution rather than that of a "home," and, as such
. ., the premises would lose the protection of the constitutional provision. The trouble here is,
however, that the evidence to establish the unlawful character of the place was. . . inadmissible.
Id.
135. 29 Wn. 2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948).
136. Id. at 924-25, 933-34, 190 P.2d at 742, 747.
137. Justice Simpson, writing for the court, stated that the court "had frequent occasion to point
out that a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and
does not change character from its success." Id. at 931, 190 P. 2d at 745 (quoting United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
While Justice Fullerton appeared to be leading the court on the exclusion issue during the 1920's and
early 1930's, by the late 1940's Justice Simpson had become the conscience of the court with his
emphasis on individual rights. In his Miles opinion, Justice Simpson reaffirmed the court's commit-
ment to individual rights by recognizing the essential role played by article 1, § 7 in protecting
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Pressure to alter the automatic nature of the state exclusionary rule
gained momentum after 1949, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Wolf v. Colorado.138 Although the Wolf Court held the fourth
amendment's substantive guarantees enforceable against the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 139 it de-
clined to incorporate the exclusionary rule. 140 Consequently, Wolf left the
states free to reject the exclusionary rule in favor of another remedy
capable of vindicating the rights of individuals victimized by illegal
searches. 141
Since Washington already had an exclusionary requirement, indepen-
dently based on the state Declaration of Rights, Wolf had no substantive
effect on the state exclusionary doctrine. 142 However, Wolf did encourage
individual liberty. The court had a duty to safeguard civil liberties and consequently held in Miles that a
technical reading of the timely motion requirement could not prevail over the defendant's constitutional
right to privacy. 29 Wn. 2d at 927, 190 P. 2d at 744. The Miles court took its responsibility to protect the
defendant's constitutional rights very seriously:
The rights of individuals as guaranteed by our constitution, are not to be lightly considered. The
framers of our constitutions . . . realized that laws affecting the liberty of men must be
safeguarded, since the wisdom of the ages has taught that unrestrained official conduct in respect
to depriving men of their liberties would soon amount to a total loss of those liberties. Where
procedure relating to arrest and search is provided, it must be strictly followed.
Id. at 926, 190 P. 2d at 743 (emphasis added). See also City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn. 2d 788.
798-803, 199 P.2d 95, 100-02 (1948) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
138. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
139. Id. at 27. The Wolf Court followed the selective incorporation approach set out by Justice
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The Court held that the guarantees of an
individual's privacy contained in the fourth amendment were implicit in "the concept of ordered
liberty;" therefore, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the states to conform to
the fourth amendment's substantive requirements. Wolf 338 U.S. at 27-28.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 31. The Wolf Court reasoned that since exclusion only protects those discovered with
incriminating evidence, it comported with due process for states to provide, instead of exclusion, the
remedies of private action and the internal discipline of the police. Id.
Wolfcontained the seeds that eventually grew into the Burger Court's selective approach to exclusion.
By introducing the deterrence of future violations as the purpose of the remedy, the Wolf Court's
decision represented a dramatic departure from the original understanding of the federal exclusionary
rule as a constitutional mandate. Kamisar, supra note 10, at 606; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note
15, at 366. See also 1 W. LaFave, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 10-12. Wofsignificantly changed the way the
federal exclusionary rule is viewed by implicitly assuming, without any authority, and, without
attempting to reconcile the language in federal jurisprudence to the contrary, that the federal exclusion-
ary rule was based exclusively on a deterrence rationale, and that other methods, if constantly enforced,
would be equally effective. Kamisar, supra note 10, at 606. Effectiveness of an alternative remedy
depends upon whom the court is attempting to benefit. Since the Washington remedy is aimed at
protecting the defendant's rights, none of the suggested alternatives is as effective as the exclusionary
rule. See infra notes 281-97 and accompanying text.
Justice Black's concurrence identified the exlusionary rule as a "judicially created rule of evidence"
developed out of the Court's supervisory power, rather than a constitutional mandate. 338 U.S. at 39-40
(Black, J., concurring). This view of exclusion came to be the centerpiece of the Burger Court's
exclusionary doctrine. See infra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g.. State v. Young, 39 Wn. 2d 910, 917, 239 P.2d 858, 862 (1952); State v. Rousseau,
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exclusionary rule opponents, such as Justice Robert Finley, to propose that
the Washington court abandon exclusion in favor of alternative remedies. 143
Unwilling to violate what it perceived as its duty and obligation to protect
the defendant from unlawful police conduct, the court consistently rejected
Justice Finley's entreaties. 144 At one point the court stated unequivocably
that it refused "to recede one iota" from the principles set down in Miles. 145
Thus, although the exact nature of exclusion's connection to the state
constitution remained unarticulated, the Washington Supreme Court
treated the exclusionary rule as a remedy constitutionally compelled by
article 1, section 7.146
40 Wn. 2d 92, 97-101, 241 P.2d 447, 450-53 (1952) (Finley, J., concurring); State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d
840, 842, 246 P.2d 480, 483 (1952). Just prior to Wolf Department Two of the Washington court
identified the state exclusionary doctrine as a rule of decision created by courts, rather than a
constitutional mandate. State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wn. 2d 601, 607, 188 P.2d 125, 128
(1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 956 (1949). In the years following Wolf the court viewed the Washington
rule as reflecting Weeks and asserted that exclusion would remain the law under article 1, § 7 until the
court decided to change it. State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 842-43, 246 P.2d 480, 483 (1952); State v.
Smith, 50 Wn. 2d 408,408, 312 P.2d 652, 654 (1957); State v. Greco, 52 Wn. 2d 265, 266, 324 P.2d
1086, 1087 (1958).
143. State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn. 2d 92, 99, 241 P.2d 447, 452 (1952) (Finley, J., concurring).
Justice Finley was Washington's most outspoken critic of exclusion during the 1950's, '60's, and early
'70's. In his Rousseau concurrence, Justice Finley criticized the court's strict adherence to the
exclusionary rule, noting that only the guilty, rather than the innocent, benefit from the rule. Id. at
99-100, 241 P.2d at 452. Since exclusion did little to deter future violations, Justice Finley proposed
abandoning exclusion in favor of sufficient deterrent remedies already existing, such as civil actions and
criminal penalties against offending officers provided for in REM. REv. STAT. § 2240-1, § 2240-2
(1952). Id. at 99-100, 241 P.2d at 452. To Justice Finley, only the innocent deserved a remedy. Justice
Finley appears to have subscribed to the forfeiture theory of privacy under which the guilty, in effect,
forfeit their privacy rights by committing a crime. Id. at 99-100, 241 P.2d at 452. See supra note 133.
For Justice Finley, the exclusionary rule was "a somewhat emotional, shot-gun application of a rule of
evidence which misses the bull's-eye, the specific aim or purpose of the rule-that is, the protection of
the innocent, law abiding citizen-about as often as it hits it." Id. at 100, 241 P.2d at 452; see also
Finley, supra note 16.
144. Shortly after Rousseau, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the Buckley principle in State v.
Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 842, 246 P.2d 480, 483 (1952). Even Justice Finley recognized that the court had
refused to adopt the approach suggested in his Rousseau concurrence. State v. Smith, 50 Wn. 2d 408,
409, 312 P.2d 652, 654 (1957).
145. State v. Young, 39 Wn. 2d 910, 917, 239 P.2d 858, 862 (1952). The court distinguished the
facts in Young from those in Miles, noting that the police had probable cause to stop defendant's truck.
Id. at 917, 239 P. at 862. The court emphasized that it had a responsibility to exclude evidence and
"protect citizens from unwarranted, arbitrary, illegal arrests." Id. at 917,239 P.2d at 862. However, the
court also recognized its responsibility to protect other citizens from those who violate the law. Id. at
917, 239 P.2d at 862. The court stated that the probable cause requirement struck the balance between
its two responsibilities. Id. at 918, 239 P.2d at 863.
146. See infra notes 211-33, 281-97 and accompanying text.
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C. Stage 2: The Dormant Period
The Washington Supreme Court continued to automatically apply its in-
dependent state exclusionary rule until the early 1960's. 147 In 1961, in
overruling Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio, 148 the United States Supreme Court held
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
[federal] Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court." 149 Consequently, state courts became obliged to apply the federal
exclusionary rule. 150
Shortly after Mapp, the Washington exclusionary rule passed from its
first period of independent application into a dormant phase. 151 The Wash-
ington court began to disregard its history of independent article 1, section
147. See supra notes 30-33, and accompanying text. One of the last references to the Washington
exclusionary rule came in a 1961 case that concerned the admissibility of the defendant's confession.
State v. Self, 59 Wn. 2d 62,366 P.2d 193 (1961), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 929 (1962). Although it held the
confession to be voluntary and admissible, the Selfcourt stated that Washington courts had developed a
rule of exclusion holding inadmissible evidence illegally obtained by the officers and involuntarily
given up by the possessor. Id. at 72, 366 P.2d at 199 (citing State v. Young, 39 Wn. 2d. 910, 239 P.2d
858 (1952), and State v. Knudsen, 154 Wash. 87,280 P. 922 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 745 (1930)).
148. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
149. Id. at 655. The Court mustered a majority for overruling Wolf but Justice Black, the fifth vote,
concurred not on the basis of the fourth amendment standing alone but rather by invoking the BoYd
convergence theory. Id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring).
Despite the plurality opinion's seemingly clear holding that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional
requirement, the source and purpose of the requirement are not clearly delineated. Stewart, supra note
10, at 1380. Justice Clark's opinion contained a mixture of reasoning and rationales which only added to
the doctrinal uncertainty concerning exclusion's constitutional connection. Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 16, at 319; see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 381-82. Other commentators view
the Mapp opinion as clearly identifying exclusion as part of the fourth amendment and therefore, part of
the fourteenth. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requien for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 26. For a detailed discussion of Mapp and its ambiguities, see Kamisar, supra note 10, at 627.
Ambiguous language prevented Mapp from firmly reestablishing the exclusionary rule as a personal
constitutional right. Recent Supreme Court decisions dismiss Mapp as merely implying that the
exclusionary rule is a necessary part of the fourth amendment. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
3423 (1984).
150. The Washington court expressed this view in McNearv. Rhay, 65 Wn. 2d 530,536, 398 P.2d
732,737 (1965). Justice Finley used his concurring opinion to renew his attack on the exclusionary rule,
arguing that it was a "contagion of sentimentality" which had no deterrent effect and should not be
perpetuated. Id. at 542-43, 398 P.2d at 740. (Finley, J., concurring) (citing 8 J. WIGNORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 2184 (3d. ed. 1940)).
151. Despite the Mapp holding, the Washington court seemed to independently apply the state
exclusionary rule in two post-Mapp decisions. See State v. Michaels, 60 Wn. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989
(1962); Tacoma v. Horton, 62 Wn. 2d 211, 220, 382 P.2d 245, 250 (1963). Eventually, the court began
referring exclusively to the WeekslMapp exclusionary rule as opposed to the Gibbons/Buckley indepen-
dently based rule. See, e.g., State v. Riggins, 64 Wn. 2d 881, 884-86, 395 P.2d 85, 89 (1964); McNear
v. Rhay, 65 Wn. 2d 530, 536-38, 398 P.2d 732, 737 (1965); State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wn. 2d 425, 428,
423 P.2d 530, 532 (1967).
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7 decisions,152 describing the exclusionary rule exclusively in terms of
federal precedent. 153 As long as the United States Supreme Court con-
tinued to require state courts to automatically apply the federal exclusion-
ary remedy whenever they found a fourth amendment violation, the Wash-
ington court had little reason to independently apply the Washington
exclusionary rule. 154 An automatically applied federal rule paralleled the
remedy developed in Washington jurisprudence. 155
However, in reaction to the Burger Court's 156 retrenchment in the area of
federally guaranteed civil liberties, 157 the Washington court returned to
152. State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 697, 674 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983) (and cases cited therein).
153. Languge used in State v. O'Bremski provides a typical description of the exclusionary rule
after Mapp:
The exclusionary rule is neither a statutory enactment nor an express provision of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. It is rather a command, judicially implied, intended
to impose restraints upon law enforcement officers and to discourage abuse of authority, when
constitutional immunity from unreasonable search is involved.. .. In each case the rights of the
accused must be balanced against the rights of the public.
70 Wn. 2d at 429, 423 P.2d at 533 (citations omitted). This balancing concept became even more
explicit in Washington court opinions after Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), discussed
infra notes 161-77 and accompanying text. See, e.g., State v. McFarland, 84 Wn. 2d 391, 393, 526
P.2d 361, 362 (1974) (the most important social good or purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
discourage and deter police conduct violative of the fourth amendment; where no police deterrent
effect will be served by exclusion, application of the exclusionary rule is unnecessary), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1005 (1975). See also State v. Baker, 78 Wn. 2d 327, 331-32, 474 P.2d 254, 258 (1970) (in
dicta, court characterized exclusion as an inherently inadequate way to restrain or regulate police or
prosecutorial conduct).
In McFarland, Justices Stafford, Rosellini and Utter dissented. 84 Wn. 2d at 397-407, 526 P.2d at
364 (Stafford, J., dissenting) (pointing out that despite majority's disenchantment with federal exclu-
sionary rule, state courts must apply it). Four years later, the McFarland dissenters formed the basis
of the majority coalescing behind the "broader privacy protection" accorded by article 1, § 7. See
infra note 160. In any event, Justice Finley's exclusionary rule discussion in both McFarland
and Baker was in terms of the federal rule, not the historically independent GibbonslBuckley
formulation.
154. Nock, supra note 32, at 332; Utter, Freedom And Diversity in a Federal System: Perspective
on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 491,499
(1984). United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan observed that "it was only natural that
when during the 1960's our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increasingly feder-
alized, state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by state
constitutions." Brennan, supra note 42, at 495. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that it had neglected the state constitution during the 1960's and early 1970's by focusing instead
on the protections provided by the fourth amendment. State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 697, 674 P.2d
1240, 1247 (1983).
155. See supra notes 79-146 and infra notes 281-97 and accompanying text.
156. The term "Burger Court" is used to identify the period beginning with the appointment of
Warren Burger as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 23, 1969.
157. Brennan, supra note 42, at 495; Nock, supra note 32, at332-33. See generally Wasserstrom,
The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CIM. L. REv. 257 (1984).
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independently interpreting the state constitution. 158 Thus, as the Burger
Court narrowed the scope and content of fourth amendment guarantees, 159
the Washington court increasingly turned to article 1, section 7 to protect a
defendant's right to privacy, which naturally resulted in a new period of
independent application for the state exclusionary rule. 160
158. Burger Court retrenchment in the area of civil liberties caused the Washington Supreme
Court, like the appellate courts of a majority of the states, to turn to the state constitution to determine
whether it provided broader protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution. Utter, supra
note 154, at 499. However, disagreement by the Washington Supreme Court with United States
Supreme Court reasoning and results did not begin with the advent of the Burger Court. See, e.g.,
Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wn. 2d 699, 711, 207 P.2d 198, 205 (1949). In
Visser, the Washington court relied on article 1, § 11 and article 9, § 4 of the Washington Constitution to
disagree with the separation of church and state analysis used by the United States Supreme Court in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Vissercourt stated that where the state constitution
and the decisions thereunder run contrary to Supreme Court decisions, the Washington court must
respectfully disagree. Id. at 711, 207 P.2d at 205.
In this latest period of independent interpretation, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the
Declaration of Rights accords broader protection in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Bar-
tholomew, 101 Wn. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (despite nearly identical language, interpretation of
state due process clause is not controlled by Supreme Court interpretations of the fourteenth amend-
ment; portions of Washington's capital punishment statute violated the state due process guarantee
though Burger Court would find no violation under the fourteenth amendment); Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.
2d 87, 653 P.2d 618 (1982) (unlike the sixth amendment, article 1, §§ 21 and 22 guarantee the right to a
jury trial in all criminal prosecutions regardless of the potential punishment); Alderwood Assoc. v.
Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (article 1, § 5 protects right to solicit
initiative signatures in a private shopping center, contray to United States Supreme Court interpretation
of first amendment); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980) (article 1, § 22, unlike the eighth
amendment, prohibits as cruel punishment certain recidivist statutes authorizing life imprisonment);
Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476,585 P.2d 71 (1978) (education is a fundamental right
under the state constitution though not under Burger Court interpretations of the federal Constitution).
159. As the composition of the Court changed, it became clear that an unmistakeable substantive
tilt away from the rights of the accused and towards a crime-control, police orientation had occurred.
Wasserstrom, supra note 157, at 260. In the decade following Mapp, "the Warren Court did not even
review, much less reverse, a single state court decision upholding the fourth amendment claim of the
accused." Id. By contrast, during the 1982 term, for example, the Burger Court agreed to review ten
fourth amendment cases; in each case the prosecutor, not the defendant, had sought review. In seven of
the nine cases ultimately decided, the Court reversed the court below and held that the police conduct
was lawful. Id. The Burger Court's hostility toward the exclusionary rule has been apparent for many
years, with the move towards narrowing the scope of the rule beginning when Chief Justice Burger
severely criticized the rule in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Wasserstrom, supra note 157, at 259; see also Brennan, supra note 42, at
495; Nock, supra note 32, at 333. For a response to Professor Wasserstrom's article, see Harris, The
Return to Common Sense:A Response to "The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment," 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 25 (1984).
160. The dormant stage ended with State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 108, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). See
infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text. White was one of a series of decisions reached by the
Washington Supreme Court between 1978 and late 1984 that "worked a rather massive change in
search-and-seizure laws through only seven decisions, each of which expressly rejects one or more
United States Supreme Court cases." Nock, supra note 32, at 333. The seven decisions in this series
are:
(1) State v. Hehman, 90 Wn. 2d 45, 47,578 P.2d 527,529 (1978) (after disagreeing with United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the court
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held that in Washington, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations are unjustified, unwarranted
and impermissible). But see RINGER RPoRT, supra note 12, at 9 (arguing that Hehman is not an
independent grounds decision because it makes no specific reference to the state constitution).
(2) State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(relying on broader protection of article 1, § 7, the court rejected United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980), and maintained Washington's automatic standing rule). See Adams & Nock,
Search, Seizure and Washington's Section Seven: Standingfrom Savucci to Simpson, 6 U. PUGET
SouND L. Rnv. 1 (1982).
(3) State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 108, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070 (1982) (in rejecting Michigan v.
DeFellippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), the court held that, unlike the fourth amendment, article 1, § 7
requires the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the "good faith" arrest of a citizen for
failure to comply with a stop-and-identify statute subsequently held unconstitutional). See infra
text accompanying note 183.
(4) State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248 (1983) (rejecting automobile
search incident to arrest doctrine as applied in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) and New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and holding that article 1, § 7 limits warrantless searches
incident to arrest to areas within the arrested person's immediate control and only for the purpose
of removing weapons or preventing the destruction of evidence probative of the crime charged).
See Note, NewLimits on Police Vehicle SearchesIn Washington, 60 WASH. L. REv. 177 (1984). For
a criticism of Ringer, see RNGER REPoRT, supra note 12.
(5) State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn. 2d 814, 821, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984) (the court refused to
follow the Supreme Court's application of the plain view exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement, holding that article 1, § 7 prohibits a police officer's warrantless entry into
the residence of the person just arrested unless the officer possesses specific, articulable facts
showing a threat to safety, a possibility that evidence of the crime will be destroyed, or a strong
likelihood of escape).
(6) State v. Jackson, 102 Wn. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 141 (1984) (refusing to "blindly"
follow the Supreme Court's lead, the state court rejected the Burger Court's new "totality of the
circumstance" test for evaluating warrants based on informant tips adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983), in favor of continued adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli two prong test).
(7) State v. Myrick, 102 Wn. 2d 506, 512, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984) (unlike the fourth
amendment, article 1, § 7 does not recognize an "open fields" exception to the warrant require-
ment). For a complete survey of search and seizure law in Washington see Utter, Survey of
Washington Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 1 (1985).
Each of these seven decisions is based on the same underlying reasoning. Although the United
States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of controversies under the federal Constitution, state court
decisions based clearly and expressly on independent state grounds are not reviewable by the
Supreme Court. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983.). Supreme Court interpretations of
the fourth amendment set minimum standards; greater rights may be afforded under the state
constitution. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn. 2d 814, 816-17, 676 P.2d 419,422 (1984). Based on the
intentional and substantial difference in wording between the fourth amendment and article 1, § 7,
see infra note 316 and accompanying text, the Washington court concluded that the state
constitution mandates that the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure be more expansively
construed. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn. 2d at 439, 688 P.2d at 141.
However, these article 1, § 7 broader protection decisions lacked a unified theory of analysis and thus
did not amount to a clear, predictable, and consistent jurisprudence. Nock, supra note 32, at 346.
Professor Nock offers three theories, the "literal," "orthodox," and "exigency" theory, and urges the
Washington Court to select one of them to place a foundation under its article 1, § 7 jurisprudence. Id.
Others, however, have criticized the court's independent grounds analysis as unprincipled. Justice
Horowitz wrote a "strenuous" dissent in Simpson, criticizing his fellow justices for reaching a result
based on their disagreement with the Supreme Court, rather than on the basis of neutral principles. State
v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 200, 622 P.2d 1199, 1216 (Horowitz, J., dissenting). After the Ringer
decision, a committee was formed at the request of the Washington State Attorney General in
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D. The Modern Period of Independence
1. The Burger Court Approach to Exclusion: A Complete Overhaul of
the Federal Rule
The need to reconsider applying the Washington rule began to resurface
after 1974, when the Burger Court ignored the long established unitary
approach and adopted a bifurcated analysis by deconstitutionalizing the
federal rule in Calandra v. United States. 161 After Calandra, the federal
exclusionary rule no longer automatically applied. 162 Rather, its applica-
tion hinged upon an empirical measurement of the deterrent benefits gained
from suppressing evidence. 163
Although the Burger Court found roots for its selectively applied exclu-
sionary rule in Warren Court decisions, 164 Burger Court jurisprudence has
conjunction with the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and the Legal Advisors
Division of the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs. RINGER REPORT, supra note 12, at
1. The committee issued a stinging criticism of the Ringer decision and the general use of article 1, § 7
to provide broader protection than the fourth amendment. Id. In its report, the Ringer Committee
proposed wording for a constitutional amendment that was introduced in the 1985 session of the
Washington legislature. Id. at 1; See H.J.R. 11, 49th Leg., Regular Session (1985). The "Ringer
Amendment" sought to replace the present text of article 1, § 7 with the wording of the fourth
amendment and to limit suppression of evidence to those situations where the United States Supreme
Court invokes the federal exclusionary rule. Id.
Similar proposals have succeeded in Florida and California. In 1982 the people of California
approved Proposition 8 which amended California State Constitution art. I, to add § 28(d) entitled
"Right to Truth in Evidence," which provides in part that "relevant evidence shall not be exluded in any
criminal proceeding." See People v. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 112 Cal. Rptr. 631,694 P.2d 744, modified,
38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (1985); Blum and Lobaco, The Prop. 8 Puzzle, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1985, at 29; Note,
Wilson v. Superior Court: Voters Reject Judiciary's 27 Year Experiment With the Exclusionary Rule, 6
CRiM. Jus. J. 111 (Fall 1982). Also in 1982, the people of Florida amended their state constitution, by
approving H.J.R. 31-H which requires the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure to "be
construed in conformity with the 4th amendment. . . as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Nevertheless, in Washington, the Ringer Amendment (H.J.R. 11) failed to get out of the Judiciary
Committee during the regular session of the 49th Legislature. Despite the apparent failure of the move
to amend the state constitution, the same result may be accomplished by independent action of the
Washington Supreme Court. The Washington court as presently constituted may be more amenable to
following the United States Supreme Court's lead on fourth amendment issues. Whitely, Supreme Court
Will Begin Session With ChangedLineup, The Seattle Times/Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1984, at
Dli, Col. 1. (Sunday ed.).
161. 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). Calandra concerned whether a grand jury could compel a
witness to answer questions derived from illegally seized evidence. Id. at 347. See Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 17, at 119. For an in depth analysis and criticism of Justice Powell's Calandra opinion, see
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16.
162. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
163. Id. at 349.
164. The Calandra Court's emphasis on the deterrent benefits of the rule was not unique. Justice
Powell's opinion cited Warren Court decisions in support. E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174-75 (1969) (giving birth to the cost-benefit calculus by holding that standing would still be
required because added deterrent value does not justify extending exclusionary rule to one who was not
490
Washington's Exclusionary Rule
displayed an open hostility towards the exclusionary rule. 165 Beginning
with Calandra, the Burger Court has interpreted the fourth amendment in a
manner more closely attuned to the common law's literal construction than
to the Boyd principle. 166 Accordingly, the Burger Court views the constitu-
tional violation as fully accomplished by the unlawful search and sei-
zure.167 Application of the exclusionary rule is not intended, nor is it able,
to cure the already accomplished wrong. 168 This interpretation of the fourth
amendment regards exclusion as unconnected to the constitutional right;
consequently, a court commits no constitutional wrong by admitting the
unlawfully obtained evidence. 169 Under the Burger Court's interpretation,
the exclusionary rule is a remedy judicially, not constitutionally, created to
serve a single purpose: to vindicate fourth amendment rights generally by
deterring future unlawful police conduct. 170 Based on an assumption that
victim of the unlawful search); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (deterrent purpose not
served by applying Mapp retroactively); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (the rule's
purpose is to deter "by removing the incentive to disregard it").
165. Wasserstrom, supra note 157, at 259. The basis of this hostility lies first, in the belief that the
exclusionary rule exacts "enormous" social costs in lost prosections, setting "countless" criminals
free. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2510 (1984); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Second, while exacting this enormous cost, the
rule's immediate effect is to provide a disproportionate benefit to the lawbreaker. Bivens, 403 U.S. at
418-20 (Burger, C.L, dissenting); Friendly, supra note 20, at 951. The rule provides no "succor" to the
innocent victim of the search, whom, it is insisted, the fourth amendment is designed to protect. Bivens,
403 U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wilkey, supra note 122, at 228. But see Loewy, supra
note 18, at 1272 (arguing that the Burger Court fails to recognize the value of the exclusionary rule as a
device for protecting the innocent).
166. Compare the approach taken in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348-54 (1974), and
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984), with thejustification offered for the common law's
nonexclusionary rule set out supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text, an approach rejected by the
originators of the federal exclusionary rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
167. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
168. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,540 (1976); Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348-49.
169. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347; Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
170. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. Two factors influence the Court. First,
since exclusion is incapable of curing the invasion of the defendant's rights, already suffered by the time
the trial has begun, the Court concludes that exclusion is a judicially created remedy, rather than a
personal right guaranteed the defendant under the Constitution. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; Leon, 104
S. Ct. at 3412. Second, the Burger Court has adopted a fragmentary model of a criminal prosecution,
whereby the government as prosecuting and policing agent (the object of the fourth amendment) is
separated from the government as court (the neutral conduit of evidence). Therefore, under this
fragmentary model the "Constitution is not itself violated if the judge decides to admit the tainted
evidence." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3432 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at
254-56. For these two reasons, the Burger Court views the exclusionary rule as a means contrived by
judges to control police. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 256. For the argument in favor of exclusion
as a personal right under the fourth amendment, see Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3438 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Kamisar, supra note 10; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 74.
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deterrence can be empirically measured, 171 and on its characterization of
exclusion as a remedial device, 172 the Burger Court refuses to apply the
exclusionary rule unless the defendant can demonstrate that the rule's
utilitarian deterrent benefits outweigh its societal costs. 173
In sum, the Burger Court has adopted a bifurcated approach, separating
its inquiry into whether the defendant's substantive rights were violated
from its decision whether to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence. 174 If
it reaches the issue of exclusion, the Court selectively applies the exclu-
sionary rule according to the results of a cost-benefit analysis. 75 Ironically,
the Court no longer considers protection of the defendant's rights a benefit
to be included in the cost-benefit calculus. 176 Using this empirical
171. But see, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (1976) (no empirical researcher,
proponent, or opponent of the rule has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has
any deterrent effect). For an analysis of the reasons an empirical measure of deterrence "is possible in
principle" but "impossible in fact," see Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's
Economic Analysis ofLaw, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647,653 (1982) ("Police compliance with the exclusion-
ary rule produces a non-event which is not directly observable-it consists of not conducting an illegal
search.") (emphasis in original).
172. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
173. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
174. Id. at 3412; Illinois v. Gates, 463 U.S. 213, 223 (1983). See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
175. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. As the court itself has acknowledged, it is impossible to measure the
effects of exclusion. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). Although it is apparent that the
exclusionary rule exacts some cost in terms of acquittals and dismissals, the statistical significance of
the available data is open to disagreement. Compare studies and statistics cited in Leon, 104 S. Ct. at
3413 n.6, with 1W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 1.2 (1985 Cum. Sup.), and Kamisar, The Court's Growing
Hostility to the Exclusionary Rule: Leon, Sheppard and Lopez-Mendoza, Prepared Remarks of Yale
Kamisar delivered at U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference, September 14, 1984, Washing-
ton, D.C. (on file at the Washington Law Review). Meanwhile, the benefits are only conjectural.
Morris, supra note 171, at 652-56. Some commentators have suggested that the Burger Court has
dropped the unitary approach in favor of the bifurcated, selective application analysis in order to
emasculate the exclusionary rule without specifically abandoning it. See Burkoff, supra note 129, at
159; see also Kamisar, supra note 10, at 662-63. By demanding that the defendant prove that excluding
the evidence results in future deterrence sufficient enough to outweigh societal costs resulting from the
loss of evidence probative of the defendant's guilt, the Burger Court places on the defendant the burden
of proving the unprovable and thereby predetermines the outcome. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication
and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 330-31 (1973); see also
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 386-87 nn. 103-04 (Burger Court begins its analysis
skeptical of the ability to measure deterrence, resulting in most decisions favoring the government). For
discussions of the Supreme Court's cost-benefit approach, see Canon, Ideology and Reality in the
Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument for Its Retention, 23 So. TEX. L.J. 559
(1982); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 642-50, 655-57; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 74; White,
supra note 72, at 1281-83.
176. Burkoff, supra note 129, at 151, 157. The Burger Court cost-benefit analysis only compares
the benefit society derives from exclusion, in terms of protecting innocent citizens from future illegal
searches, with the costs society bears in the form of freeing criminals. See, e.g., United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412-13, 3419-22 (1984). The cost-benefit analysis no longer takes into account the
benefit derived from protecting the defendant's rights. Yet, the Court continues to require, as a threshold
matter, the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Continued
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approach, the United States Supreme Court has systematically narrowed
the scope of the exclusionary rule's application in a variety of contexts. 177
2. The Return to Independent Application of the Washington
Exclusionary Rule
While it was only a matter of time before the Washington court would have
been asked to decide whether article 1, section 7 compelled a stricter remedy
than the federal exclusionary rule, the courtjumped the gun in the 1982 case
of State v. White. 178 The White court appears to have misconstrued the
Supreme Court's holding in Michigan v. DeFillippo,179 reading it as a
decision curtailing the operation of the federal exclusionary rule. 180 In fact,
adherence to the standing requirement is inconsistent with the deterrence rationale. See supra note 129.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has maintained the standing requirement despite the inconsistency
since Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173-76 (1969). Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MN. L. Rnv. 349, 433 (1974). By placing the cost-benefit burden on the defendant
and by continuing to require the defendant to demonstrate a form of standing, the Burger Court reveals a
sub rosa motivation: its preoccupation with the substantive question of a defendant's putative guilt.
Burkoff, supra note 129, at 153-54. In essence, the Court has allowed the nature of the unlawfully
seized evidence to legitimatize the government's unconstitutional conduct to the extent of allowing its
introduction against the victim of the illegal search. Thus, interest-balancing may not be the real basis
for judgment in the exclusionary rule cases, but may instead be merely a stylish way to write an opinion
once ajudgment has already been reached on the basis of individual, subjective values. Kamisar, supra
note 10, at 642-43.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule does not operate
in grand jury setting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not operate in
federal civil tax proceedings as to evidence illegally seized by state officers); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976) (full and fair opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claim in state court precludes federal
habeas corpus relief sought on grounds of failure to exclude); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268
(1978) (witnesses may testify at trial, even though their identitieswere discovered as a result of unlawful
search and seizure); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (evidence inadmissible in prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief may be used to impeach defendant's statements made on cross-examination);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (exclusion does not operate where defendant's personal
rights not violated despite fact that police intentionally violated rights of a third party to obtain evidence
against the defendant); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (exclusion does not bar evidence
obtained pursuant to defective warrant from use in prosecution case-in-chief if police officers act in
objective good faith reliance on the facial validity of the warrant); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct.
3479 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not operate in civil deportation hearings). By comparing the
incremental benefit to the overall cost, instances of benefit are severely reduced by each prior decision.
Thus, by continuing to curtail the application of the rule, the Burger Court will reach the point where the
benefits to be obtained through application of the rule will no longer outweigh the costs in any situation.
Kamisar, supra note 10, at 664. At that point the total loss of the exclusionary rule may be the "ultimate
cost." Id.
178. 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). In White, the defendant was arrested for violating WASH.
REv. CODE § 9A.76.020(1) and (2), Washington's stop-and-identify statute. After spending a night in
jail, the defendant confessed to a burglary. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 95,640 P.2d at 1063. The issue before
the court was the constitutionality of the stop-and-identify statute and the admissibility of the con-
fession. Id.
179. 443 U.S. 31(1979).
180. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 102, 640 P.2d at 1066.
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the Burger Court never reached the exclusion issue, holding instead that no
fourth amendment violation occurred. 181
Nevertheless, Justice Williams, writing for the White court, rejected the
United States Supreme Court's selective application of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule, characterizing it as not only inconsistent with
federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence, 182 but also inconsistent with the
broader privacy protection contained in article 1, section 7 of the Washing-
ton constitution, and with the forty years of independent state exclusionary
rule jurisprudence. 183 According to the White court, article 1, section 7
requires a unitary approach to exclusion; whenever the "right is unreasona-
bly violated, the remedy must follow." ' 84
181. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 34-40. The defendant had been arrested for violation of a
"stop-and-identify" city ordinance. In a search incident to that arrest, police officers discovered a
controlled substance, and later the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession rather thn for
violation of the stop-and-identify statute. Id. at 33-34. Michigan state courts held the stop-and-identify
statute unconstitutional and reversed the conviction on the grounds that the evidence should have been
excluded. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the arrest was based on probable cause and
made in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid ordinance, even though the ordinance was
subsequently held unconstitutional. Since the arrest was valid, so was the search incident to it. Since no
constitutional violation occurred, the Supreme Court did not address whether or not the exclusionary
rule applied. Id. at 40. See Note, Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure-The Role of Police Officer
Good Faith in Substantive Fourth Amendment Doctrine-Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979),
55 WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1980).
182. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 110-12,640 P.2d at 1071-72. The court criticized the BurgerCourt forits
failure either to adhere to the clear intent of Mapp v. Ohio or to overrule it. Id. at 111, 640 P.2d at 1071.
Justice Williams also rejected the good faith arrest exception as subjective, unworkable, and "contrary
to well established Fourth Amendment principles." Id. at 107, 640 P.2d at 1069. This discussion of the
federal rule was unnecessary because the White court held the DeFillippo decision inapplicable on the
grounds that, unlike the statute in DeFillippo, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.020(1) was "flagrantly
unconstitutional." Id. at 104, 640 P.2d at 1067.
'83. Id. at 110-11, 640 P.2d at 1071. The White court rejected the characterization of the
exclusionary rule as a remedial measure created to deter future unlawful police action. Id. at 105, 640
P.2d at 1068. Instead, the court found :hat article 1, § 7 clearly recognized an individual's right to
privacy with no express limitations, in contrast to the fourth amendment, which focuses on delineating
express limitations on governmental actions. Id. at 110, 640 P.2d at 107 1. In Washington, the protection
of the individual's privacy is the paramount concern. Id. at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071. As long as the
defendant demonstrates that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate, exclusion automatically attaches. Id. at 110 n.9, 640 P.2d at 1071 n.9.
Consequently, article 1, § 7 mandates that exclusion not be selectively applied. Id. at 110-11, 640 P.2d
at 107 1. Justice Hicks in dissent criticized the majority, noting that even if article 1, § 7 affords a broader
privacy protection, the court had broadened the exclusionary rule even beyond the language of article 1,
§ 7. Id. at 115-16, 640 P.2d at 1074 (Hicks, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071. The language employed by Justice Williams was unfortunate
because it implies that a right may be reasonably violated without triggering a remedy. The context of
the entire opinion, including footnote 9, demonstrates that Justice Williams did not intend to suggest
that a good faith violation would not trigger exclusion. Rather, he used "reasonableness" to denote the
standard to be used to determine whether a violation occurred. Id. at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071. Washington
courts have long read reasonableness into the text of article 1, § 7 in that all searches and seizures
without authority of law are unreasonable, while searches and seizures with authority of law are
reasonable. See, e.g., cases cited in State v. McCollum, 17 Wn. 2d 85, 106-12, 136 P.2d 165, 175-76
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Nine months later, in State v. Bonds, 185 the court expounded on the
independent nature of Washington's exclusionary doctrine.186 Bonds re-
quired the court to determine whether the exclusionary rule applied to evi-
dence obtained under unusual circumstances; evidence had been obtained by
Washington police officers incident to arresting the defendant in Oregon and
transporting-him back to Washington in violation of, Oregon law. 187 The
court concluded that although the police conduct was offensive, no article 1,
section 7 violation occurred because the officers had probable cause to arrest
the defendant and did so without violating any Washington law. 188
Having recognized a violation of Oregon law, rather than a violation of
the Washington constitution, the Bonds court felt justified in employing a
bifurcated, rather than a unitary approach.189 Writing for the five member
majority, Justice Pearson focused first on the Washington rule's historical
development, identifying its objectives as (1) protecting the privacy rights
of individuals against unreasonable government intrusions; (2) deterring
future unlawful police conduct; and (3) preserving the judiciary's integrity
by refusing to consider evidence obtained without authority of law. 190 The
Bonds court then applied a cost-benefit analysis, from a slightly different
perspective, 191 and concluded that under the circumstances the societal
(1943) (Millard, J., dissenting). Once a court determines that the right has been violated, exclusion
automatically attaches. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 110, 640 P.2d at 107 1. In a recent case presently awaiting a
decision, the government seized upon the "unreasonable violation" language, arguing that White
should be strictly limited on its facts because the language of the opinion was so broad as to remove any
state action requirement. Respondent's Response to Appellant's Opening Brief at 14, State v. Huft, No.
50948-4 at 14 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard Jan. 28, 1986). The government stretched the import of the White
decision in an attempt to persuade the court to adopt the federal good faith exception. See infra note 202.
185. 98 Wn. 2d 1, 643 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
186. Id. at 9- 5, 643 P.2d at 1029-32. For a discussion of Bonds, see Note, Illegal Extraterritorial
Arrest and Extradition Does Not Give Rise to Application of the Exclusionary Rule as Long as Probable
Cause is Present, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 691 (1982/3).
187. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d at 5-6, 653 P.2d at 1027-28.
188. Id. at 7, 8-9, 14-15, 653 P.2d at 1029-32. In concluding that the defendant's constitutional
rights were not violated, the Bonds court may have been influenced by the heinous nature of the crime
charged. Defendant had been convicted of the first degree murder, rape, and burglary of an elderly
woman who was a customer on defendant's paper route. Id. at 3-4, 653 P.2d at 1026-27. Justice Utter
argued in dissent that "It]he arrest by the officers in this case was quite simply 'without authority of law'
under both Oregon and Washington laws." Id. at 25, 653 P.2d at 1038 (Utter, J., dissenting). Justice
Utter correctly pointed out that probable cause to arrest was not the only issue. Id. at 24, 653 P.2d at
1037. The Bonds majority recognized that article 1, § 7 mandates that even when probable cause exists,
evidence must be suppressed if obtained pursuant to an arrest that fails to follow statutory requirements.
Id. at 9-10, 653 P.2d at 1029-30.
189. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d at 14-15, 653 P.2d at 1032.
190. Id. at 9-14, 653 P.2d at 1029-31.
191. Id. at 11-12, 653 P.2d at 1030. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, Justice Pearson
placed the burden on the state to show that the "costs of suppression in the particular case outweigh the
benefits achieved by suppression." Id.
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costs caused by excluding the evidence outweighed the benefits. 192 Never-
theless, the Bonds court made it clear that when a violation of article 1,
section 7 occurs, the unitary approach must be applied, and a cost-benefit
analysis would be inappropriate and unnecessary. 193
With White and Bonds, Washington's exclusionary rule moved into a
new period of independent application. In addition to the historical sources
and purposes underlying the rule, the court based the modern Washington
rule on the more expansive privacy protection it found in article 1, section
7.194 Although the White and Bonds courts recognized that a defendant had
a right to a remedy when his privacy was unconstitutionally violated, both
courts failed to explain why they automatically applied the exclusionary
rule, rather than an alternative remedy.195
Few of the Justices who made up the White and Bonds majorities remain
on the court.1 96 Thus, given the Burger Court's continued development of
the selective application approach, it is not surprising that the new court has
been asked to decide the future of Washington's independent exclusionary
requirement. 197
III. HISTORICAL CONCLUSIONS: THE STATE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE'S CONNECTION TO THE WASHINGTON
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Although White and Bonds signaled the beginning of the Washington
exclusionary rule's third stage of development, this third period may be
192. Id. at 14, 653 P.2d at 1031-32.
193. Id. at 10-11, 653 P.2d at 1030.
194. Id. at 9-14, 653 P.2d at 1029-31; State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071
(1982).
195. Justice Williams' approach in White has been described as exclusion based on a moral
imperative. Adams & Nock, supra note 160, at 28 (evidence is excluded because "exclusion is morally
right and legally necessary to uphold and vindicate the underlying privacy guarantee"). See also Nock,
supra note 32, at 370 (White "began the process of articulating a theory that would recognize the
exclusionary rule as a moral imperative not requiring utilitarian justification"). The danger of an
exclusionary rule mandated by a moral imperative is that concepts like morality mean different things to
different people and societal morality tends to change over time. Indeed, almost 60 years ago Justice
Brandeis found morality on the side of exclusion. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Today, however, both proponents and opponents of exclusion claim the high
moral ground. For example, Justice Brennan asserts that abandonment of the exclusionary rule would
threaten "the very foundation of our people's trust in their Government on which our democracy rests."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Conversely, Justice
Burger has argued that "a vast number of people are losing respect for law and the administration of
justice because they think that the Suppression Doctrine is defeating justice." Burger, Who Will Watch
the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. Rev. 1,22 (1964) (emphasis in original). See also Barrett, supra note 133,
at 582; Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1035-36.
196. See infra notes 199, 201 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
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short lived. Due to changes in the Washington court's membership, the
court majority that supported a broader state privacy protection no longer
exists. 198 In its place a new majority appears to be forming behind a less
protective interpretation of article 1, section 7, one that more closely
reflects federal search and seizure jurisprudence. 199 Even though the White
198. For example, by 1985 three members of the five-member majority in White are no longer on
the court. Of the five members concurring in the Bonds opinion only two remain on the court. In State v.
Huft, No. 509484 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard Jan. 28, 1986), the government argued that the change in the
court membership could be used by the court to strictly limit White to the facts of the case. Respondent's
Response to Appellant's Opening Brief at 14, Huft.
199. Since late 1984 four new members have joined the court: Justice Barbara Durham, Justice
William C. Goodloe, Justice Keith M. Callow, and Justice James A. Anderson. After the makeup of the
new court crystallized, newspaper articles speculated on the conservative direction the new court would
take. After Justice Durham's appointment, the Seattle Times characterized the court as a body "in
ideological transition," identifying the new justices as having "conservative reputations." Gelernter,
Into The Temple, Seattle Times, Jan. 14, 1985, at CI, col. 1. Justice Durham is quoted as stating that
"judges are responsible in part for crime in America" and that "the justice system isn't really doing
justice to the victims yet." Id. at Cl, col. 2. In an earlier article, the Seattle Times predicted that the new
court majority would take a more conservative approach to the court's rulings. Whitely, Supreme Court
Will Begin Session With Changed Lineup, Seattle Times/Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1984, at
DII, col. 1 (Sunday ed.).
A sign that the new court may not apply independent state grounds analysis using article 1, § 7 came
in State v. Marchand, 104 Wn. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). New Justices Callow and Goodloe joined
with four holdover members of the court to hold that although authorized by WASH. REV. CODE
46.64.060-.070, police daylight "spot checks" of automobiles to check the driver's license and
registration were unconstitutional because there were no constraints on police officer discretion as to
which vehicles to stop. Id. at 440-41, 706 P.2d at 228. However, the Marchand majority based its
decision, not on article 1, § 7, but rather on the fourth amendment, relying on the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Marchand, 104 Wn. 2d at
436-38,706 P.2d at 226-27. Although Justice Brachtenbach's opinion for the court stated that the issue
required analysis of the relationship of the fourth amendment and article 1, § 7, the court never reached
the question under the state constitution. Id. at 441,706 P.2d at 228. Since the court found that the "spot
checks" violated the federal provision, arguably, there was no need to look to article 1, § 7. Id. at 441,
706 P.2d at 228. While this approach can be criticized because no federal issue exists unless state law
fails to provide the protection sought, see infra note 205 and accompanying text, -it also leads to
speculation that Justices Callow and Goodloe would not have joined a majority opinion based on state
constitutional grounds. Although the dissent disagreed with the majority's view of Prouse and viewed
the "spot checks" as constitutional under the fourth amendment, it-neglected to take the next logical
step, determining whether the police conduct violated article 1, § 7. Marchand, 104 Wn. 2d at441-42,
706 P.2d at 228-29 (Durham, J., dissenting).
At this point, predictions as to the "new court's" attitude towards article 1, § 7 are speculative.
However, the court has heard oral argument on two cases that provide opportunities to limit the state
exclusionary rule or to overrule one or more broader protection decisions and thereby put an end to
independent interpretation of article 1, § 7. State v. Stroud, No. 51501-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard May 15,
1985); State v. Huft, No. 50948-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard Jan. 28, 1986). Stroud concerned the validity
of an automobile search conducted incident to the defendants' arrest for theft. Respondent, State of
Washington's Opening Brief at 1-3, State v. Stroud, No. 51501-8 [hereinafter cited as Respondent's
Opening Brief]. The search incident to arrest occurred prior to Ringer, in which the Washington court
overruled prior case law and confined such searches to those meeting certain conditions. State v.
Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). Police had spotted defendants at 5:00 AM breaking into
a softdrink machine on the premises of a closed service station. Respondent's Opening Brief at 4.
Parked just in front of the machine was an automobile with its lights on, the engine running, and the
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and Bonds courts rejected the federal approach to exclusion,200 it was
inevitable that the court's new membership would be asked to conform the
state exclusionary rule to the Burger Court's flexible, selectively applied
exclusionary doctrine. 201 Consequently, the court now must decide
whether to adopt the good faith exception-the Burger Court's most far-
reaching exclusionary rule modification. 202
passenger door open. Id. at 4-5. Both defendants disclaimed any connection to the automobile. After
placing the defendants in the patrol car, one of the officers spotted a loaded revolver in the automobile.
The officer entered the vehicle, seized the revolver, conducted a thorough search of the auto, including
the luggage and glove compartments, and discovered various narcotics related items covered with
narcotics residue. Id. at 5-7. At the same time, the other officer contacted the owner of the vehicle. Id. at
8. At trial, the court denied a motion to suppress, concluding that the police officer had probable cause
to enter the vehicle and, in any event, the seizure was justified as resulting from a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Id. at 11. Defendants were convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics and they
appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, which certified the case directly to the Washington
Supreme Court.
Stroud presents various options for resolution. For example, the government argued that the court
could reject the appeal strictly on procedural grounds, in that the defendants failed to challenge the trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 10. In addition to a possible procedural disposition
of the case, the court has several alternatives to resolve the appeal on the merits. Since the search took
place prior to the Ringer decision, even further choices are presented. Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court's options for resolving the Stroud appeal include: (1) affirming the convictions by refusing to
retroactively apply Ringer; (2) finding that the facts indicate the presence of the Ringer requirements for
a search incident to arrest: the area searched was within the arrested person's immediate control, and the
search was necessary either to prevent the suspect from reaching a weapon, effecting an escape, or
destroying evidence of the crime for which he was arrested, see Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 699-700, 674
P.2d at 1248; (3) overruling Ringer and finding the search constitutional under the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(police need not make search concurrent to the arrest; a contemporaneous search is constitutional); (4)
overruling State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), thereby discontinuing automatic
standing for defendants charged with crimes that have, as an essential element, possession of the thing
seized; (5) following the Burger Court decision in Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), by adopting
an inevitable discovery exception to the state exclusionary rule, finding that the police would have
inevitably discovered the evidence in a lawful impoundment search; or (6) going beyond the good faith
exception adopted by the Burger Court in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), by adopting a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the warrantless context: since Ringer had not yet been
decided, the police officers acted in the good faith belief that they did not need a warrant, and
consequently no purpose would be served by suppression of the evidence.
How the court chooses to resolve Stroud will clearly indicate what direction it will take in search and
seizure cases under article I, § 7. In addition, in Huft, supra, the government argued that, inter alia, the
facts of the case offered the Washington Supreme Court the opportunity to bring the exclusionary rule in
line with its federal counterpart by limiting State v. White and adopting a good faith exception. See infra
note 202.
200. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 108-12, 640 P.2d at 1070-72. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying
text.
201. Nock, supra note 32, at 374. Professor Nock correctly predicted that the court would be asked
to adopt the good faith exception.
202. The Burger Court adopted a limited good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984), and applied it in a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
Under the good faith exception, a court will not exclude evidence obtained by a police officer pursuant
to a facially valid warrant subsequently held defective. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416. See infra notes 261-80
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and accompanying text. The good faith issue is now before the Washington Supreme Court in State v.
Huft, No. 50948-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard Jan. 28, 1986). Huft concerns an appeal by a defendant
convicted of maintaining a marijuana growing operation in his home. Physical evidence and statements
were obtained under a search warrant. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Huft. A neutral magistrate
determined the existence of probable cause based on an anonymous tip, information secured from a
public utility without a warrant that showed a large increase in the defendant's electrical usage, and
further police investigation that confirmed certain elements of the informant's information. Respond-
ent's Response to Appellant's Opening Brief, Huft, Affidavit, at app. A. At trial, defendant moved to
suppress, challenging the sufficiency of the facts and circumstances used to determine probable cause
and claiming that the warrantless search of defendant's utility records was an illegal search. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 1-2, Huft. The trial court found that the warrantless search of utility records was not a
constitutional violation. On the question of probable cause, the trial court at first found the warrant to be
insufficient, but then reversed itself, applied the federal "totality of the circumstances" test articulated
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and held that probable cause had been established. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 1-2, Huft. The court then went on to hold that, in any event, the police officer acted in
good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant, and the Leon good faith exception authorized the
admission of all evidence and statements. Id. at 3. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that White
compelled application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at v. In response, the government contended that
White should be limited to its facts and that adopting the good faith exception "'would be an immense
step in restoring the public's confidence in the criminal justice system." Respondent's Brief at 15-16.
Thus, Huft presents the court with the good faith/selective application issue. The Washington court's
first opportunity to adopt a good faith exception came in State v. Stroud, No. 51501-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
heard May 15, 1985), which is currently before the court. See supra note 199. However, if the court
chooses to adopt such an exception under the facts in Stroud, it will be a broader exception than that
adopted thus far by the Burger Court. Id. Whether the Washington court seizes either opportunity to
alter the exclusionary rule remains to be seen. This Comment argues that the theoretical basis
underlying the Washington exclusionary rule is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's selectively
applied exclusionary rule, as exemplified by the adoption of the good faith exception. See infra notes
261-80 and accompanying text. However, this Comment does not attempt to evaluate the wisdom of
adopting a good faith exception. For a discussion of the Leon decision, see W. LAFAVE, supra note 18,
§ 1.2, at 8-35 (1985 Cum. Supp.); Bloom, United States v. Leon andIts Implications, 56 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 247 (1985); LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency: United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895(1984); Van de Kamp, The Good Faith Exception-A Warning
Letter to Prosecutors, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 167 (1985); Comment, I Come Not to Praise the Exclusionary
Rule But to Bury It, 18 CROIGHToN L. REv. 819 (1984-85); Comment, United States v. Leon and
Massachusettes v. Sheppard: How Far Should Good Faith Extend?, 12 W. St. U. L. Rev. 859 (1985);
Note, United States v. Leon: The Long Awaited GoodFaith Exception Has FinallyArrived, 36 MERCER
L. REv. 757 (1985); Note, United States v. Leon: The Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 30 S.D.L. REV. 169 (1984); Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule-A Panel Discussion, 6 WHrTIR L. REV. 979 (1984); Note, Exclusionary Rule-Good Faith
Exception, 98 HARv. L. REv. 108 (1984). For discussions in support of "good faith" exceptions
generally, see H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 260-62 (1967); Ball, supra note 17; Bernardi, The Exclusion-
ary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 51 (1980); Brown, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 23 S. TEx. LJ. 655 (1982); Carrington, GoodFaithMistakes and the ExclusionaryRule, I CrIM.
J. ETHics 35 (Summer/Fall 1982); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to
the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1978); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If
the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736,740 (1972). For criticism of "good faith" exceptions in
general, see Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551,
585-615 (1984); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 333-59 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15;
Schiag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: GoodFaith Limitations andDamage Remedies, 73 J. CsuM.
L. & CRmNOLOGY 875 (1982); Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 274-75, 304-09, 336-40 (1984);
Comment, The Exclusionary Rule And A Good-Faith Exception Is it Timefor a Change?, 35 MERCER
L. REv. 699 (1984).
499
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:459, 1986
No one challenges the Washington court's power to independently
interpret the state constitution and reject the Supreme Court's approach to
exclusion. 203 Rather, disagreement centers on the circumstances that make
it "legitimate" for the court to reject Supreme Court reasoning and re-
sult.20 4 Some jurists and scholars argue that United States Supreme Court
decisions should not be accorded presumptive validity by state courts
interpreting their own constitutions. 20 5 Others contend that disagreement
203. See, Nock supra note 32, at 334; Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. Rev. 353, 355 (1984). In
Washington, even critics of the article 1, § 7 broader protection analysis have expressly recognized that
the Washington court has the power to so interpret the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95
Wn. 2d 170, 199, 622 P.2d 1199, 1216 (1980) (Horowitz, J., dissenting); State v. Davis, 38 Wn. App.
600, 607, 686 P.2d 1143, 1147 (1984) (Durham, J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that since federal interpretation of constitu-
tional guarantees establishes the minimum level of protection, state supreme courts have the power to
interpret state constitutional provisions as providing broader protection for individual rights. Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). The Supreme court will not
review state decisions as long as the state court "indicates clearly and expressly that [the decision] is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds." Long, 463 U.S. at
1041. However, the Long approach reverses the Supreme Court's traditional presumption that state court
decisions are intended to be independent unless the record clearly shows otherwise. Id. at 1066
(Stevens, J., dissenting). This reversal of the traditional presumption is indicative of the attitude held by
some members of the Supreme Court who are not pleased with the rise of independent grounds
decisions in state courts. Chief Justice Burger, forexample, demonstrated his displeasure by applauding
the decision by the people of Florida to amend their state constitution to conform with the fourth
amendment. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 638 (1983).
204. This Comment uses the term "legitimacy" to "refer to the debated propriety of the state
courts reaching results under their constitutions, contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions rendered
under similar or identical federal constitutional provisions." Williams, supra note 203, at 355 n.3.
205. Justice Brennan has argued that state courts should not view Supreme Court decisions as
dispositive of state constitutional issues, but rather such decisions can claim precedential weight only if
they are logically persuasive and well reasoned. Brennan, supra note 42, at 502. Justice Brennan did not
address whether state courts need look at federal precedent at all. One view, the "second look
doctrine," assumes that independent state constitutional analysis is unnecessary when the Supreme
Court expansively construes the federal constitution. However, when the Supreme Court declines to
provide protection under the federal Constitution, state courts must interpret their own constitutions.
Because of the differences between the state and federal judicial systems, Supreme Court interpreta-
tions should not be viewed as presumptively valid. See Williams, supra note 203, at 396-97.
Others believe that state constitutional provisions and precedent should be examined before their
federal counterparts. Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court believes that regardless of whether
the state constitutional issue is raised before, after, or simultaneously with the United States Constitu-
tion, "lawyers and judges should feel free to adopt modes of analysis that differ from those employed by
the United States Supreme Court." Utter, supra note 154, at 506. For Justice Utter, "United States
Supreme Court decisions should be given the same weight and respect as decisions of courts of sister
states interpreting similar provisions of their own constitutions [and] Washington . . . courts should
not feel compelled to . . . explain why they chose not to follow the federal rule in a case involving a
similar or even identical provision of our Declaration of Rights." Id. Justice Utter has identified five
reasons why state courts should look first to the state constitution: (1) the very nature of the federal
system places state courts under a duty to independently interpret and apply the state constitutions; (2)
protection of the fundamental rights of Washington's citizens was intended to be a separate function of
the state constitution; (3) turning to the state constitution first helps develop a body of independent
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with the Supreme Court is often unprincipled, result-oriented decision
making. Under this approach, state court disagreement with Supreme
Court interpretations is legitimate only if based on a set of neutral, objec-
tive criteria. 20 6
jurisprudence; (4) a principled body of law will develop to dispel the appearance of a result orientation;
and (5) it is improper and premature to apply the federal Constitution before the Washington constitu-
tion just as it is improper to decide a case on constitutional grounds when statutory grounds would
suffice. State v. Coe, 101 Wn. 2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984).
When a court looks first to the state constitution, "no federal issue is properly reached when the
state's law protects the claimed right." Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory & State Courts, 18
GA. L. REv. 165,178 (1984). Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court argues that no judicial review
of state action is required under the fourteenth amendment unless a state court decides, after looking to
its own precedent and constitution, that the state constitution does not provide the protection sought. If a
state court holds that the state constitution does not provide the protection sought, then it is proper for
the court to determine if the failure to provide protection violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L.
REv. 125, 133-35 (1970). Supreme Court opinions are not "presumptively the right answer to be
followed unless the state court explains why not." Linde, E Pluribus, supra, at 179. Justice Linde
suggests that state courts should ask "what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to the case at
hand," rather than looking to whether a state constitutional guarantee is broader than its federal
counterpart. Id.; see also Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills ofRights, 9U. BALT.
L. REv. 379 (1980). Butsee Deukmejian &Thompson, AllSailandNoAnchor-JudicialReview Under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 975,990 (1979) (arguing that the "the existence
of conflicting federally protected rights should foreclose resolution of a case on a basis of the state
constitution"); see also Keiman, Forward: Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27
WAYNE L. Rev. 413, 429 (1981); Comment, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1357 (1982); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a
Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1977).
206. For example, then associate Justice Horowitz' dissent in State v. Simpson recognized the
court's power to independently interpret the state constitution, but he argued that unless the court
eschewed a result-oriented approach, confidence in the judiciary would be undermined. 95 Wn. 2d 170,
199, 622 P.2d 1199, 1216-17 (1980) (Horowitz, J., dissenting). Justice Horowitz put forward four
objective criteria that would determine whether it was appropriate for a state court to interpret its
constitution in a manner inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions: (1) are the differences in
constitutional text significant enough to be seen as mandating an independent interpretation?; (2) does
preexisting state jurisprudence justify a result different from Supreme Court decisions?; (3) do unique
local conditions require an independent interpretation?; and (4) what has the Supreme Court said about
the issue in question? Id. at 200-01, 622 P.2d at 1217. See Note, supra note 205, at 297, 318-19.
Justice Durham, while Chief Judge of the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, also
disagreed with the use of independent grounds, arguing that the majority had no principled basis for
interpreting article 1, § 3 in a manner inconsistent with the Supreme Court interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment. State v. Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 606-09, 686 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (1984)
(Durham, C. J., dissenting). In Justice Durham's view, United States Supreme Court decisions are
controlling authority and state courts must have "sound historical reasons" for departing from federal
precedent. Id. at 607-08 n.5, 686 P.2d at 1147 n.1.
Charges that independent grounds decisions are result-oriented or based purely on ideological
differences are most often leveled by dissenters or by those who disagree with the substantive result
reached by a state court. Williams, supra note 203, at 358. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra
note 205 (George Deukmejian, now Governor of California, was the California Attorney General and
Clifford Thompson was an assistant Attorney General during the 1970's when they represented the
losing side on many cases in which the California Supreme Court independently interpreted the state
constitution).
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Due to the formation of a new court majority, this Comment assumes,
arguendo, that in the future the Washington court will continue to distin-
guish the state exclusionary rule from its federal counterpart only if one of
two neutral criteria is present: (1) some meaningful difference, either
historical or textual, between the parallel provisions of the state and federal
constitutions; or (2) a preexisting state exclusionary rule jurisprudence
inconsistent with Supreme Court interpretations. If the Washington Su-
preme Court modifies the state exclusionary rule to conform it to its federal
counterpart, that modification must be consistent with the state rule's
doctrinal and theoretical bases. Initially, the propriety of any modification
hinges on the source in law from which the exclusion requirement derives.
For example, the court may view exclusion as a personal right mandated by
a provision of the Washington Declaration of Rights. The court then has a
constitutional duty to exclude whenever law enforcement officers obtain
evidence by violating the accused's personal article 1, section 7 rights.
However, the court may determine that the rule springs from a court's
inherent supervisory power. Then modification need only be consistent
with the rule's purpose.207
During the origin and development stages of the state exclusionary rule,
the Washington court discussed exclusion in terms of two state constitu-
tional provisions-article 1, sections 7 and 9.208 The nature of the connec-
tion between the rule and these two constitutional provisions determines
the extent to which the court can modify the state exclusionary require-
ment. 20 9 Moreover, modification of the state exclusionary rule may be
barred by the due process guarantee contained in article 1, section 3: the
underlying, albeit unarticulated, premise of the Washington exclusionary
rule.210
A. Article 1, Section 7: Exclusion As a Constitutionally Compelled
Remedy
Whether the relationship between the exclusionary rule and article 1,
section 7 is evaluated in terms of the purposes the remedy was created to
serve or in terms of alternative mechanisms available to enforce article 1,
section 7, the conclusion remains the same. Exclusion is the most effective
remedy to vindicate the defendant's constitutional right to privacy; there-
fore, exclusion is constitutionally compelled by article 1, section 7.
207. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 79-160, 182-97 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 340-74 and accompanying text.
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1. Purposes of the Article 1, Section 7 Exclusionary Rule
The Washington court has never specifically held that article 1, section 7
mandates the exclusionary rule. Rather, the court has viewed exclusion as a
judicially created remedy necessary to enforce the state constitution's
privacy guarantee. 211 While this view of exclusion's source in law appears
identical to the Burger Court view, the Washington conception of the
remedy's constitutional connection and the remedy's purposes differ mark-
edly from that of the Burger Court. As the Washington Supreme Court
observed in State v. Bonds,212 the state rule emanates from a different
perspective than its modem federal counterpart. 213 In Washington, the
exclusionary rule is a personal remedy,214 compelled by article 1, section 7
because only exclusion can effectively vindicate the defendant's right to
privacy. 215 By contrast, the federal rule, after its overhaul by the Burger
Court, is a general, future-oriented remedy, aimed at protecting the collec-
tive rights of innocent citizens216 by deterring future unlawful police
conduct. 217
a. Redressing Invasion of Defendant's Privacy: The Paramount
Purpose
As the Bonds opinion noted, the paramount concern of the Washington
rule is to protect the "privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable
government intrusions. ' 218 More specifically, however, from its very in-
ception in State v. Gibbons,219 the rule's paramount purpose has been to
vindicate the defendant's right to privacy.220 Throughout the exclusionary
rule's development, the court has acted according to the principle that
whenever the defendant's right to privacy is violated, a court must, by
necessity, apply the exclusionary remedy.221 With the formulation of the
211. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
212. 98 Wn. 2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
213. Id. at 11-12, 653 P.2d at 1030.
214. The Washington Court invokes the exclusionary rule in order to redress the past violation to
the defendant's rights and to cure the continuing wrong. See supra notes 122-46, 178-97 and
accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 281-96 and accompanying text.
216. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 417 (1978). This
collective remedy view is reflected in the Burger Court's reliance on the deterrence of future violations
as the only justification for the federal exclusionary rule. See also Loewy, supra note 18, at 1268-69.
217. See supra notes 162-77, infra notes 261-75 and accompanying text.
218. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d at 12, 653 P.2d at 1031.
219. 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922).
220. See supra notes 79-160, 178-97 and accompanying text.
221. State v. Dersiy (Dersiyl), 121 Wash. 455,458,209 P. 837,838 (1922). Although the Gibbons
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Buckley principle, it became even clearer that, unlike the modern federal
rule, the Washington rule acted as a remedy aimed at curing a past harm as
well as preventing a present danger. 222 To the Buckley court, the rule's
paramount purpose was to protect defendants against the state's attempt to
"profit" from the violation of their rights.223
Application of the Washington exclusionary rule has never depended on
the balance between societal and individual interests. The Washington
court steadfastly adhered to its principled automatic approach to exclu-
sion.224 Yet, the court has recognized that it must somehow balance its
responsibility to protect the defendant from the effects of the constitutional
violation with its responsibility to protect innocent citizens from those who
violate the law.225 However, rather than achieving a balance by selectively
applying the exclusionary rule, the court has recognized that the probable
cause requirement 226 strikes the balance between these competing respon-
sibilities. 227 In State v. Miles,228 the court implicitly rejected a cost-benefit
convergence theory quickly faded into the jurisprudential background, the Washington court adhered to
the proposition that a right, once granted, cannot be curtailed simply because society would pay a
further price for extending it. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 200 (1978). Failure to apply a
remedy when the defendant's article 1, § 7 rights are violated would demonstrate that "recognition of
the right in the original case is a sham, a promise that [the government] intends to keep only until that
becomes inconvenient." Id.
222. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. Consistent with the rule's primary purpose,
the Washington court has always required a threshold showing that the defendant's personal privacy
rights have been violated before exclusion can attach. See supra notes 108, 126-29 and accompanying
text. This "standing" requirement is inconsistent with the federal future-oriented deterrence rationale.
The Washington "standing" rule developed first as a logical extension of the convergence theory, under
which exclusion is a constitutional right. See Burkoff, supra note 129, at 162. After Buckley, the
Washington standing requirement was based on the theory that the evidence is excluded to provide a
remedy for a wrong done to the defendant, and therefore, if the defendant was not wronged, then the
defendant is not entitled to a remedy. See State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 P. 321 (1925); State v.
Vennir, 159 Wash. 58, 291 P. 1098 (1930); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 634 (discussing standing and its
connection to rights in the context of the federal exclusionary rule).
224. See supra notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
225. State v. Young, 39 Wn. 2d 910, 917, 239 P.2d 858, 862 (1952).
226. The Young court employed a definition of probable cause used in Washington since 1930. See
Vennir, 159 Wash. at 64, 291 P. at 1100. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in believing the accused
to be guilty. Young, 39 Wn. 2d at 917, 239 P.2d at 862. Although the Burger Court has lessened the
stringency of the probable cause standard, the Washington court has thus far refused to follow. See State
v. Jackson, 102 Wn. 2d 432,688 P.2d 136 (1984). In Jackson, the court rejected the Burger Court's new
"totality of the circumstances" test for probable cause adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Instead, the Washington court continued to adhere to the traditional two prong test: basis for the
knowledge and credibility of the informant. However, the court now has the opportunity to overrule
Jackson and follow the Burger Court. State v. Huft, No. 50948-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. heard Jan. 28, 1986);
see supra note 202.
227. Young, 39 Wn. 2d at 917-18, 239 P.2d at 862-63.
228. 29 Wn. 2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948).
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approach when it required strict adherence to the article 1, section 7
privacy guarantee,229 even if search and seizure procedures made law
enforcement more difficult and uncertain.230
In the development of the Washington exclusionary rule, the distinction
between a constitutional right and a judicially created remedy was more
semantic than substantive. 231 Whenever the right was violated, the exclu-
sionary remedy had to be applied. 232 In effect, article 1, section 7 compels
a remedy whenever it is violated and to deny the exclusionary remedy is
tantamount to denying the right itself.2 3 3
b. Deterrence: At Most a Hoped-For Side Effect
If the Washington court adopts a selective application approach more in
line with the federal rule, it must hold that the state exclusionary rule is
based solely on the deterrence rationale.234 Yet, the Washington rule's
paramount purpose has been, from its inception, vindication of the defend-
ant's rights, rather than deterrence of future police illegalities.235 Although
the Bonds court accurately identified the utilitarian-based deterrence ra-
tionale as a secondary objective of the Washington exclusionary rule, 236 the
deterrence rationale did not play a major role in Washington jurisprudence
229. Id. at 926, 190 P.2d at 743.
230. Id. at 932-33, 190 P.2d at 746.
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if such arrests and searches
cannot be made, law enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after
consulting the lessons of history, designated our [clonstitution to place obstacles in the way of too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people
than the escape of some criminals from punishment. Taking the law as it has been given to us, this
arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of those who excuted them.
ld.(quoting from United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 229 (1948)). The Miles court appears to have
assumed that any balance in competing values had been conducted by the framers of article 1, § 7 and
that the court had no power to alter that balance. Justice Simpson, writing in dissent for the four-justice
minority in City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn. 2d 788, 199 P.2d 95 (1948), stated that although
exclusion shields the guilty from the justice of the law they have flouted, nevertheless the obligation of
the judicial oath requires courts to exclude evidence to maintain defendants' constitutional rights
whenever they have been violated. Id. at 804, 199 P.2d at 103.
231. Whenever the defendant's article 1, § 7 right was violated, the exclusionary remedy had to be
applied. See supra notes 79-147 and accompanying text. See infra notes 281-96 and accompanying
text. Some commentators have reached the same conclusion about the federal exclusionary rule. See
Burkoff, supra note 129, at 187.
232. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
233. See Burkoff, supra note-129, at 186-87.
234. See supra notes 163-77 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
236. State v. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d 1, 12, 653 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831
(1983).
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until after Mapp v. Ohio.237 The history of the state exclusionary rule
reveals that if deterrence played a role at all in the rule's origins and
development, it was merely as a hoped-for side effect. 238 There is no
suggestion in either Gibbons, Buckley, or any other pre-Mapp state exclu-
sionary rule decision, that the rule's survival depended upon proof that it
significantly deters future unlawful police behavior.239
Since the Buckley principle cites public policy as one source of the
requirement that the state not profit from unlawfully obtained evidence, one
could argue that by denying the state any profit, the thrust of the principle
was to deter future violations.240 However, the Buckley court expressed no
concern with future deterrence in its discussion of the exclusionary rule.
Rather, that secondary concern was implicit in the court's recognition of
the deterrence already contained in Washington's criminal statutes. 241 The
Buckley court explicitly noted that section 2240-1 of the Remington Com-
piled Statutes made it unlawful for police officers to search residences
without a search warrant. 242 In fact, Justice Fullerton characterized this
criminal statute as having been deficient before the legislature added
section 2240-2, which made police violations a gross misdemeanor.243
Given the preexisting deterrent capabilities of the statutes, 244 and the fact
that the Washington court also encouraged tort damage actions to vindicate
237. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Only after the federalization of the exclusionary rule in Mapp did
Washington decisions begin to explicitly rely on the deterrence rationale. See supra notes 151-59 and
accompanying text. Even Washington Supreme Court decisions based on the broader protection
accorded by article 1, § 7 now cite the deterrence rationale as an objective of the state exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d at 108,640 P.2d at 1070 (citing the need to deter future legislative as
well as police conduct); State v. Hehman, 90 Wn. 2d 45, 49, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978) (to deter
pretextual misdemeanor arrests).
238. See supra notes 79-146 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 79-146 and accompanying text. Professor Kamisar has reached the same
conclusion concerning federal cases prior to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Kamisar, supra
note 10, at 599-600.
240. Deterrence of future violations must certainly have played some role in the public policy
formulation that mandated the Buckley principle's prohibition against the state profiting from its
unconstitutional conduct. See State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 89, 258 P. 1030, 1031 (1927).
241. Id. at 90,258 P. at 1031.
242. Id. at 90, 258 P. at 1031. REM. COMP. STAT. § 2240-1 (1922) provided that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any policeman or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling-house or
place of residence without the authority of search wanant issued upon a complaint as by law provided."
243. Buckley, 145 Wash. at 90, 258 P. at 1032. RM. COMP. STAT. § 2240-2 (1922) provided that
"[a]ny policeman or other peace officer violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor." At this time gross misdemeanors were punishable by imprisonment in county jail for
not more than one year and/or by a fine not to exceed $1000. REM. COMP. STAT. § 2267 (1922).
244. The statute, especially after the institution of the stiff penalty, put policeman on notice as to
what was expected of them. It follows that the statute was expected to deter policeman from violating
article 1,§ 7 just as other criminal laws act as deterrents to the commission of crime. See H. PAcKER,
supra note 20, at 39-46.
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the rights of the "innocent, " 245 it is illogical to assume that the Washington
court created and applied the exclusionary rule for the purpose of deterring
future law enforcement violations. 2
46
c. Judicial Integrity vs. Judicial Review
Finally, the preservation of judicial integrity was not an historical objec-
tive of the Washington rule. 247 Like the deterrence rationale, judicial
integrity was not offered as a justification for the state exclusionary rule
until after Mapp v. Ohio required the Washington court to apply the federal
exclusionary rule. 248
Although the Washington Supreme Court has never applied exclusion
solely to protect the judiciary's integrity, the court has, since Buckley,
viewed exclusion as a judicial tool, essential to preserve the dignity of the
state itself.249 Presumably, the state's dignity is involved because allowing
245. See, e.g., Ladd v. Miles, 171 Wash. 44, 52, 17 P.2d 875, 878 (1932) (where search warrant
issued on the basis of hearsay and without probable cause, malice is inferred and the sheriff, as well as
his deputies, can be held liable in tort for malicious prosecution); Olson v. Haggerty, 69 Wash. 48, 52,
124 P. 145, 147 (1912) (search proceedings maliciously instituted or prosecuted without probable cause
may be made the basis for an action for malicious proceeding).
246. Over 30 years afterBuckley, Justice Finley identified Washington's criminal sanctions and tort
damage actions as sufficient deterrents to future unlawful police conduct. State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn. 2d
92, 99-101,241 P.2d 447,451 (1952) (Finley, J., concurring). If exclusion was aimed only at deterring
future violations, then adding it to the already existing statutory deterrent and the common law tort
deterrent would exemplify what Judge Posner calls an excessive sanction. See Posner, Excessive
Sanctions For Governmental Misconduct In Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. Rnv. 635 (1982). For a
response to Judge Posner, see Morris, supra note 171.
247. But see State v. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d 1, 12, 653 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1982) (identifying judicial
integrity as a secondary exclusionary rule rationale), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
248. See, e.g., State v. Cory, 62 Wn. 2d 371,378, 382 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1963) (a court should not
participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers by admitting the
fruits of an illegal search). Despite the rhetorical appeal of the integrity rationale, it is doubtful that it
ever served as the basis of a court's decision. Oaks, supra note 20, at 669; Schrock & Welsh, supra note
16, at 264. The Washington Supreme Court's failure to apply the exclusionary rule in a case like Bonds
illustrates the point. There, the police, at a minimum, violated the laws of another state and illegally
extradited a defendant back to Washington.
Many see judicial integrity as the original justification for the federal rule. United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 3455 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The integrity rationale is often traced to Justices
Holmes' and Brandeis' dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,469-85 (1928). See United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 358-59 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 16, at 258-60,262-65. However, under the Burger Court's selective application approach, judicial
integrity is no longer considered a separate rationale for the federal exclusionary rule. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
at 3420-21 n.22 (whether a failure to exclude offends the court's integrity is essentially the same inquiry
as to whether exclusion would serve its deterrent purpose).
249. State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 89, 258 P. 1030, 1031 (1927). The concept of exclusion as a
method of prohibiting the government from profiting by its violation of the defendant's rights has no
direct connection to the goal of preserving judicial integrity. State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227,666 P.2d 802,
807 (1983).
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the state to profit from its violation of article 1, section 7 eviscerates the
state's constitutional provision in the defendant's case. Since Marbury v.
Madison,250 a court's power of judicial review has stood between the
individual and governmental attempts to circumvent constitutional
guarantees. Consequently, in the context of executive actions violative of
article 1, section 7, the Washington court's strict and unwavering commit-
ment to an automatically applied exclusionary rule can be seen as simply
another manifestation of the court's inherent power to judicially review
governmental actions and nullify them if the court finds them unconstitu-
tional. 25 1
Just as judicial review gives meaning and force to the entire state
constitution by refusing to give judicial effect to government-initiated
unconstitutional conduct, 252 the Washington exclusionary rule saves article
1, section 7 from becoming a meaningless promise.253 Judicial review in
the context of searches and seizures conducted by executive officers should
be no different from judicial review of legislative conduct. 254 Since the
court has an obligation to exercise its power of judicial review to maintain
the defendant's constitutional rights, 255 exclusion allows the court to meet
its responsibility to preserve and protect the constitution by nullifying
unconstitutional governmental conduct. 256
250. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
251. See Kamisar, supra note 10, at 590-91; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 325, 333-36.
252. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 325.
253. If article 1, § 7 lacks meaning without exclusion, a court, in its attempts to effectuate the
intention of the framers, must apply the exclusionary rule. It cannot be presumed that the framers of the
state constitution intended article 1, § 7 to be without effect. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137, 163 (1803). See infra notes 281-339 and accompanying text.
254. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 325. When the Washington court finds a state statute
unconstitutional, it invalidates the law, and refuses to uphold the defendant's conviction under the
statute. See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). The court's response should not
be any different when the issue concerns what remedy to invoke when the executive's conduct violates
the defendant's right to privacy without authority of law.
255. Cf Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn. 2d 788, 804-05, 199 P.2d 95, 103 (1948) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 230, infra notes 358, 374 and accompanying text.
256. Nullification is the sanction most frequently invoked by courts in response to constitutional
violations. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532
(1972). The most complete remedy, and the only real way to nullify the executive's conduct, is to return
the parties, so far as possible, to the situation that would have existed had the illegal search never
occurred. White, supra note 72, at 1278 n.21. One of the first state courts to adopt the exclusionary rule
did so on this basis. State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903). TheBuckley principle's
prohibition against the government profiting by its violation of the defendant's rights also seeks to
restore the status quo ante, as if the "officers had stayed within the law." See State v. Davis, 295 Or.
227, 666 P.2d 802, 807 (1983).
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2. Modification of the Exclusionary Rule Would Not Effectuate Its
Historical Purposes
The Washington court has neither read the exclusionary rule into article
1, section 7 nor expressly characterized exclusion as judicial review.
Assuming that article 1, section 7 was the only possible constitutional
source mandating exclusion, 257 the Washington court's options with re-
spect to the rule's future would include (1) continuing Washington's inde-
pendently based exclusion doctrine; (2) rejecting the present rule in favor of
the more "flexible," empirically-based federal rule; or (3) abandoning the
rule in favor of an alternative remedy.
Before making this choice, the justices must confront the difficult
question that separates a unitary from a bifurcated approach: whether it is
appropriate to take into account the tension created by the court's compet-
ing responsibilities. 258 As the "guardian" of the defendant's personal
constitutional rights, the court has a responsibility "to resist every en-
croachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights." 259 However, the court must also protect "society,
group interests and rights equated with the concepts of ordered liberty and
freedom through government under law." 260
257. Article 1, § 7 is not the only possible source of a constitutional mandate of exclusion. This
Comment argues that both article 1, §§ 9 and 3 mandate the exclusionary rule. See infra notes 298-374
and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 19-28, infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
259. James Madison, Address to First Congress, I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789). The framers of
the Washington Declaration of Rights took special care to ensure that courts would not forget their
responsibility to preserve individual rights by expressly making mandatory provisions such as article 1,
§ 7. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 29. In addition, the framers recognized the dangers of gradual encroach-
ment on civil liberties and reminded all who read the Declaration that "frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual right, and the perpetuity of free
government." WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 32. See also State v. McCollum, 17 Wn. 2d 85, 95-96, 136 P.2d
165, 169-70 (1943) (Millard, J., dissenting). One of these fundamental principles that the court must
keep in mind is the Boyd principle, that constitutional guarantees such as article 1, § 7 must be liberally
construed because a close and literal construction robs it of its efficacy, and leads to the gradual
depreciation of the right. State v. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d 51, 65, 483 P.2d 630, 638 (1971) (Rosellini, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
260. Finley, supra note 16, at 384. Judges cannot insulate themselves from the public perception
that the exclusionary rule frees large numbers of criminals, thus increasing the crime rate and
frustrating society's ability to prosecute criminals and protect itself. See, e.g., Q & A With The Attorney
General, 71 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (July 1985). In addition, it is impossible for the justices to completely put
aside their own personal preferences, political slants, and values. F. RODELL, NiNE MEN 29-30 (1955).
Thus, many scholars and jurists make a persuasive argument that the courts must take positions that
further the governmental and societal goal of enforcing the law and combatting crime. See H. PAcKER,
supra note 20, at 158; Gelernter, supra note 199 (quoting Justice Durham). As Justice Durham's
comments to the newspapers reveal, individual justices are concerned with the freeing of the undeniably
guilty on what they perceive as technicalities in the law. Gelernter, supra note 199. Attorney General
Meese also expressed publicly the view that criminal suspects are guilty and undeserving of protection
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Altering the scope of the exclusionary doctrine to balance the competing
values would be appropriate if the Washington Supreme Court operated in a
jurisprudential vacuum. However, the court's prerogative is constrained by
the Declaration of Rights and the principles established by the over forty
years of independent state exclusionary rule jurisprudence developed prior
to the Burger Court's adoption of the selective application approach.
Unless the court is willing to repudiate Washington's independent jurispru-
dence, any modification in the application of the exclusionary remedy must
be logically consistent with the purposes underlying the Gibbons/Buckley
doctrine.
a. Selective Application, Good Faith, and the Washington Rule
The Washington rule's underlying principles -and paramount purpose are
inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the flexible, selectively
applied federal rule. 261 This inconsistency can be demonstrated by compar-
ing, for example, the Washington rule's underlying principles and purposes
with the doctrinal elements relied upon by the Burger Court to adopt the
good faith exception in United States v. Leon,262 the most far-reaching
selective application decision to date. 263
under the Miranda rule. Shenon, Meese and His New Vision of the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1985, at B10, col. 3. Nevertheless, objective analysis refutes this line of thinking. First, it is disin-
genuous to argue, as many do, that the framers meant the guarantee against unlawful search and seizure
to protect only the innocent. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 133, at 581; Wilkey, supra note 122, at 228.
The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches derived out of the use of writs to
enforce unpopular laws. Colonial Americans wished to protect the illegal business of "smuggling" the
ingredients of New England rum. Search and Seizure in the Old Days, supra note 54, at 712. See R.
RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 11, 25 (1983); Comment, Defining Fourth
Amendment Searches: A Critique of The Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REv.
191, 203-04 (1985). Second, it is irrelevant that, in cases where police conduct is only "marginally
illegal," the defendant receives a benefit totally disproportionate to the wrong suffered. See Friendly,
supra note 20, at 951. The important point is the fact that police have acted illegally, not the quantum of
the illegality. The necessity of bringing criminals to justice cannot justify illegal search and seizure.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,282 P.2d 905,907 (1955) (opinion ofTraynor, J.). Nor is criminal guilt
a factor. Justices must be concerned with protecting the rights of the defendant before them, without
regard to guilt. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 907. The framers of article 1, § 7 made the choice that the privacy of
the guilty, as well as the innocent, should be secure from unlawful police activities, despite the cost. See
Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting); State v. Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 190
P.2d 740 (1948).
261. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
262. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
263. Kamisar, supra note 175, at 12-14. Leon and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), marked the first time that the Supreme Court employed the selective application
analysis to hold that exclusion does not operate in the prosecution's case-in-chief against the victim of
the search. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Currently, this good faith "reliance" exception only applies in the warrant context. Sheppard, 104 S.
Ct. at 3428. However, there is every reason to believe that the Court will, at its first opportunity, adopt
the more inclusive "good faith mistake" exception that extends to warrantless searches, where the
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The Leon Court adopted a good faith exception that makes exclusion
inapplicable whenever "the officer conducting the search acted in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid." 264 To reach this
conclusion, the Supreme Court employed its selective application analy-
sis.265 First, the Leon Court rearticulated the Calandra conception of
exclusion; the federal exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally mandated
personal right of the defendant, but rather a judicially-created remedy. 266
On its face, this appears to be consistent with the historic relationship
between the Washington exclusionary rule and article 1, section 7, but the
similarity is semantic rather than substantive.267
Second, the Court observed that the federal remedy seeks to vindicate
fourth amendment rights generally by deterring future unlawful police
conduct. 268 This view is inconsistent with the Washington remedy's para-
mount purpose: the vindication of the defendant's personal right to privacy
as opposed to article 1, section 7 rights generally. 269
Third, the Leon opinion notes that as a remedy, the exclusionary rule is
applied only when it efficaciously serves its sole purpose-deterring future
unlawful police conduct. 270 Washington jurisprudence also requires that
exclusion apply only when it serves its paramount purpose.271 In Washing-
ton, however, the paramount purpose has always been the protection of the
defendant's personal right to privacy.272
Fourth, the Leon Court applied the deterrence rationale's concomitant
cost-benefit analysis and determined that excluding evidence obtained in
good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant would not deter future police
officer has an objectively reasonable, although mistaken, good faith belief that his actions conform to
fourth amendment requirements. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413-14. Kamisar, supra note 175, at 49; Note,
Exclusionary Rule-GoodFaith Exception, supra note 202, at 109. Overhauling of the federal rule will
not cease with the adoption of the broader "good faith mistake" exception. The Burger Court has
indicated a willingness to abandon application of the exclusionary rule, even in cases of substantial and
deliberate violations, should a more efficacious sanction be developed. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413-14.
264. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3428 (1984).
265. For a description of the selective application approach, see supra notes 161-77 and accom-
panying text.
266. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
267. See supra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
268. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
269. See supra notes 79-146, 182-93 and accompanying text.
270. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
271. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 108, 126-29 and accompanying text. Although a "standing" requirement is
inconsistent with the deterrent-based federal rule, the Burger Court continues to require the defendant
to demonstrate that he had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. See
Burkoff, supra note 129, at 164-67. See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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misconduct. 273 Consequently, there was nothing to be gained by society's
willingness to bear the "substantial" costs incurred when exclusion is
required. 274 Use of such a cost-benefit analysis to balance competing
interests is inconsistent with the purposes and underlying theoretical basis
of the Washington exclusionary doctrine. Since the paramount purpose of
the Washington rule is the vindication of the defendant's rights, an em-
pirical measurement is both inappropriate and impossible.275
Under the good faith exception, the Supreme Court recognizes that the
defendant's rights have been violated but a court need do nothing about
it.276 Such a view contradicts the principle that lies at the very heart of the
Washington exclusionary rule and the doctrine of judicial review: when a
right is violated a remedy must attach 277 because "the very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." 278 Furthermore,
the Washington court has recognized that it is inappropriate for a court to
make the state exclusionary rule's application contingent upon balancing
the defendant's rights against those of society.279 Consequently, unless the
Washington court is prepared to repudiate the Gibbons/Buckley rule ap-
plied in Washington since 1922, the court must reject the good faith
exception, as well as the selective application analysis on which it is
based. 280
273. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3420-21.
274. After determining that officers acting in good faith could not possibly be deterred, and that
magistrates who misapply the standards for determining probable cause are not the object of exclusion's
deterrent purpose, Justice White concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 3420-21.
275. It is impossible to quantify the benefit accrued from protecting "privacy" or individual
liberties. Kamisar, supra note 10, at 647. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
276. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. See supra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
278. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). See supra notes 247-56 and
accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., State v. Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948). See supra notes 230, 259-60
and accompanying text.
280. Although selective application is not the solution to the exclusionary controversy, much of the
controversy surrounding exclusion can be avoided by decriminalizing victimless crimes, such as liquor,
gambling, and narcotics offenses, which most frequently provoke police to invade an individual's
privacy. For an exploration of this alternative, see Geller, supra note 11, at 624; Kaplan, supra note 16,
at 1028, 1034.
Another related proposal would selectively repeal the exclusionary rule so that it would only apply to
these lesser, more numerous victimless crimes. Geller, supra note 11, at 624; Kaplan, supra note 16, at
1048-49. Consequently, exclusion would not apply in the most serious crimes, such as "treason,
espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnaping by organized groups." Id. at 1046. It is asserted that
this would allow a court to protect privacy without exacerbating the political hostilities created by the
rule's frustration of the public's need for retribution. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 267-68 n.55;
see also Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1035-36. However, making the Washington exclusionary rule crime-
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b. Abandoning the Exclusionary Rule in Favor of an Alternative
Remedy
If article 1, section 7 compels a remedy to enforce its guarantee of the
defendant's right to privacy, why have Washington courts automatically
applied the exclusionary rule as that remedy, rather than an alternative
enforcement mechanism? In both White and Bonds, the Washington Su-
preme Court failed to explain the automatic application of exclusion to
remedy article 1, section 7 violations. 281 The answer lies in the fact that in
the article 1, section 7 exclusionary context, the "distinction between a
right and a remedy is semantic, not substantive. 282 Whenever a violation
occurs, article 1, section 7 compels the most effective remedy possible, and
to deny that remedy amounts to a denial of the right itself.283 Exclusionary
rule opponents have offered various alternative remedies including crimi-
nal prosecution of the offending officer, injunction against department-
wide violations, an administrative system of rewards and punishments, and
civil damages arising out of-a tort action against the offending officer.284 In
specific would be an unprecedented step requiring the repudiation of the historical basis upon which the
state exclusionary rule was founded. The substantive requirements do not vary according to the crime
charged. A defendant's rights are violated to the same degree by an illegal search regardless of whether
the evidence uncovered is probative of a narcotics violation or a murder charge. In addition, a crime-
specific exclusionary rule would violate the basic premise underlying the state exclusionary doctrine:
whenever a constitutional violation occurs, the remedy must follow. See supra notes 218-33 and
accompanying text.
281. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proposing a damage remedy); Amsterdam, supra note 176, at 409-39
(proposing a system of administrative rules adopted by police departments); Finley, supra note 16, at
389 (contempt charges, administrative remedies, and damage actions); Oaks, supra note 20, at 756
(proposing abolition of exclusionary rule in favor of an effective tort remedy); Posner, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sur'. Cr. REv. 49 (1981) (offering common law tort remedies, tort actions
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and actions under civil rights statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Costs and Viable Alternatives, I J. CRim. JusT. ETmics 16, 17 (1982)
(proposing legislative alternatives of an administrative review board, civil tort action, criminal trial for
offending officer). See generally Wilkey, Constitutional Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S.
TEX. L.J. 30 (1982). Other commentators conclude that alternative remedies are ineffective and thus
exclusion is a consitutionally mandated remedy. See Atkinson, supra note 15, at 24-26; Geller, supra
note 11; Stewart, supra note 10, at 1385-89. For a more general discussion of the effectiveness of
alternatives, see I W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 1.2 (1985 cum. supp.).
Proposals to abandon the exclusionary rule in favor of these various alternatives develop out of the
two main criticisms of the rule. First, the rule is seen as incapable of protecting the rights of innocent
search victims, the only rights the fourth amendment is meant to protect. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at
415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra note 20, at 736-37. Second, many believe that "the
benefit received [exclusion of evidence probative of the defendant's guilt] is wholly disproportionate to
the wrong suffered." Friendly, supra note 20, at 951. See also, Brief for Government at 32-33, United
States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). But see Loewy, supra note 18, at 1248, 1264 (although fourth
amendment exists to protect the innocent, abandonment of the exclusionary rule in favor of tort actions
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theory, since article 1, section 7 does not specify any particular enforce-
ment mechanism, the Washington court could replace exclusion with one
of these alternatives. However, the concept of alternatives is deceptive
because it inherently suggests that one possibility is as effective as the
next. 285
The constitutional provision requires a court to apply the most effective
remedy at its disposal.286 However, alternatives proposed thus far fail to
provide as effective a remedy as the exclusionary rule. 287 Civil damage
suits are too expensive, time consuming, not readily available, and seldom
successful. 288 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that juries would award
damages to compensate guilty defendants for the violation of their rights or
that a police officer would be charged and convicted of a crime for
successfully apprehending the guilty party.289 Such a proposal would allow
the government to "buy" its way out of its obligation to comply with article
1, section 7.290 Damage actions cannot effectively serve the exclusionary
rule's most important function: to protect and vindicate the defendant's
personal right to privacy.291
would be detrimental'to the innocent). For a complete listing of the various criticisms lodged against the
exclusionary rule, see Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Costs and Viable Alternatives, supra.
285. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
286. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955) (opinion of Traynor, J.);
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26; Stewart, supra note 10, at 1383-85.
287. Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26; Kamisar, supra note 10, at 618-20; Stewart, supra note 10, at
1388-89; see also Cahan, 282 P.2d at 913. Those who have argued that exclusion is inferior to other
remedies, do so in the context of protecting only innocent victims of illegal searches. See, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Oaks, supra note 20, at 756-57; Wilkey, supra note 122, at 227-32.
288. Geller, supra note 11, at 656. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is
unrealistic to expect the poor and powerless of our society to pursue remedies against the power
structure. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) (opinion of Jackson, J.). Justice Jackson's
opinion for the Court also noted that innocent victims usually do not care to take steps that will air the
fact that they have been under suspicion. Id.
289. The unlikelihood that defendants would recover demonstrates that damage actions are
inconsistent with one of the main assumptions underlying the state exclusionary rule: that the
defendant's right to privacy deserves protection to the same extent as the rights of innocent victims of
illegal searches. See supra notes 79-146, 179-93, 211-56 and accompanying text.
290. Dellinger, supra note 256, at 1563.
291. State v. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d 1, 28 n.2, 653 P.2d 1024, 1039 n. 1 (1982) (Utter, J., dissenting) (the
Washington court has found such remedies to be inadequate as an alternative to the exclusionary rule),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); Atkinson, supra note 15, at 26; Stewart, supra note 10, at 1387.
Damages are awarded as an affirmative remedy, a nonequity concept through which the government
grants the right to pursue a remedy fora wrong. Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 1109,
1111-12 (1969). By contrast, exclusion is a defensive remedy meant to protect the defendant from the
effects of the illegal search. Id. As a defensive remedy, exclusion is a constitutional remedy, i.e., a
remedy available "as a matter of constitutional right for the redress of constitutional wrongs." Id. In
essence, "damages are awarded and motions to suppress granted for entirely different reasons, and are
hence not fungible 'alternative remedies."' Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 334 n. 199. Moreover, in
all cases in which the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would operate, there would also be
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Criminal prosecutions and injunctions are rarely brought and even more
rarely succeed. 292 While such procedures, along with a system of police
administrative regulations, are probably the the most effective deterrents,
and do not require injured parties to pursue their own remedies, neither do
they serve the state exclusionary remedy's primary purpose, preserving the
effectiveness of the defendant's rights.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the guilty and innocent alike,
alternatives to the exclusionary rule provide little incentive for the victim of
the unlawful search and seizure to bring the legality of the law enforcement
officer's action to the attention of the court. 293 The exclusionary rule,
however, assures that the judiciary pays a great deal of attention to police
practices, 294 which results in comprehensive and clear statements of the
constitutional search and seizure requirements. 295
Arguably, each of the alternative remedies would effectuate the federal
rule's sole objective-protection of the innocent by deterring future viola-
tions. However, the alternatives fail to provide a remedy capable of protect-
ing and preserving the defendant's right to privacy-the paramount pur-
pose of the Washington exclusionary rule. From the defendant's
perspective, the alternatives are, in reality, no sanction at all,296 Conse-
quently, article 1, section 7 compels the exclusion remedy: the only
enforcement mechanism capable of effectuating the state privacy guarantee
by restoring the defendant and the government to the status quo ante. 297
Exclusion, as the only effective enforcement mechanism, is therefore
compelled by article 1, section 7.
immunity from civil damages. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3456 n.35 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715,718(Ist Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2654
(1985).
292. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 1387.
293. Geller, supra note 11, at 655.
294. Id. at 654.
295. Id. at 654-56; see 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, §1.2, at 28 (1978); see also Kamisar, supra
note 10, at 569. Even critics of exclusion recognize that it provides occasion for judicial review, and it
gives credibility to constitutional guarantees. Oaks, supra note 20, at 756. See also Amsterdam, supra
note 176, at 429. For an illustration of the effect of ignoring police practices by failing to adopt an
exclusionary rule, see supra note 50. Justice Linde argues that abolishing the exclusionary rule will be
seen as a decision freeing law enforcement officers from having to abide by substantive constitutional
guarantees. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 242 (1972); see also
Burkoff, supra note 129, at 160-61; Kamisar, supra note 10, at 597.
296. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
297. See White, supra note 72, at 1278 n.21 ("Tbe most natural and complete remedy is to place the
parties so far as possible in the situation that would have existed had the wrong never occurred.").
Although damages may be preferred at private law, such a preference is not applicable "where one party
is the government and the other an individual who holds constitutional rights of liberty and property
against it." Id. Damages constitute an enforced exchange and, although they may be appropriate in the
commercial context "where all things are in principle exchangeable," such an exchange is incompati-
ble with rights against the government and the reasons for the existence of such rights. Id.
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B. Exclusion as a Mandate of Article 1, Section 9: The Influence of
Boyd v. United States on the Framers of the Washington
Declaration of Rights
Although the preceding developmental history demonstrates the exis-
tence of a preexisting independent state jurisprudence inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's approach to exclusion, the Washington court may decide
to repudiate prior case law in order to follow the Supreme Court's lead. 298
However, rejection of the Supreme Court's approach to exclusion in favor
of continuing Washington's independent exclusionary rule is more than just
a legitimate exercise of state supreme court power: the state constitution
requires the court to exclude evidence seized without authority of law.299
In State v. Gibbons, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the Boyd
convergence theory, holding that the introduction of unconstitutionally
seized evidence, in effect, compelled defendants to give evidence against
themselves in violation of article 1, section 9. 300 While its adoption of the
exclusionary rule under a convergence theory reflected the meaning in-
tended by the framers for article 1, sections 7 and 9, the Gibbons court
reached its conclusion on an incorrect basis. In Gibbons, Chief Justice
Parker analogized to the court's earlier decision in State v. Jackson.301 In
Jackson, the court held that the prosecution violated the defendant's article
1, section 9 privilege against self-incrimination by demanding, in front of
the jury, that the defendant produce incriminating documents claimed to be
in his possession. 302 The Gibbons court concluded that the introduction of
illegally seized evidence violated article 1, section 9 in much the same way
as the demand in Jackson.303 Although the Gibbons court failed to explain
298. The Washington court has recently repudiated prior case law dealing with the search incident
to arrest doctrine on the grounds that the reasoning employed to reach such decisions was unsound. See,
e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983) (overruling prior case law that
had expanded the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement as being "without
historic foundation and . . . inconsistent with traditional protections"). For a detailed argument in
favor of courts overruling prior case law, see State v. McCollum, 17 Wn. 2d 85, 112-96, 141 P.2d 613,
615-47 (1943) (Millard, J., dissenting) (attempting to convince the court to overrule cases expanding
the search incident to arrest doctrine as neither well-founded nor well-reasoned). Repudiation, however,
is not a step that should be taken lightly. As the Burger Court recently recognized, "any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311
(1984).
299. See infra notes 300-37 and accompanying text.
300. 118 Wash. 171, 184-88, 203 P. 390,395-96(1922). See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying
text.
301. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188, 203 P. at 396 (citing State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 P. 470
(1915)).
302. Jackson, 83 Wash. at 517-18, 145 P. at 471-72. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
303. Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188, 203 P. at 396 (1922). Although Jackson concerned documents
rather than physical evidence such as whiskey, 83 Wash. at 515, 145 P. at 471, the Gibbons court
attached no significance to the nature of the evidence. See supra notes 72, 86 and infra note 331 and
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the logical connection, 3°4 it must have concluded that the exclusionary rule
was mandated by that aspect of article 1, section 9 that protects the
defendant's right not to testify and prohibits prosecutorial conduct that
would cause a jury to draw negative inferences from the defendant's
decision not to take the witness stand.305
The logic of such an interpretation cannot withstand close scrutiny. The
prosecution's demand in Jackson had no purpose other than to create a
negative inference in the minds of the jury.306 By contrast, the prosecution's
purpose for introducing evidence, even if illegally seized, is to put before
the jury evidence highly probative of the defendant's guilt, not to raise a
negative inference concerning the defendant's failure to testify. The illegal
nature of the evidence in Gibbons was irrelevant. The same inference would
be raised by highly probative evidence seized in a legal search. 307
To the extent that the Gibbons court also implicitly adopted the reason-
ing underlying the Boyd convergence theory, its decision was consistent
with the historical context in which article 1, sections 7 and 9 were drafted.
In 1889, federal law viewed compelling the defendant to produce evidence
and obtaining evidence by an illegal search as equivalents; both methods of
acquiring evidence turned the defendant into the unwilling source of the
evidence in violation of the self-incrimination clause.308 Fifty years later, in
accompanying text.
304. Justice Parker merely stated:
If it be the law, as it clearly is, that the prosecution has no right to make such a demand upon the
accused in the presence of the jury. . , such demand suggesting that what is sought will be
incriminating evidence against the accused, how can it be said that evidence procured in an
unlawful manner through the violation of an accused's [article 1, § 7 right] may be used against
him, as was done in this case?
Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 188-89, 203 P. at 396 (1922).
305. The Jackson court held that the demand in front of the jury violated article 1, § 9 because the
prosecution sought to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against compulsory production of
evidence. The demand placed the defendant under the imputation of guilt. Thus, the prosecution
succeeded either in compelling the accused to defend himself or causing the jury to draw negative
inferences from his failure to do so. Jackson, 83 Wash. at 516-18, 145 P. at 471-72.
306. Id. at 519, 145 P. at 47.
307. However, the point that seemed most important to the Jackson court was that the prosecution's
demand, in effect, accomplished indirectly what the constitution said could not be done directly.
Jackson, 83 Wash. at 518, 145 P. at 472. An illegal search circumvents the privilege against self-
incrimination in much the same way. If evidence cannot be obtained legally, through a valid search
under a warrant, an exception to the warrant requirement, or through a legal subpoena, then unlawfully
acquiring the evidence achieves indirectly what cannot be done directly. It is possible that Justice Parker
and the Gibbons court used this reasoning to find the Jackson holding apposite.
308. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The importance of the Boyd doctrine in Washing-
ton is whether the framers of article 1, §§ 7 and 9 intended to reflect the Boyd convergence theory and
the broad trespassory-based privacy right. Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions limited
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and overruled the Boyd con-
vergence theory. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege
covers compulsion of testimonial or communicative evidence only, not real or physical evidence, and
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State v. Moore,30 9 the Washington court adopted the Supreme Court's
"testimonial" interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination, an
interpretation that would make the Gibbons convergence theory untena-
ble. 310 However, the Moore court relied exclusively on the intentions of the
framers of the federal provision, incorrectly assuming that the framers of
therefore compulsory blood alcohol level tests do not violate the fifth amendment); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (fifth amendment protects person asserting privilege only from
compelled self-incrimination and consequently the contents of business records are not privileged
because they are created voluntarily without compulsion); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472
(1976) ("the continued validity of the broad statements contained in [Boyd] has been discredited by
later opinions); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,617 (1984) (business documents are not privileged
but the act of producing subpoenaed documents cannot be compelled without a grant of statutory
immunity); see also id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Boyd convergence theory is dead; "Fifth
Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind"). But see
id. at 618-19 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court did not
decide that the fifth amendment provides no protection whatever for private papers because there are
certain documents, like private diaries, which no person should be compelled to produce). See also
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) ("[t]he Fifth Amendment theory [of exclusion] has
not withstood critical analysis or the test of time"). However, determining the intent of the framers of
the state Declaration of Rights requires this Comment to focus on federal law as it stood in 1889, making
subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning Boyd irrelevant.
309. 79 Wn. 2d 51,483 P.2d 630 (1971).
310. In Moore, the Washington Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
Washington's Implied Consent Law, WASH. REv. CODE § 46.20.308 (1969) (requiring motorists
suspected of DWI offenses to submit to breathalyzer tests). Justice Finley, writing for the majority,
incorrectly cited State v. Schoel, (54 Wn. 2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959)), for the proposition that where
the state and federal constitutional text is similar, they should receive the same interpretation. Moore,
79 Wn. 2d at 56-57, 483 P.2d at 634. As the dissent pointed out, the Schoel court compared the
identically worded double jeopardy provisions and concluded that they were "identical in thought,
substance and purpose." Id. at 66, 483 P.2d at 639 (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (quoting Schoel, 54 Wn.
2d at 391, 341 P.2d at 481). Justice Finley ignored Washington's history of independence from United
States Supreme Court interpretations of parallel federal constitutional provisions, even where the text is
identical as in article 1, § 3 and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See supra note 83.
However, the Moore court followed Schmerber and held that article 1, § 9 protects against compelled
production of testimonial rather than real or physical evidence. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d at 57, 483 P.2d at
634. Ten years later, the Washington court again refused to rely on independent state grounds to
interpret article 1, § 9 differently from the fifth amendment. State v. Franco, 96 Wn 2d. 816, 829, 639
P.2d 1320, 1327 (1982). Justice Dimmick's opinion declined to overrule Moore, characterizing it as
"stare decisis" on the issue." Id. at 829, 639 P.2d at 1327. Most recently, the Washington court
followedMoore and Franco in State v. Zwicker, 105 Wn. 2d 228, 713 P.2d 1101 (1986). LikeMoore and
Franco, Zwicker involved a challenge to the constitutionality of breathalyzer tests under WASH. REv.
CODE § 46.20.308 (1983). Zwicker, 105 Wn. 2d at 232, 713 P.2d at 1103. Defendants argued that art. 1,
§ 9 barred the statutory authorization of the use against them at trial of their refusal to submit to the
Breathalyzer. Id. at 238, 713 P.2d at 1106-07 . While the court held that refusal evidence could not be
admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief on relevancy grounds, it rejected the self-incrimination
challenge. Id. at 238, 713 P.2d at 1106-07. Invoking Moore and Franco, the court noted that article I,
§ 9, like its federal counterpart, only protected the accused from being compelled to give a testimonial
communication. Id. at 242, 713 P.2d at 1108-09. Without reaching the issue of the nature of the
evidence, the court held that no compulsion was involved; therefore, no article 1, § 9 violation
occurred. Id. at 241-43, 713 P.2d at 1108-09.
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the Washington constitution intended to adopt a guarantee identical to that
embodied in the federal constitution. 311
Analysis of the language chosen for article 1, sections 7 and 9, in light of
the historical context in which the Declaration of Rights was drafted,
reveals that the framers were probably heavily influenced by Boyd v. United
States.312 Therefore, the textual differences between the state constitutional
provisions and their federal counterparts may be far more meaningful than
previously thought. 313 The textual differences between the state and federal
guarantees against self-incrimination are readily apparent. Article 1, sec-
tion 9 provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself. " 314 The fifth amendment, on the other hand,
provides that "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." 315 As in the case of article 1, section 7, the
framers of the Washington Declaration rejected use of the federal text for
article 1, section 9.316 Instead, they chose wording for each of the
constitutional provisions that, on its face, created a civil liberty protection
311. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d at 56, 483 P.2d at 633 (quoting from E. DuMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 77 (1957)). A century separated the drafting of the fifth amendment and
article 1, § 9. Justice Utter has observed that there were vast differences in the social, political and
historical environment in which the framers of the two documents worked. Utter, supra note 154, at
498. Based on these vast differences, Justice Utter concluded that it is highly unlikely that the framers
of the Washington Declaration had anything more in common with the federal framers than a common
language and a similar, although vague, democratic philosophy. Id. At most, the framers probably
sought to reflect the breadth of federal protections as they understood them at the time, rather than
intending that their document conform to future interpretations of the federal Constitution.
312. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 326-38 and accompanying text.
314. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (emphasis added).
315. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
316. The Committee on Preamble and Declaration of Rights adopted article 1, § 7, expressly
rejecting the fourth amendment text. 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 51,497. Unfortunately, available
historical sources provide little information as to what the framers intended by their choice of the
specific language in article 1, § 7. See generally id. See also State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 690, 674
P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983). However, contemporaneous accounts do describe article 1, § 7. 1, as having
made private affairs "sacred." 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 497 n.14. As to article 1, § 9,
Washington's first constitution, ratified by the people on November 4, 1878, in an unsuccessful bid for
statehood, contained language identical to the fifth amendment. WASHINGTON'S FIRST CONSTITUTION,
1878 AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, ARTICLE V, §8, at 67 (E. Meany & J. Condon ed. 1919).
However, the drafters of the 1889 constitution chose to depart from the earlier state constitution and
never considered the federal language as an option. 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 498. They also
deliberately rejected a proposal that would have limited the privilege to one prohibiting compelling
persons to "testify" against themselves. Id. Justice Rosellini interpreted the 1889 JOURNAL as demon-
strating that the framers specifically indicated that the word "testify" was inappropriate to express their
intended meaning. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d 51, 65,483 P.2d 630, 638 (1971) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (citing
1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 498). The drafters also rejected another proposed amendment, the text
of which went unreported. 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 498. Thus, the drafters settled on the "give
evidence" language in a measured and deliberate fashion.
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commensurate with parallel federal provisions as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States.317 The Moore court did not
realize that this purposeful departure from the federal text reflected the
influence of the trespassory theory of privacy rights and the convergence
theory of exclusion articulated in Boyd-three years before the drafting of
the state constitution. 318
The unique language chosen by the framers for article 1, section 7 created
a broad and inclusive privacy protection that directly reflects theBoydtheory
of privacy. The Boyd court erected an impenetrable barrier between an
individual's "privacies of life," as defined by a nineteenth century con-
ception of property rights, and unlawful governmental actions. 319 Under this
broad property-based privacy right, violations of the fourth amendment's
procedural protections contained in the warrant clause or violation of the
317. The term "evidence" embodies more than just testimonial or communicative evidence. Thus.
"give evidence" provides a broader privilege than the narrower "testify" terminology rejected by the
framers. Three members of the drafting committee were attorneys. 1889 JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 19,
469 (George Comegys), 475 (Francis Henry), 488 (C.H. Warner). The three attorney members would
have been familiar with the then prevailing legal meaning of the terms employed. At the time of the
drafting of article 1, § 9, evidence was defined in one well known treatise as "all means by which any
legal matter of fact is established or disproved." GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §1 (1842). A Harvard Law
Review article published in 1889 defined evidence as "any matter offact which is furnished to a legal
tribunal otherwise than by reasoning, as the basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of
fact." Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARv. L. REV. 142, 143 (1889) (emphasis
added). Professor Wigmore's evidentiary treatise concluded that many state constitutions in using the
"give evidence" language intended to mirror the federal guarantee. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, at
§ 2252. However, Wigmore did not publish his first edition until 1905. What the framers of the
Washington provision had in mind in choosing the "give evidence language" depended on the legal
meaning of those terms in 1889.
318. BoYd was a landmark case in its time because it was the first significant fourth and fifth
amendment case to reach the Supreme Court. Comment, Formalism, Legal Realism, attd Constitu-
tionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951-52
(1977). Fourth amendment cases were rare during the nineteenth century partly because Congress did
not grant the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear a criminal defendant's appeal until 1891 (26 Stat. ch.
517, §5 at 826). Id. at 952 n.42; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 376 n.51. The government
could not appeal criminal cases until 1907. Act of March 2, 1907 ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. See 2 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 332 n.2, 727 (1937); F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OFTHE SUPREME COURT 119-20 (1927); see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 15, at 376 n.51.
319. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The exclusionary rule developed in Boydand
later reasserted in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), was an automatic consequence of the
view that personal property was immune from seizure. White, supra note 72, at 1279. For a discussion
of property rights influences in Boyd, see Comment, supra note 318, at 945-60; Comment, Tle Life and
Times ofBoyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 184-90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Life and Times]. However, the property rights influence on the right to privacy did not mean
that only physical invasions of one's person and property were barred. Individuals were also protected
against governmental trespass into certain types of information as well. See infra note 320 and
accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of privacy rights in the nineteenth century, see
generally Comment, The Right To Privacy In Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1892
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Nineteenth Century].
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"unreasonable search and seizure" clause amounted to unlawful govern-
mental trespass against an individual's home and "privacies of life."
320
The framers of the state provision rejected the ambiguity of separate
warrant and unreasonable search clauses in favor of language that, on its
face, prohibits the government from trespassing against an individual's
home or privacy.321 The unique language chosen for article 1, section 7
seems to have come directly out of Boyd. Article 1, section 7 states that "no
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law."322 The Boyd Court relied on the English prece-
dent of Entick v. Carrington323 to recognize an indefeasible right of
320. Under the Boyd trespassory theory of exclusion the Court placed property subject to search in
two categories. First, stolen goods and contraband were considered as items that the government had a
greater right to possess than did the accused. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. As long as the procedural
safeguards contained in the warrant clause were honored, the government could search for these items
without trespassing. Id. at 623-25; Comment, supra note 318, at 960. On the other hand, personal
effects, such as books and papers, were items in which the government had no superior property right.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-28. The government was barred from searching for those, even if the search was
procedurally reasonable. Id. Any search for such items, even with a warrant, was a trespass. Comment,
Life and Times, supra note 319, at 186. Under the traditional view of Boyd, the federal Constitution
permitted the government to intrude into an individual's privacy only if the exercise of that power was
consistent with the rules of property law. Id. at 194. This property rights concept stems from Boyd's
reliance on a landmark English case, Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
Consequently, the Boyd Court designed the exclusionary rule to provide a meaningful remedy for the
"trespassory violation" against individual rights protective of a person's indvidual security and privacy.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
The breadth of the privacy protection afforded prior to 1889 has often been misunderstood. An article
published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193
(1890)) is often credited with originating the concept of an independently protectable right to privacy.
However, by 1889, American courts and legislatures had already recognized privacy as an independent
interest worthy of protection in a variety of contexts. See generally Comment, Nineteenth Century,
supra note 319, at 1893-94. The legal community in the nineteenth century took the proverb "a man's
home is his castle" very seriously, using the law of trespass and constitutional provisions regulating
searches and seizures (such as article 1, § 7) to safeguard the family home, and its domestic privacy,
against official and unofficial intrusions. Id. at 1895. When the framers drafted § 7, the boundaries of
this privacy right included any physical trespass against the person or into the sanctity of the home.
Moreover, the right to privacy in the nineteenth century also included protection from unwarranted
invasion for confidential communications, as well as personal information. Id. at 1899, 1904.
321. At the time of the drafting of the state constitution, unlawful searches and seizures were
considered aggravated trespasses. T. CooLEY, THE LAW OF TORTs 346 (2d ed. 1888). Trespass was
commonly defined as an unlawful interference with one's person, property or rights. BLACK'S LAW
DICTnONARY 1187 (1st ed. 1891). This seems interchangeable with the wording of art. 1, § 7, which
prohibits disturbing a person's private affairs and invasions of his home without "authority of law."
322. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
323. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765). In Entick, Lord Camden observed that:
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is
preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances. . . . Every invasion of private property,
be it ever so minute, is a trespass.. . . It is now incumbent upon the [government] to show the law
by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.
Id. at 1066, quoted in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627.
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personal security, personal liberty, and private property against "all [un-
lawful] invasions on the part of the government and its employe[e]s of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. ,,324
At the same time, the "give evidence" language in article 1, section 9
probably reflected the framers' intent to incorporate the Boyd con-
vergence theory. Like article 1, section 7, the text of the self-incrimina-
tion guarantee seems to have come directly from Boyd. In Boyd, Justice
Bradley carefully examined the fourth and fifth amendments and con-
cluded that searches and seizures conducted in violation of the fourth
amendment, were "almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment.'"325
Under the convergence theory adopted by the framers, article 1, section
9 mandates the exclusion of physical and real evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Al-
though the Washington court's most recent interpretation of the self-
324, Bovd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 633. Justice Bradley found the fourth and fifth amendments to be so interrelated as to
require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment guarantees. Id. When
Justice Bradley referred to the fifth amendment in the same passage, he switched from the give evidence
language to the more restrictive wording contained in the fifth amendment, "compelled to be a witness
against himself." Id. The Boyd Court's perception of the interrelation, orconvergence, of the fourth and
fifth amendement, gave birth to the Boyd exclusionary rule and arose out of a particular passage of
Entick:
[I]t is very certain that the law obligeth no [person] to accuse himself; because the necessary means
of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel
and unjust; and it would seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the very same principle.
Entick, 19 Howells State Trials at 1073-74, quoted in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629. The Boyd Court's
interpretation of this passage has been severely crticized. See, e.g., Comment, Search and Seizure in
the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 694-98 (1960)
(criticizing the fourth and fifth amendment interrelation theory and pointing out that Boyd misread
Entick). However, neither the correctness of Boyd's interpretation of Entick nor the validity of the
perceived interrelation between the constitutional guarantees has any relevance for determining what
the framers of article 1, § 7 intended. In 1889, Boyd and its interpretation of the fourth and fifth
amendments was the law in federal court and Boyd's effect on the framers of the state constitution is the
key point.
Boyd also seems to have influenced the wording chosen for article 1, § 32 which provides: "Funda-
mental Principles. A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual right and the perpetuity of free government." According to sources compiled at the time, the
framers based this provision on three sister state constitutions: (1) ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 20
(now contained in ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 23 (West 1971); (2) N.H. CoNsr. of 1792, § 38 (now contained
in N.H. CoNsT. Part I, art. 38 (West 1970); and (3) Wis. CoNsT. of 1848, art. I, § 22 (West 1957). 1889
JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 517 n.5 1. A comparative analysis reveals that all three cited state provisions
contain the reference to the importance of "frequent recurrence to fundamental principle." However,
none of the cited provisions contain Washington's "security of individual right" language. The concept
that fundamental principles must be referred to as essential to protect "the security of individual right"
seems to reflect Boyd's emphasis on the need to give full force and effect to constitutional rights
protective of "the security of the person and property." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
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incrimination clause 326 conflicts with the convergence theory, the modem
interpretation is incorrect for two reasons. First, under the Washington
court's current interpretation, the privilege against self-incrimination only
bars compelling the accused to make an incriminating testimonial com-
munication; the government does not violate the privilege when it compels
the accused to produce physical or real evidence.327 Given the history of the
ancient guarantee on which the fifth ' amendment is based and given the
federal text, this "testimonial" or "communicative" evidence limitation
may be persuasive in the federal context. 328 However, it is inapplicable to
the privilege contained in article 1, section 9.
The framers of article 1, section 9 implicitly chose not to employ the
narrow federal language and explicitly rejected a narrow "testimony"
based guarantee. 329 It seems likely that the framers intended to give effect
to the Boyd Court's explicit recognition that illegal searches in general, not
just those seeking private books and papers, compel an individual to give
evidence against himself.330 Moreover, from the time of Gibbons up until
the 1960's, the Washington court did not construe article 1, section 9 as
only applying to testimonial evidence.331
Second, the modem interpretation misses a central historical point by
requiring that the accused must be "compelled" to some action that
produces the evidence for the prosecution. 332 True, an illegal search does
326. State v. Franco, 96 Wn 2d. 816, 829, 639 P.2d, 1320, 1326-27 (1982). The modem
interpretation requires that defendants demonstrate that the government compelled them to produce the
evidence and that the evidence was testimonial or communicative in nature rather than real or physical.
Id. at 829, 639 P.2d at 1325-26. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
327. Id. at 827, 639 P.2d at 1326; see also State v. Zwicker, 105 Wn. 2d 228, 241-42, 713 P.2d
1101,1108-09(1986).
328. See E. DuMBAuLD, supra note 311, at 77 (privilege against self-incrimination developed in
early England out of "reaction against the ecclesiastical practice of inquisition").
329. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
330. Boyd, 116 U. S. at 633.
33 1. The Gibbons court attached absolutely no significance to the nature of the evidence seized.
See supra notes 72, 303 and accompanying text. In Moore, Justice Finley cited several cases to support
his claim to the contrary, that courts observed a distinction between physical and testimonial evidence.
State v. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d 51, 57,483 P.2d 630,634 (1971) (citing Mercer Island v. Walker, 76 Wn. 2d
607,458 P.2d 274 (1969)); State v. Duckett, 73 Wn. 2d 692,440 P.2d 485 (1968); State v. West, 70 Wn.
2d 751,424 P.2d 1014 (1967)). However, two of the cases cited by the majority opinion were based on
the modem federal interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination, not on prior Washington
case law. Walker, 76 Wn. 2d at 612-13, 458 P.2d at 277-78; West, 70 Wn. 2d at 752-53,424 P.2d at
1015. Moreover, according to the Walker court, West and Duckett reached only the more limited holding
that bodily exhibition tests, such as the observation of the person or his movements in a police lineup
where nothing has been taken from the accused, were not violative of the privilege. Walker, 76 Wn. 2d
at 613, 458 P.2d at 278; see also Moore, 79 Wn. 2d at 64, 66, 483 P.2d at 637-39 (Rosellini, J.,
dissenting).
332. See supra note 322-26 and accompanying text. Wigmore's treatise attacked Boyd forcefully
on the compulsion point, arguing that the crucial protective element of the self-incrimination privilege's
Washington Law Review
not compel the defendant to take any action; the entire evidentiary transac-
tion is government initiated and conducted. However, unlike modern courts
which focus on the specific act the government compelled the defendant to
undertake, 333 the Boyd and Gibbons courts based their convergence theo-
ries on the result of the search and concluded that the privilege against self-
incrimination barred turning the defendant into the unwilling conduit of
incriminating evidence. 334
One could argue that since the accused is also the unwilling source of
evidence obtained pursuant to a legal search and seizure, the reasoning
underlying the Boyd convergence theory is unsound. However, the con-
vergence theory reflected in article 1, section 9 is based upon the tres-
passory theory of privacy rights. 335 As a member of society, the accused
implicitly enters into, and is bound by, the social compact and thus can be
seen as impliedly consenting to invasions of his or her privacy that are
conducted with authority of law. 336 Consequently, since the accused im-
pliedly consents to the legal search, evidence is not seized against his or her
will. However, no consent is given, either expressed or implied, when the
government trespasses against an individual's privacy and seizes evidence
in violation of the constitution.
Although recent decisions by the Washington court may be inconsistent
with recognition of the article 1, section 9 exclusionary mandate, the
Washington court should reevaluate its position. 337 The court should note
protection was the requirement that no force be exerted against the accused to compel conduct or to
"extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2263.
333. Comment, supra note 318, at 946.
334. See supra notes 64, 300-07 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
336. According to John Locke and the social compact theory, individuals join together in society
mainly to insure the protection of their preexisting property rights. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 303-20 (P. Laslett ed. 1960). Under Locke's view of natural law, the concept of protected
property included a body of innate, indefeasible, individual rights. G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THEORY 529 (3d ed. 1965). Justice Bradley, who authored Boyd, was one of the leading advocates of
natural law on the Court in the late nineteenth century. Comment, supra note 318, at 952 n.43. The Boyd
Court explicitly recognized that "the great end for which men entered into society was to secure their
property." 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P.
1765)). See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text. In exchange for the protection of such rights,
which extended beyond the mere title to goods and land, Comment, supra note 318, at 950, individuals
implicitly agree to abide by the rules of society such as allowing the government to "disturb" their
"private affairs" so long as it is done under "authority of law." The Washington legislature employed
this implied consent concept in enacting WASH. REV. CODE §46.20.308 (1970), the mandatory
breathalyzer test requirement challenged in both State v. Moore, 79 Wn. 2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 (1971) and
State v. Franco, 96 Wn. 2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982). See supra note 310.
337. By adopting the federal approach to the self-incrimination guarantee in Moore, 79 Wn. 2d at
57, 483 P.2d at 634, and declaring it stare decisis on the issue in Franco, 96 Wn. 2d at 829, 639 P.2d at
1327, the court failed to effectuate the framers intent and in effect eroded the protection provided by
article 1, § 9. See supra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
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that the framers, influenced by Boyd, intended article 1, section 7 as a
prohibition against any trespass against an individual's natural and invio-
late property-based privacy rights.338 Furthermore, article 1, section 9
reflects the Boyd convergence theory, requiring the exclusion of all evi-
dence obtained by such a trespass because, by violating the social compact,
the government compels the defendant to involuntarily supply incriminat-
ing evidence. 339
C. Article 1, Section 3: The Due Process Exclusionary Right
The Washington Supreme Court has never viewed exclusion as specifi-
cally mandated by article 1, section 7340 and it has recently refused to
overrule State v. Moore concerning the scope of the article 1, section 9 self-
incrimination guarantee. 341 However, the due process guarantee embodied
in article 1, section 3 of the Washington constitution may be the underly-
ing, albeit unarticulated, source of the Washington exclusionary rule.
342
Two basic themes underlie the Washington Supreme Court's exclusion-
ary rule jurisprudence: (1) a concern with the defendant's constitutionally
protected privacy rights;343 and (2) the principle that since article 1, section
7 compels a remedy, to deny the remedy is tantamount to denying the right
itself.344 This concern with vindicating and protecting the rights of the
individual immediately jeopardized by the process lies at the heart of the
article 1, section 3 due process right. 345
Since the due process guarantee has no specific substantive require-
ments, the framers gave the Washington Supreme Court the responsibility
to breathe life into the due process clause.346 In its attempts to define the
general term "due process of law," the Washington court has often ob-
served that creating a precise formulation is impossible. 347 However, from
its earliest attempts at construing article 1, section 3, the court has viewed
due process as placing the liberty of every citizen under the protection of
338. See supra notes 316-36 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
341. State v. Franco, 96 Wn. 2d 816, 829, 639 P.2d 1320, 1327 (1982).
342. "No Person shall be deprived of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law." WASH.
CONsT. art. 1, § 3.
343. See supra notes 218-56 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 100, 221 and accompanying text.
345. Linde, supra note 295, at 242.
346. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341U.S. 123,162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
347. See, e.g., Olympic Forest Products v. Chaussee Corp., 82Wn. 2d418, 422,511 P.2d 1002,
1005 (1973); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 116-17, 110 P. 1020, 1023 (1910).
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the general laws and rules of society-the "law of the land. ", 348 While the
requirements of the procedural aspect of due process change over time as
society alters its concept of fairness between the individual and the govern-
ment, 349 the due process guarantee also makes certain rights inviolate. 350
Article 1, section 3 does not, of itself, provide an undifferentiated due
process exclusionary right to every defendant.35' However, when viewed in
tandem with the right granted by article 1, section 7, there can be no such
thing as due process of law when the government deprives an individual of
life or liberty on a criminal charge by introducing evidence seized in
violation of that individual's constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
For example, the Washington Supreme Court has held that due process by
itself does not require a trial by jury, but since a jury trial is guaranteed in
the state constitution, due process requires that the government view the
348. Strasburg, 60 Wash. at 117-18, 110 P. at 1027; see also id. at 128-29, 110 P. at 1026-27
(Rudkin, C. J., concurring).
349. See Finley, supra note 16, at 384-88. Justice Finley saw due process interpretations as
products of judges' attempts to balance competing responsibilities in an effort to seek an accommoda-
tion between individual and societal rights. Id. at 388. However, Justice Frankfurter warned that courts
must interpret due process in a manner "detached from passing and partisan influences." Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 163. Due process represents fairness between the individual and
government as developed by history and prior case law. Id. The history of the state exclusionary rule and
prior case law have, in and of themselves, established the exclusionary rule as a due process right of the
defendant. See supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text. Moreover, while balancing may be
appropriate for procedural due process unconnected to a right expressly guaranteed by the state
constitution, article I, § 22 of the Washington Declaration of Rights makes the protection in article 1,
§ 7 mandatory. Consequently, the privacy guarantee contained in article I, § 7 should not be suscepti-
ble to value judgments and interest balancing. See supra notes 247-56, infra notes 352-59 and
accompanying text. But see Wingo, Rewriting Mapp & Miranda: A Preference for Due Process, 31
KAN. L. REV. 219,234 (1983) (arguing that since due process is based on fairness, a due process-based
exclusionary rule need only be applied after weighing governmental interests against interests of the
defendant).
350. See, e.g., Olympic Forest Products v. Chaussee, 82 Wn. 2d 418,422-23, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005
(1973) (right to a hearing is an inviolate due process guarantee).
351. This Comment suggests that exclusion is a due process right under the Washington constitu-
tion only when the defendant's personal right to privacy has been violated. A standing requirement is
necessary because the due process exclusionary right derives from defendants' right to have the
government-as-prosecutor respect their personal constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy. Some
observers disagree with a due process standing requirement, viewing the due process clause as the last
fundamental protection protecting the individual from illegal government conduct. See, e.g., Com-
ment, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule: A Fifth Amendment Approach to the Regulation of
Intentional Government Misconduct, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 277, 297 (1983). Under this view, a standing
requirement is inappropriate because the due process exclusionary rule requires the court to focus on the
conduct and nature of the illegal governmental activity. Id. Others contend that the fourth amendment is
personal not only in its guarantee of personal physical privacy but also in that it guarantees each
individual a personal right "to insist that the state utilize only lawful means of proceeding against him.'-
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,206 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Although Justice Fortas referred to the fourth amendment, his argument applies to the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as well.
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right to ajury trial as inviolate.352 If the court is to meet its responsibility of
ensuring that the Declaration of Rights "protect[s] and maintain[s] individ-
ual rights," 353 and of ensuring that each provision in the declaration is
"mandatory," then it must require the state to obey the constitution in
enforcing the law354 and abide by constitutional privacy protections when it
seeks to prosecute a citizen.355
In terms of due process, exclusion is neither solely a product of the right
to privacy nor is it a part of the defendant's right to a fair trial. 356 Rather, it is
a due process right to a fair prosecution: a guarantee that the state, in all its
parts, will protect and preserve the defendant's article 1, section 7 rights.357
Consequently, one aspect of this due process exclusionary right flows from
the court's obligation to exercise its power ofjudicial review to maintain the
defendant's constitutional rights.358 Exclusion can be seen as nullifying the
executive's unconstitutional actions in order to maintain the inviolate
nature of the defendant's article 1, section 7 rights. A court's failure to
exclude violates the defendant's right to a fair prosecution by denying the
defendant's due process right to judicial review of government actions and
nullification of unconstitutional governmental conduct. 359
Excluding evidence as an element of due process is not a novel approach.
Due process has long been invoked to exclude coerced confessions. 360
352. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 116-17, 110 P. 1020, 1023 (1910).
353. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
354. White, supra note 72, at 1280.
355. Id.
356. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 683 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued
that exclusion is only an incidental means used by the court to penalize past official conduct and deter it
in the future, rather than a means to reach the correct resolution of the controversies before it. Id. at 680,
683. Justice Harlan recognized only two kinds of rights-the right to a fair trial and the right to privacy.
However, a third right exists: the due process right to a fair prosecution, including judicial review by an
appellate court. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 314-16. Seesupra notes 247-56 and accompanying
text.
357. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 370-71.
358. City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn. 2d 788, 803-05, 199 P.2d 95, 103 (1948) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting) (the only satisfaction a court can derive from maintaining the constitutional rights of a guilty
defendant arises from the knowledge that the obligation of the judicial oath requires it).
359. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 314-16.
360. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (first fourteenth amendment due process
confession case). Originally, these confession cases involved the violent extraction of a confession.
Consequently, the underlying rationale for exclusion was the untrustworthiness of the confession. Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 554 (5th ed. 1980). As long as courts
grounded the exclusion of coerced confessions on the "trustworthiness or "reliability" rationale, no
analogy could be drawn to the exclusion of illegally seized evidence; the unlawful nature of the search
had no effect on the reliability or probativeness of the evidence. However, the Supreme Court held
coerced confessions as violations of due process even when independent evidence provided corrobora-
tion. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (due process clause bars police procedure which
violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime; due process clause assures that
527
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After deciding in Wolf v. Colorado361 that exclusion need not be incorpo-
rated through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, 362 the Su-
preme Court began developing a due process exclusionary right for the
most egregious violations. 363 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio,364 the Court over-
ruled Wolf and held that exclusion was an essential part of both the fourth
and the fourteenth amendments. 365 Since the Burger Court continues to
require state courts to apply the federal exclusionary rule in state prosecu-
tions, the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence must be a require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 366 Although the
appropriate procedure be followed before liberty is curtailed or life taken); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (the due process clause mandates the suppression of coerced confessions "even
though statements contained in them may be independently established as true"). The voluntariness
standard has continued to evolve as the Supreme Court has made it clear that probable truth or falsity of
the confession is not the issue, but rather "whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officers
was such as to overbear [the] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined."
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,544 (1961). Washington courts have applied theRogers standard to
assess the voluntariness of a confession. See, e.g., State v. Braun, 82 Wn. 2d 157, 162, 509 P.2d 742,
745 (1973).
In his Mapp dissent, Justice Harlan attempted to distinguish the use of the due process clause to
exclude involuntary but truthful confessions from illegally seized evidence probative of the defendant's
guilt. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 684-85 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). According to Harlan, the
former is not concerned with an appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct, rather it is concerned
with fairness and is a procedural right, the violation of which occurs at the time the improperly obtained
statement is admitted at trial. Without this right, all the careful safeguards erected around giving
testimony would become empty promises. Id. On the other hand, according to Justice Harlan, the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has as its true basis "the disciplining of the police." Id. For
Justice Harlan the trial became unfair ifa coerced confession was introduced, but he saw nothing unfair
about the state allowing the trier of fact to consider other relevant evidence regardless of how it was
obtained. Id. at 683. Apparently, while Justice Harlan disapproved of the fifth amendment being an
empty formality, id., he did not have a similar concern for the fourth amendment.
361. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
362. Id. at 27-28. See Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility ofEvidence, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1304, 1305 (1951).
363. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). The Court barred the use of trustworthy
evidence because the use of a stomach pump to extract the evidence, as well as other unlawful police
conduct, amounted to "methods that offend the Due Process Clause." Id. at 174. Rochin was grounded
in the judicial integrity rationale, rather than the deterrence rationale that underlies the Burger Court's
remedy or the "vindication of the defendant's rights" rationale underlying the Washington remedy. See
Wingo, supra note 349, at 239. Due process was not violated, however, when the police repeatedly
entered into a defendant's home to install a secret microphone, which remained hidden and monitored
for over a month. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1954). For a discussion of exclusion and
due process in the 1950's, see Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig, Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1080-90 (1959); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 614-15.
364. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
365. Id. at 657.
366. Specific guarantees contained in the federal Bill of Rights apply against the states only if the
guarantee is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See supra notes 82, 139
and accompanying text. The Mapp Court overruled Wolf on the basis of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, not the Court's use of its supervisory power. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see Kamisar, supra note 10, at 626-627. However, the Burger Court predicates its selective
application approach to exclusion on its conclusion that the rule is a judicially created remedy, rather
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language of article 1, section 3 and the federal due process clause is
virtually identical, the Washington Supreme Court has never viewed fed-
eral interpretations of due process as controlling the substantive require-
ments of the state guarantee. 367 Consequently, even if one argues that the
selectively applied exclusionary rule satisfies the fourteenth amendment's
flexible due process requirement, the state due process clause can require a
stricter, automatically-applied exclusionary remedy consistent with state
jurisprudence. 368
than a constitutional right. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. This shift from the federal
rule's original conception as a constitutional right presents difficulties for the "due process" premises
of the federal rule. State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802, 807. The Oregon Supreme Court
observed that "[i]t is not easy to explain how 'due process' of the defendant actually on trial, the
necessary premise for applying the federal rule to state trials under the fourteenth amendment, depends
on the Supreme Court's estimate of its effectiveness in one or another context affecting future police
behavior." Davis, 666 P.2d at 807 n.9. Moreover, during the 1983 term the Supreme Court stated that
"there comes a point at which courts. . . cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches." INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3490 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does not operate in civil
deportation hearings; quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976)). Lopez-Mendoza
suggests that the federal exclusionary rule is now to be considered an exercise of the Court's supervisory
power. Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 74, at 130. Moreover, by basing its exclusionary remedy on
the deterrence rationale, the Burger Court implies that exclusion derives from the Court's supervisory
power rather than any constitutional connection. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16, at 367.
If the federal rule is, in fact, based on the Court's supervisory power, then as a matter of federalism,
the Washington Supreme Court should ask where the United States Supreme Court derives its authority
to impose the rule on the states. The Supreme Court's supervisory power does not bind state courts.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting); State v. Winters, 39 Wn. 2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951)
(arguing that if federal rule springs from supervisory power, Supreme Court has no authority to impose
it on states). However, one commentator has suggested that the modern federal exclusionary rule
exemplifies the Supreme Court's inherent power to develop and impose on the states rules of "constitu-
tional common law." Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foward: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-6, 22-23. For a discussion of this issue, see Ball, supra note 17, at 650;
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 17 (criticizing Professor Monaghan's constitutional common law
argument as just another name for the supervisory power and proposing the judicial review theory of
exclusion); Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 74, at 130 (1984); Wingo, supra note 349, at 234
(federal exclusionary rule no longer constitutionally based; since Supreme Court has no supervisory
power over states, the Court should either abandon the rule or construct its own constitutional
foundation).
367. See, e.g., Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101,258 P. 1039 (1927). In construing article 1, § 3,
the Washington Supreme Court's decision whether to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead is
based on the persuasiveness of the federal Court's reasoning, not on the basis of the Court's au-
thoritativeness. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn. 2d 631, 639, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1984) (using
independent grounds and broader protection analysis, court held that portions of capital punishment
statute (WAsH. REV. COD § 10.95. 100), while not violative of fourteenth amendment, did violate article
1, § 3). But see State v. Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 606-09, 686 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (1984) (Durham,
C.J., dissenting) (as court of appeals judge, Justice Durham argued that interpretations of article 1, § 3
should not be inconsistent with Supreme Court interpretations of the fourteenth amendment unless an
historic basis exists for doing so).
368. Some argue that the due process requirements under the fourteenth amendment are more
flexible than requirements under the fifth amendment's due process clause. See generally Hill, The Bill
ofRights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 181, 187-92 (1969); Geller, supra note 11, at
529
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Viewing Washington's independent exclusionary rule as a due process
exclusionary right provides meaning to the Buckley principle. 369 By their
very nature, due process violations result in both error and harm, condi-
tions that a court seeks to remedy by invoking the exclusionary rule.370
Washington courts have long adhered to the principle that when article, 1
section 7 rights are violated, by necessity the exclusionary remedy must
attach. 371 The most natural remedy is to undo the harm. 372 By excluding
evidence to prevent the state from profiting from its violation of the
defendant's rights, a court undoes the harm to the defendant by, in effect,
restoring the parties to the status quo ante, as if the state's officers had
stayed within the limits of their authority.373 Clearly it is beneath the dignity
of a government said to be of laws, not of people, for a defendant to be
convicted upon evidence obtained in violation of the "law of the land. " 374
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1985 term the Washington Supreme Court will decide
whether to alter the automatic nature of Washington's independent exclu-
sionary rule to conform to its federal counterpart. The court should refuse
to do so because of the rule's inextricable connection to three state constitu-
tional provisions. First, the framers of article 1, sections 7 and 9 intended to
reflect the federal interpretation of search and seizure and the privilege
642 n. 101. Under this view the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does not require the same
exclusionary rule as the fourth amendment. Id. Thus, the fourteenth amendment would not require
suppression unless a police officer intentionally violated a person's fourth amendment rights. Id.
369. The Buckley principle addresses the responsibilility of the state, not just the prosecutorial arm
of the state. State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 88-89, 258 P. 1030, 1031 (1927). But see State v. Cyr, 40
Wn. 2d 840, 842,246 P.2d 480,483 (1952) (substituting "prosecutorial authority" for "state" in citing
the Buckley principle). Given that the Buckley court identified exclusion as necessary to preserve the
dignity of the state as a whole, it would be inconsistent for a court to find that the state had obtained
evidence in violation of the defendant's rights, and yet to find that it is consistent with due process of law
for the state to profit from its violation by convicting the defendant on the basis of the illegally seized
evidence. Geller, supra note 11, at 641 (quoting from A.C.L.U. Brief Amici Curiae for respondent at 6,
California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972)).
370. White, supra note 72, at 1280 ("the major thrust of the 'due process of law' standard. . . is
more obviously concerned with remedy and procedure...").
371. See supra notes 100, 218-233 and accompanying text.
372. White, supra note 72, at 1278 n.21.
373. State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227,666 P.2d 802,806-07 (1983); White, supra note 72, at 1278 n.21.
See supra notes 220-23, 297 and accompanying text.
374. Recognition of a due process exclusionary right will not come easy for the present court.
Instinctively, reluctance develops at the realization that by insuring that an individual may not be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law, a court may be preventing the justice of the law from
reaching the guilty. However, the judicial oath requires Washington courts to maintain the constitu-
tional rights of defendants, regardless of the appearance of guilt. City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn. 2d
788, 804, 199 P.2d 95, 103 (1948) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
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against self-incrimination as embodied in the United States Supreme
Court's landmark decision of 1889, Boyd v. United States. Under that
interpretation, the language of article 1, section 9 requires the exclusion of
all evidence seized in violation of the defendant's privacy without authority
of law. Second, the accused has a due process exclusionary right under
article 1, section 3, which requires the state to adhere to the law of the land
at each stage of the prosecutorial process. Any refusal by a court to review
and nullify the government's unconstitutional conduct by suppressing
evidence acquired in violation of article 1, section 7 denies the accused's
due process exclusionary right.
Finally, article 1, section 7 compels the exclusionary rule as the remedy
most capable of protecting and giving full force and effect to the defend-
ant's constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy. From the very inception
of the article 1, section 7 exclusionary rule, the Washington Supreme Court
viewed the rule as a method of protecting and giving full force and effect to
the defendant's right to privacy. Over the past sixty-four years the court
steadfastly adhered to its unitary approach, taking seriously the state
exclusionary rule's underlying principle: whenever a violation of the
defendant's article 1, section 7 rights occurred, by necessity, the state
exclusionary remedy followed. This independent state jurisprudence
stands as an obstacle to any attempt by the court to jettison or curtail
Washington's exclusionary rule.
Washington Supreme Court justices have an obligation to effect the
purposes of the framers of article 1, sections 7 and 9, especially when the
framers deliberately chose language that differed from counterpart federal
provisions. To effectuate those purposes, the court must look to the intent
of Washington's founding fathers, rather than the intent of the framers of the
federal Constitution. The court may decide to abandon Washington's
independent approach to the exclusionary rule. Such a decision, at a
minimum, ought to be made knowingly and openly, with a full articulation
of the court's reasons for disregarding the framers' intention to adopt the
Boyd view of search and seizure and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Moreover, compelling reasons must exist for disregarding stare de-
cisis and repudiating the rich history of thoughtful independent state
exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
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